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POLITICAL THEORY TODAY*

JUSTIFIED or not, it is certainly a current view that there have recently been no significant contributions to political theory either in England or in America. Thus, Noel Annan: "What has characterised Western political thought since 1945? The almost total collapse of political philosophy—in the sense that Mill or Green or Marx wrote it."[1] Or, in a review of Hans J. Morgenthau's *Dilemmas of Politics:* "He insists that the empirical study of politics requires a philosophic framework, and that generally it doesn't exist. Admittedly theory holds its place in the curriculum, but it is historical and traditional with little meaning for our time."[2] The political theory here referred to is, of course, what used to be understood by that term. That is something which is morally and philosophically oriented and useful for guiding social action. It is something concerned with values, that leads to beliefs, that seeks a rational and empirical structure from which to recommend.

It is not that new and negative kind of political theory which takes the form of arguing that nothing can usefully be said about values, for they are just what is accepted in the society in which we live; that nothing can be prescribed or recommended, save acquiescence. Yet this rejection of rationalism—for that is surely what it is—by this kind of political theory is both symptom and cause of an attitude spreading beyond it. Instances are all around us today. Thus Mr. Justice Devlin lately asserted, in his Maccabaean lecture, that society should not be expected to give its reasons for condemning some prac-

* This article is a revised version of an address given at Columbia University in October 1959 at the invitation of the Faculty of Philosophy. At the time the address was delivered, the author was Visiting Professor of Government in Columbia University.

[1] *The Listener,* February 19, 1959, p. 323.

[2] By M. R. Merrill, in *Western Political Quarterly,* vol. XII, No. 2, p. 617.

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tice which it dislikes. It is enough that the practice is regarded as intolerable. And the Lord Chief Justice of England has recently advised British magistrates that they should have regard only to their own personal views when determining their sentences, and should disregard anything else, including the reversal of their actions by higher courts. By implication the burning of witches, racial discrimination, and the Lord Chief Justice's own wish to reimpose judicial birching could be justified by the mere emotional preference of any society for that course. That is so even though perhaps some, basically holding this opinion, would more guardedly add that the society must have it somewhere in its tradition to act in this way. For this ethical relativism is logically of a piece with that negative kind of political theory which tells us that there are no truths or principles suitable for orientation, susceptible of rational demonstration, that all we can do is to look to custom. It leads us to the conclusion that we are, whether as individuals or as societies, upon an uncharted sea, drifting rudderless and undirected, whither we know not, at the mercy of winds and currents which we cannot control even if—and here too there is doubt—we can comprehend them. Such political theory seems, we may think, like Burke without the belief in providence, Hegel without the dialectic, or to be a historicism which finds in history evidence neither of freedom of choice nor of predetermined pattern.

For this negative kind of political theory we do not lack. It is negative in the sense that it cannot prescribe or recommend upon any rational grounds. It cannot establish criteria for testing political institutions or behavior in terms of the ends they serve or the purposes to which they are directed. Indeed, it makes its central theme the denial of the existence of any rational criteria. But since political studies are unavoidably concerned with societies which because they live must act, any such denial of criteria must itself be a prescription—of acceptance, of acquiescence. It is a direction not to direct. It is the act of deciding not to act. In the long run or the short, its consequence must be to persuade the student of political theory not to study political theory. Or at least its effect must be to claim that only that kind of political theory is a profitable exercise which shows up another political theory as having been an unprofitable exercise.

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It would hardly be surprising—such an attitude to political theory being prevalent as I think it is—if political theory itself were to languish and become unfashionable. Whether or not there are deep social causes behind this dearth of political theory in the past more positive, creative and directional understanding of the term, such as a post-war impatience with beliefs and a desire to get on with prosperity, there can be no doubt that it exists. But we must not forget that this negative kind of political theory is political theory also. It is certainly more prevalent than it is articulated; perhaps because there is a more severe limit set to writing books about what political theory is not than about what it is. We do seem, however, to be moving to a position in the subject rather like that reached by abstract art, where a prize was recently given for a black and completely unadorned canvas as the best work of the year.

II

If, then, we understand the dearth of political theory in some such manner as this, to what is it due? There are, I suggest, several contributing causes.

The first is the very success of political science itself. By this I mean for the moment, although I would not confine political science to this, the formidable growth in the volume of behavioral studies and the improvement in the techniques they employ. Many, if not all, of these shed useful light upon the working of institutions or the operation of forces, sometimes too upon attitudes, ideas and policies. Even if they often confirm what we already knew, they serve to verify, to render more exact, occasionally to moderate and to induce a healthy caution into the processes of generalization. They depict regularities and, within narrower limits than is always realized, they may serve as bases for prediction. Akin to them is the growth of what has come to be called political sociology, though I am not sure that this differs in any essential way from what has always belonged to the descriptive side of politics. The significant point about this sociological approach is its impatience with the dichotomy between man-the-individual and the state, its particular application of the pluralist theory by way of the study of group-organizations and social institutions which, without necessarily altering legal systems or political structure, yet influence the way

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they work and materially affect the place of the citizen in the state, that more narrowly political relationship in which each has impact on the other.

Now the characteristic of these developments is the emphasis they lay on one part of the field of political studies, the purely descriptive. This part is, of course, a fundamental part, but it is only a part. Such, however, has been the fascination of, and the facility provided for, this kind of study that it has led to several consequences relevant to what we are considering here. First, it has deflected thought and research in this direction where neat and tidy results could be achieved, easy to assess as contributions to knowledge and raising no tiresome controversial issues or possible allegations of political bias; and so it has to some extent discouraged adventure into the more speculative and risky areas where political thought touches upon morals, philosophy, ethics, psychology, aesthetics, jurisprudence. Secondly, it has produced so much that this has had something of a snowball effect. The very volume of material has made it an increasingly time- and energy-absorbing process for the student of politics merely to keep abreast of the work done, let alone to pursue the new lanes and byways opened up. Thirdly, the myth of a "value-free" political science has been given a greater credibility. It has been insufficiently understood how far description in this field is dependent for significance upon analysis and explanation into which values enter.

Here is the root of the deflection from political theory to political science. It lies in the misguided attempt to assimilate political studies to the natural sciences. If it dates from Hobbes and Newton, it has been clearly accelerated in the century since Darwin's *Origin of Species,* and seems to have been brought to its climax by additional developments of more recent times through a process of delayed and cumulative action. Just because we see so clearly the inadequacies of the theories of "necessary" or predetermined political evolution propounded by men like Herbert Spencer and Karl Marx we underestimate the influence upon the climate of present-day opinion of the idea, belief, or attitude they shared. If we live in a historically determined world, what is more natural than for the political theorist concerned with directing the course of social change to abdicate in favor of the political scientist who merely describes it? If politics is scientific like meteorology, it is logical to expect

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it to describe or predict, but not to prescribe. We do not control the weather; nor should we expect to control the movements of political society. We accept them even though we make it a part of our curriculum to study them.

Behind this there may also lurk a less respectable reason. That is what might be called the politics of political studies—or the advantage of research and of writing which does not raise controversial issues. In the past it has sometimes been safer for the academic worker to stick to description and pseudo science because this is favored by authority, and avoids the risk of clashing with "Foundations". "It seems probable that the activities of social scientists are increasingly being restricted by the power holders as the implications of social science become more apparent to the power holders and as social scientists become more dependent on funds for research."[3] Certainly no academic discipline can hope, or justifiably claim, to play its proper part in society if it betrays the commitment to truth in order to gain material advantage. This is what the remark of Hans J. Morgenthau quoted below[4] hints it is doing.

Yet there is certainly discernible an impatience with this "hyper-factualism" as well as with the view of politics as no more than an account of the operation of "necessary" laws of evolution. As John D. Millett wrote recently, "our fraternity of scholars generally repudiates the 'gloomy conclusion' that impersonal, nonrational forces 'beyond the control of men' govern social conduct. Instead, many insist that their purpose is to promote the goal of intelligent social action."[5] We might say, perhaps, that there was a renewed tendency to take heed of the words of Hobbes that "science is the knowledge of consequences, and dependence of one fact upon another: by which out of what we can presently do, we know how to do something else when we will, or the like, another time."[6] For those words suggest the cause and justification of political studies, the need to know how to act. Millett, indeed, puts forward "the proposi-

[3] Arnold M. Rose, "Sociology and the Study of Values", *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. III, No. 1, p. 17.

[4] See p. 12.

[5] "Testament of Politics: An Exhortation to Political Scientists", POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, vol. 71, No. 4, December 1956, p. 525.

[6] *Leviathan*, I, v.

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tion that from accumulated political thought and observation, political scientists have actually developed certain fundamental conceptions of government which stand above the stress and strain of current partisan strife. It is high time to make these conceptions articulate, to develop them in their full majesty, and to evaluate them by the test of experience."[7] However that may be, "there is no progress for political scientists", he remarks, "in the sterility of an esoteric semantics."[8]

III

A second reason, I would suggest, for the tendency to evade the responsibility for constructive political theory lies in what has been happening to philosophy. This is not so much the preoccupation with linguistic analysis. No one should quarrel with the clarification of words and concepts resulting from this, or with the greater caution in their employment which it encourages. In both respects its contribution is invaluable. It ought to lead, and there are signs that it is leading, to a more exact treatment of political theory and a more rigorous method.

But the so-called revolution in philosophy has of course gone much further than this. By concentrating on the imperfections of language, it has seemed to throw doubt on the very possibility of meaningful statement. (Did not Wittgenstein arrive at this result?) Under its impact principles used by political theorists appear—because they are tainted with the naturalistic fallacy—to be useless as guides. Concepts become tautologies. Generalizations are seen as so vague that anything can be read into them—or nothing. In fact much, if not all, of the work of political theorists from Plato to G. E. Moore is considered meaningless. Small wonder, then, if there is little encouragement to enter upon so discredited an activity.

Philosophy itself has so narrowed its field that it no longer claims to have anything to say of practical significance. If it analyzes the logic of thought, nothing is to result that can be expected to be helpful in the business of living. We cannot be helped by philosophy, or by a philosophically oriented political theory, for instance, to condemn (or approve) the torture of prisoners in a concentration camp. To do so is merely to give

[7] Millett, *loc. cit.*, p. 525.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 538.

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vent to a personal preference—or prejudice, as the late T. D. Weldon put it. Small wonder again, then, if entering upon the adventure of political theorizing is discouraged, for this is precisely the kind of question upon which it is expected to offer guidance.

An example of what I mean is a recent article on "The 'Consent' of the Governed"[9] in which the author starts out with the declared intention of showing that the notion of consent is a fiction. But then this notion of consent has been used, and I would say fruitfully used in political theory, despite the treatment given to it by Hume, for about three centuries; and that being so one must be permitted to doubt whether it can really be no more than purely fictitious. Now this article is interesting in several ways connected with my present argument. This is so first because by denying all meaning to the term—for to call it a fiction is surely to do this—it exemplifies the current philosophic influence in the direction of analyzing all significance out of a concept, thus discrediting it as a useful one and tending in effect to prohibit its employment. But, secondly, it is interesting for the reason that it adds to the treatment of the concept by such other writers as Lindsay, Lipson, MacIver, an analysis that serves the purpose of further clarification, in itself a valuable contribution. Thirdly, it leads to the conclusion that the term does in fact correspond to an important reality. Thus this article is not a pure illustration of the negative tendency to which I refer, nor of the sheer defeatism to which it leads; perhaps on the contrary it may indicate that we are already in a stage of transition away from this, and certainly other evidence could be brought to support such a view. Yet we cannot have it both ways: a notion cannot be a fiction and at the same time describe reality. We are not entitled to claim that a term is bereft of all meaning and usefulness, and then discover that it enshrines an important element of truth. What we are to do, however, is in a case like this to reinterpret such true concepts, rendering them more fertile and creative, more forward-looking and useful for our guidance. We have to undertake the business of reinterpretation in the light both of the different demands which changed conditions produce, and of the new body of knowledge as well as the developments of technique at our disposal for meeting them.

[9] C. W. Cassinelli, in *The Western Political Quarterly*, June 1959.

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What I say here about the notion "consent of the governed" I have argued elsewhere ought to be said of other concepts and terms which have played a leading part in political theory—such as happiness, self-realization, freedom, education, property, the good life, and the nature of political obligation. They are, as it were, elements in the grammar of politics calling for new interpretation or changing emphasis, and for fresh analysis, in the light of varying social experience and knowledge. I cannot help thinking that it should be part of the business of philosophy to help in this adventure.

IV

There is, however, another reason for the eclipse of political theory. This lies, paradoxically enough, in what really amounts to the greater need for it. If we consider what is the character of the dominant political philosophy of modern times in the Western world we must say, I think, that it is utilitarian and social-democratic. Yet at the very moment that it has come to fruition, as it were, in the welfare state and the affluent society it has had most doubt thrown upon some of its foundations. Now, doubt about the validity of a particular manifestation of political philosophy ought not to reflect upon the thing itself, but rather to bring about a rethinking. Yet it does seem as though the former consequence had followed. Can it be that the very universality of acceptance of the tenets of faith of one approach to social problems has rendered us no longer capable of reëxamining them, for to defend what is taken for granted is to labor the obvious, and to suggest that reinterpretations are called for by a fuller experience is to fly in the face of cherished assumptions? Can it be that the success of one political theory has led to so complete an annihilation of alternatives that when deficiencies were revealed in it they could not seek their natural remedy?

Acceptance, of course, has been tacit rather than explicit. We may not all say in so many words that we believe in equalizing the opportunities to happiness, in aiming at the greatest happiness of the greatest number, or in identifying happiness for the individual with the greatest possible continuous flow of goods and services, and for society with a maximum gross per capita productivity. Yet these are surely the criteria invariably em-

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ployed; and the fact that we do not specify them, but take them for granted, only means that they are so much a part of an accepted body of doctrine that they are not thought of as needing exposition or defense.

Political parties do not differ in their willingness to accept these criteria. Or at least none openly challenges them. They disagree of course in matters of method, emphasis or interpretation, and especially on the principle of equality, where their behavior when in power sometimes clearly belies the principle. But even here they will not be found nowadays attacking the theory, still less denying the objective to which its general acceptance requires them to pay lip service; they will take refuge in arguments about speed, cost, practicality. The ideal condition to which they look forward is really that of "the acquisitive society" which Tawney analyzed in the early 'twenties.

While this is true of parties of the Right, it seems to be in large measure true of parties of the Left also. For these have tended increasingly to regard the equalizing of wealth not only as an end in itself but as the exclusive end. What precise combination they have adopted of socializing it, of taxing the rich, of raising wages, of providing free services, of ending poverty and insecurity does not matter. Whatever pattern their program of social justice or their new deal has taken, it has been concerned with utility and not with use.[10]

But the evils of an acquisitive society are not rendered less evil by being universalized, nor wrong scales of value less wrong by giving everyone the chance to adopt them. The remarkable

[10] Since writing this I have come upon some remarks of the economist Alan Day which are highly illuminating, as well, I think, as confirmatory. He writes in *The Observer* of November 15, 1959: "It is absurd that in one of the richest countries in the world, where real income is rising progressively . . . there is a sense of poverty. . . . Much more important than the problems of the technical means of running the economic system . . . is the problem of how we shall use our rising incomes. It is much less important to argue whether we should double our standard of living in 20 years or in 35, than to consider the implications of a steadily rising standard of living. . . . How are we going to plan for this . . . without ruining the country for everyone by imposing an amorphously squalid subtopia over half its area? These subtopian dangers, and our preoccupation with our poverty and economic crises, are both most apparent in our attitude to our social capital. . . ."

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success in the way of improving conditions which the new deals and social programs have achieved seems nevertheless to have produced a widespread sense of frustration. The affluent society shows signs of being emotionally and aesthetically impoverished, less a society than a lonely crowd of organization men and status-seekers, prone to seek escape from freedom and responsibility in conformity, acquiescence, or in being "other-directed". Its coming has served neither to reaffirm and endorse an old scale of human values nor to create a new and ardently held pattern of beliefs. Rather does it threaten the brave new world of a Huxley and an Orwell, of frustration and hatred, of inhumanity and violence.

I would not entirely exonerate political theory, or the lack of it, from blame for the growth of such social irresponsibility. At least I think it can do something by way of remedy if it looks afresh at the twin foundations of our dominating political doctrine. On the utilitarian side, I would suggest, it needs to take a fresh look at the process of free and empirical individual valuation which was so much a part of its original contribution and which, in denying the orthodox claims of conformity, placed responsibility where alone it can lie. On the side of social democracy it ought, I suggest, to look again at the old discredited concepts of the good life and self-realization with the help, not only of Aristotle and Plato, but of the modern psychologist and political scientist with their examination of the warping and restricting effect of pressures upon the quality of social life, or of individual life. Then perhaps it might lead us to a society which spent less on advertising commercial products than upon education.

V

The need for political studies to work in this frame of reference is the greater for several recent developments. One is the tendency toward the identification of the modern state with one ideology or the other in the most intense social conflict of the time. This greatly reinforces the compulsions to conformity ordinarily in the hands of the group dominating state power. It supports them with the plea of patriotism and the demand for ensuring the security, and indeed the survival, of the social order itself in the face of the utter destruction threatened by the op-

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posed ideology, identified with another state power. This reached its climax in the West in McCarthyism and in the operations of the Un-American Activities Committee, but has spread its poison much more widely. It is, of course, matched and surpassed in Russia. This "corruption of patriotism", as Hans J. Morgenthau has recently called it,[11] is a patent attack upon personality as well as upon the place of the individual in society, in fact upon the very values that make the society worth defending. Its effects on intellectual freedom and civic responsibility are insidious and far-reaching. They are not to be measured by the few who resist or suffer, who can be counted, but by the many who succumb and cannot.

While this particular development is new in form rather than in essence, for the claim of political authority to absorb the total personality of the individual is as old as history, its importance is much greater today because the whole mechanism for bringing compulsion to bear upon the mind is both more powerful and more concentrated. It is more powerful because the propagandist and the public relations man have a revolutionized body of knowledge available for their use. It is more concentrated inasmuch as the instruments of press and advertising, radio and television, through which they work, are monolithic in character and closely combined under the control of very few people.

Here it is impossible to do more than suggest what are the effects of this kind of compulsion. Suffice it to give two quotations, one from an American, the other from a Russian, source. H. H. Wilson speaks of these as being the production as an "ideal type" of the man who is "dedicated to the avoidance of extreme views and believes it better to have no convictions that cannot be adjusted by consensus and compromise."[12] Pasternak, in an image that is recognizable beyond the confines of the Soviet Union, writes:

[11] In *Dilemmas of Politics* (Chicago, 1958).

[12] *The Dilemma of the Obsolete Man* (Los Angeles, 1954); see also his *Congress: Corruption and Compromise* (New York, 1951). This theme is to be found in much other work, such as W. Sargant, *Battle for the Mind* (Garden City, 1957); Allen Wheelis, *The Quest for Identity* (New York, 1958); William H. Whyte, *The Organization Man* (New York, 1957); David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven, 1950); Erich Kahler, *The Tower and the Abyss* (New York, 1957) and *Man the Measure* (New York, 1956).

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> It was then that falsehood came into our Russian land. The great misfortune, the root of all the evil to come, was the loss of faith in the value of personal opinions. People imagined that it was out of date to follow their own moral sense, that they must all sing the same tune in chorus, and live by other people's notions, the notions which were being crammed down everybody's throat. And there arose the power of the glittering phrase.[13]

There can surely be no doubt about the growing importance of these pressures, or about the need this renders the more urgent for the political scientist to appraise their impact. He has not only to ask, that is to say, to what they are due and what forms they take. He has also to evaluate their effects. Such evaluation, indeed, can alone give meaning to his analysis. For to speak of political studies as having meaning is to say both that they present an ordered system of knowledge or empirically tested principles, or both, and that this is capable of offering guidance in the contemporary world. This is their proper task: to afford guidance. It is not merely to describe, regardless of all possible relevance. Nor is it to give a perfect one-and-only answer in a predicament where generally there is none. Nor even is it to predict. And the fact that this is the true nature of the political student's work shows why it needs to be, and to be seen to be, related to a coherent system of values. For it to be oriented as I suggest would help it to attain a coherence it lacks, and so to do what it is supposed to do. Failure to realize this is what is implied by Hans J. Morgenthau when he says that "it is the measure of the degree to which political science in America meets the needs of society rather than its moral commitment to the truth that it is not only eminently respectable and popular, but—what is worse—that it is also widely regarded with indifference."[14]

The second development I have in mind which brings about this kind of pressure, and calls the political theorist to reassess our directives, is the result of the technological revolution. It is the loss of identity by the individual with the growth of the monolithic structure as the characteristic feature of economic, political and social life. In relation to it he feels insignificant. It is remote and incomprehensible; and he is confronted by it on all sides. It may be the corporation, private or public, that employs him and controls so much of his life and in which his

[13] *Doctor Zhivago* (New York, 1958), p. 363. [14] *Loc. cit.*

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security lies; the trade union that represents or instructs him, and with which, because of its growth in size, he is sometimes out of effective touch; the municipality or metropolis in which he lives; the political party with its millions of members; the government department, civic authority, or combine which supplies him with necessary services; or even the commercial corporation, shares in which constitute his property. All represent vast, impersonal, remote forces, often unaccountable, generally without any flow of responsibility either to him or from him. In little or no degree does he regard them as reflecting his personality. The less he finds himself able to influence them, the less does he think himself answerable for what they do, often in his name—answerable, that is, to himself, to society, to history. This means that there is a large area of his life, comprehending most of his relationships with the larger community, which has little or no meaning for him; it goes no way to meet his creative urge, his desire to give a purposive cohesion to his activities, his emotional need for fellowship; and yet it absorbs progressively more of these relationships. Compensation has to be sought in nonsocial or antisocial activities. As J. A. M. Meerloo writes:

> If the complexity of a country's political and economic apparatus makes the individual citizen feel powerless, confused and useless, if he has no sense of participation in the forces that govern his daily life, or if he feels these forces to be so vast and confusing that he can no longer understand them, he will grasp at the totalitarian opportunity for belonging, for participation, for a simple formula that explains and rationalises what is beyond his comprehension.[15]

Such frustration, alienation, schizophrenia are so plainly the antithesis of what I have called the twin foundations of our political doctrine with its concern for individual valuation and the good life that, if there is any truth in this diagnosis, this must clearly call for its reëxamination in the light of them.

Nor can there be any doubt that this diagnosis is at present being made widely and with an impressive unanimity. True, this is more characteristic of American than of English writing. That may be due to the development having gone further in America, to there being perhaps less resistance to it in the form of traditional or precapitalist codes of behavior, and less of a conviction that political institutions provide possible ways of

[15] *Mental Seduction and Menticide* (London, 1957), p. 108.

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escape. But there can be no doubt that the same phenomena exist in Britain too, or that there has been an increasing similarity in them during the last decade. True, too, that the diagnosis is to be seen more in the work of sociologists and psychologists than of political theorists. Perhaps they are nearer to the sources upon which a political theory appropriate to our group-, organization-, and complex-infested society must draw. For their whole tendency is to treat the individual not as the philosophic abstraction familiar to political theorists of the past, seen in contradistinction to another abstraction, the state; but as seeking his identity, his fulfillment, his freedom in a complex of social relationships some of which serve and others hamper it. That political theory must also have this kind of approach is surely the corollary. Essentially, that is to say, it is a projection of political pluralism.

The interest of the political scientist in pressure groups, élites, minorities, representative systems and the behavior of electors, parties and their organization, the press and the radio and public opinion is indeed an expression of just this impulse. If all these invite study because they are both clearly part of the process of government and also susceptible to more or less exact description—that is to "scientific" treatment—they have another characteristic in common. That is their relevance to the participation of the citizen in the democratic state. This is now seen to be manifold and complex in its forms, and channeled in devious ways. But the study of it is undertaken on the basis of assumptions in the realm of political theory, and, although these are generally tacit, to them must be attributed the view that the work is worth while. Orthodox democratic theory, starting from a monistic basis, held it manifest that maximum participation or the most active consent of all was the criterion of democracy. Moving off, as it were, from this postulate, these studies then show that in fact this participation resolves itself in practice into decision by pressure groups and minorities, indicating therefore that participation is unreal or nonexistent and democracy false. Robert A. Dahl's *Preface to Democratic Theory*,[16] for instance, despite reference to consensus, seems to amount to this: it articulates this discovery into the argument than the main activity of participation consists in the appeasement of minorities.

[16] Chicago, 1956.

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It is impossible to escape the impression that these studies are conducted with a certain narrowness of perspective. They seem to lack the sense of orientation which political theory ought to give them. There is an apparent unawareness of any larger pattern in which they can be seen to cohere, and which can make them more creative and meaningful. This is because in a pluralist world we still live under the influence of a monistic politics. Our behavior as students of politics postulates a society essentially pluralist; our theory has been incompletely adapted to it. We should not be surprised by this; the history of political thought shows how slowly and hesitatingly the dead wood is cut away, how often our thinking is colored by ideas which, though discarded in logic, remain a habit in practice. Now, our past preoccupation with the state as the only form of association interesting us directly still colors our democratic theory. We have rejected it, for we now in fact regard it as "one association among many". It is surely the burden, for instance, of much of De Jouvenel's recent work that even in matters of power or of sovereignty the phenomena we examine are not manifest solely in the state and its ancillary organizations, but belong essentially anywhere that people come together to make decisions and act in combination. Such widening of our perspective should not lead to the abandonment of democratic theory. Rather ought the result to be a fresh look at its foundations. The criteria emerging from this are then seen to have no exclusive relevance to that particular association we know as the state. The frame of reference that I have suggested they provide[17] has a much more general application. If it gives greater coherence and orientation to our activities in political studies, it may also help that discipline to offer some guidance on the processes of valuation needed among the pressures and impulsions to conformity with which the world that results from the technological revolution confronts us.

VI

Finally, an orientation of political theory, or a frame of reference for it, of the kind here implied is suited to our needs. For the good life, self-realization, happiness—vague and difficult

[17] Very generally above, more specifically in my *Foundations of Political Theory* (London and Fair Lawn, N. J., 1958).

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to give precision to though they be—do have meaning. They summarize what, as practical people living in the everyday world of our own experience, we seek in order to give direction to our lives; and what we do there we should do as political theorists. Indeed, we look for aid to psychology and ethics and any other branch of study which may contribute to this eclectic "master-science" to help in their analysis.

What is the kind of help they can give in fact today? A few lines cannot do justice to this and so may risk weakening the case. But at least it may be said that they suggest the absence of any single, ideal stereotype, pattern of belief and behavior, but point rather to great diversity. They indicate valuation as an individual, rational or intelligent, and empirical process, needing to produce active belief rather than passive acquiescence if it is to be creative and fulfilling; pleasure as having no exact correlation with what the economist calls consumption, with market-value "utility" but rather with the use that is made of goods and services; happiness as being as closely related to how we live as to having the materials with which to live, as involving the satisfaction of needs for fellowship, for making activity meaningful or creative, for responsible "participation". If they thus reinforce the basic tenets of social democracy, they serve to extend their relevance from the increasingly remote "political" area, in its orthodox definition of exclusive concern with the legal mechanisms of the state, to that occupied by all the forms of interlocking collectivities which characterize the life of modern societies.

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THE NEW CONSERVATISM

CULTURAL CRITICISM V. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

I

THE years between 1949 and 1956, anxious, eventful and confusing as they were, were also significant in the development of American political thought, for they witnessed one of the infrequent but recurring attempts to substitute a conservative *Weltanschauung* for the dominant liberal tradition. Conservatism, in the sense of a preference for aristocratic, rather than democratic, values, has never quite become extinct in this country, and has occasionally asserted itself, either in the form of a claim in behalf of the right of one group to rule, or in the form of criticism of our democratic values and leadership. The thirties and forties were a period of relative quiescence, but even then this position was not wholly without its advocates. Francis Graham Wilson and Peter Viereck, for example, have been publishing from an explicitly conservative point of view since before the Second World War, and August Heckscher's *A Pattern for Politics* appeared in 1947. It was not until 1949, however, that a self-conscious "New Conservative" movement began to take form, encouraged by a broad and sympathetic audience.

The publication in that year of Peter Viereck's *Conservatism Revisited,* which was given an enthusiastic, or at least cordial, reception on all sides, seemed like a signal for the appearance of a long series of articles in the academic journals and little magazines, books, and reviews about other books, written from a similar point of view. In 1951, Russell Kirk's *Randolph of Roanoke* appeared, and in 1953 his most important work, *The Conservative Mind,* was published. In 1956 Clinton Rossiter's *Conservatism in America* became another major contribution to the work of this movement. Viereck's conservative ideas received further development in his *Shame and Glory of the Intellectuals* (1953), *The Unadjusted Man* (1956), and *Conservatism: From John Adams to Churchill* (1956). Others who have been associated with this group include Canon Bell, John Blum, Daniel Boorstin, McGeorge Bundy, Thomas I. Cook, Raymond English,

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John Hallowell, Anthony Harrigan, Milton Hindus, Klemens von Klemperer, Eric von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Richard Leopold, S. A. Lukacs, Malcolm Moos, Eliseo Vivas and Chad Walsh. To this list might also be added the names of Allen Tate, Richard Weaver, Robert Penn Warren and John Crowe Ransom, who have been identified as "Southern Agrarians", and who have written from a viewpoint very sympathetic to that of the New Conservatives.[1]

The march of events since the end of World War II had prepared well for the favorable reception of a conservative approach to politics. The refusal of the Soviet Union to permit an enduring peace settlement, the disasters in Eastern Europe, the "anti-Communist" hysteria, and the inability of certain intellectuals to recognize the tyrannical nature of Stalin's Russia, coinciding with the decline of New and Fair Deal enthusiasm, had all contributed to an atmosphere in which a fundamental turn to the right appeared to be a real possibility. The outbreak of war in Korea and then the Eisenhower victory in 1952 served to intensify the belief of many that the American mind had reached crossroads, had lost patience with "naïve liberalism", and that a slow, ponderous and epoch-making change of course was in the offing.

Among those who were encouraged by this prospect, the air was thick with predictions, prescriptions and obituaries of liberalism. In a review of Kirk's major work, Canon Bell declared that "In writing *The Conservative Mind* Mr. Kirk has taken on a job of public education, and at a very strategic time. For the political temper of this country has taken a turn in the direction of politics popularly labeled as conservative."[2] Reviewing Mr. Viereck's *Shame and Glory of the Intellectuals,* James Burnham urged that

> The time thus calls for a new shift in the cycle. From Marxified liberalism we must move not back to reaction but forward to a new conservatism. The new conservatism must break with the theoretical errors and the degenerated practices of liberalism. Abandoning Rousseau, it must admit that "totalitarianism is not the opposite of naturalistic relativism, as many liberals believe, but its consequence."

[1] See Viereck's *Conservatism: From John Adams to Churchill* (New York, 1956), pp. 106-7. Also, there is an excellent bibliography in the back of Rossiter's *Conservatism in America* (New York, 1956), pp. 310-27.

[2] *Commonweal,* vol. 54, September 21, 1951, p. 579.

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> At the same time it will assimilate and preserve the positive results of the past generation. It will not dethrone Jefferson and Jackson, but place Hamilton, Burke and Choate along side them.[3]

Like their forerunners of the earlier part of this century, the Adams brothers, More, Babbitt, Mencken, Santayana and Eliot, these "conservatives" had almost as much contempt for the capitalist business élite and its *laissez-faire* ideologists as they had for their radical opponents. They were determined, therefore, that this American reaction against totalitarianism should be channeled, not into support of the banal slogans of the N.A.M., but into an appreciation of a moderate, gentlemanly and traditionalist conservatism on the European model.

One ironic result of this was that, like the Right and Center, the Left as well was cordial in its reception of the new writers. Relieved to hear a voice of civilization and learning and tolerance coming from the long arid regions of the Right, encouraged by the expectation that now the debate between Left and Right would be carried on between men who agreed in their respect for the things of the mind and spirit, liberal and socialist reviewers leaned over backwards in their efforts to be fair and sympathetic with the New Conservative authors. Dwight MacDonald, in the pages of the *New Republic*,[4] was as friendly and tolerant in his review of *Conservatism Revisited* as A. M. Schlesinger was in his review of the same book in the *New York Times*.[5]

The significance of the new movement was interpreted in different ways from different parts of the political spectrum. For the moderately conservative in spirit, many of whom had become dissatisfied with the development of liberalism, a vigorous articulation of their viewpoint was offered. For the Right, there was the hope that at last their old *bêtes noires* would be repudiated, and that America would become, or would be shown to have been all along, *their* country.

All agreed, however, that real issues of political philosophy had been raised. The American commitment, or apparent commitment, to liberalism was going to be debated. On the one hand, there was going to be a reinvestigation of the American

[3] *New York Times*, March 15, 1953, Section 7, p. 10.

[4] Vol. 121, November 14, 1949, p. 34.

[5] October 23, 1949, p. 49.

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past to see how "liberal" our traditions and philosophy really were. On the other hand, there was projected a restatement of American values and aspirations from a conservative point of view. America, threatened and confused—America, upon whom the survival of Western civilization depended—was going to search her soul.

At this point, one is compelled to notice the discrepancy between what was projected and what has occurred. Have the New Conservatives given us a conservative political philosophy, or any at all? Is there a New Conservative approach to the problems of the West at this point in history? Have they grappled with the traditional issues of political theory? Unless one is satisfied with Kirk's "affirmation of the moral nature of society," the answer is disappointing. There are some men, it is true, who are generally regarded as "conservative", and who have written political theory: Willmoore Kendall, Walter Lippmann, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin are examples. Significantly, however, these men are rarely or never identified as New Conservatives. There seems to be no one who is both a rigorous political theorist and a generally recognized member of the New Conservative movement.

This, I believe, is no accident. The thesis will be developed here that the New Conservatives are not fundamentally interested in political theory, that their self-identification as "conservatives" is based upon a profound misunderstanding of the things that are signified by that term, and that their own motives are in conflict with the rôle that their adopted philosophy would have them play.

II

The basic interest of the New Conservatives lies in the field of social or cultural criticism. The application of the rationalistic spirit to the problems of political society which began with the Greeks had its result in comprehensive philosophical systems in the ancient world, and in the several disciplines that comprise social science in the modern. Paralleling this tradition, but only occasionally in agreement with it, has come a running line of commentary and moral evaluation from the poets, dramatists, novelists and men of letters. From Aristophanes through Voltaire, Goethe, Mann and Eliot, the doings of men in the court, the market place and the home have been subjected to a kind

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of criticism that is less rationalistic and analytical, and much more consistently concerned with aesthetic, emotional and religious values. The New Conservatives are solidly within this latter tradition. The main difference between them and their literary predecessors is that the latter have usually recognized the line of division between cultural criticism and political theory, and have remained on their side of it, or prepared themselves adequately before crossing.

Russell Kirk has given the subtitle "Essays of a Social Critic" to his *Beyond the Dreams of Avarice;* it might have been applied with equal appropriateness to most of his other books. Peter Viereck's *Shame and Glory of the Intellectuals* and *The Unadjusted Man* are equally devoted to cultural criticism. Others among the New Conservatives who can be regarded as cultural critics are August Heckscher, Eliseo Vivas, Daniel Boorstin, Raymond English, John Hallowell, S. A. Lukacs and Robert Nisbet. Finally, the Southern Agrarians and all of the twentieth-century predecessors of the New Conservatives have been engaged to some degree in this activity.

The associations that are stirred by these names—Tate, Weaver, Warren and Ransom, the Adams brothers, More, Babbitt, Mencken, Santayana and Eliot—bring us to the key point: this is cultural criticism of a particular kind. The essential spirit of the New Conservatives (excepting Rossiter, for he seems to represent a completely different mentality) is not a desire to protect America from the machinations of Jacobins and planners; nor is it a desire for some kind of ethical and religious revival. It is a spirit of revulsion from the society and culture that have been produced and shaped by America's politically and economically emancipated masses. It is a rejection of the mass society. Further, it is not a rejection based upon any previous theoretical commitments. It is aesthetic and visceral.[6]

Until the early years of this century, America was growing

[6] It is interesting to note that there persists a certain area of agreement between the disenchanted of the Right and the disenchanted of the Left. The complacent bourgeois Center appears as the common point from which their reactions begin, and there is often a striking similarity in their indictments of it, even if their agreement fades when it comes to the matter of positive proposals. Harvey Swados, writing in the socialist-oriented *Dissent* magazine, reminds us of Viereck when he tells us that "The kinds of children emerging from school, church and station wagon in the 50's would seem best exemplified by their heroes and the heroes of their parents too: Elvis Presley,

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and changing so rapidly that no one was sure what the new democratic culture was going to be like. Now that the period of galloping growth and change has passed, the image of the mass society is becoming sharper and more detailed. It is new, and in many respects it is vulgar and ugly. One does not have to be a conservative to be depressed by the junky magazines that fill up 90 per cent of the space on the stands, or the cosmetic and patent-medicine commercials on television, or the gaudiness of Detroit's latest leviathans. The New Conservatives, I believe, are men who are so revolted by the debasement which they have seen of cultural, aesthetic and religious values, that they have lost all faith in and hope for the success of the aspirations embodied in this new kind of democratic society.

It is important to understand the relation of the New Conservatives to the society that they are criticizing, on the one hand, and to the aristocratic tradition to which they appeal, on the other. First, it should be emphasized that *they are themselves the products of the American mass society.* They are not the scions of a traditional resistance to mass power. Since the early decades of the nineteenth century, America has had no politically functioning class or interest which has identified itself with the task of restraining the growth of the political power of the democratic masses. The New Conservative criticism of mass values and culture is not a traditional function, but a spontaneous and contemporary development. The "New" is appropriate, whether or not the "Conservative" is. As highly educated men, they have been able to compare the form of civilization that has developed in America with that of Britain and Europe, and to judge the former by the latter. They have found it wanting.

In the second place, they have turned to what they have called "Burkean conservatism" because it contains a set of social values

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Sal Mineo, Natalie Wood, even James MacArthur, and—the apotheosis of the entire generation—the late James Dean. The face of each is eloquent of the tormenting discontent of an American youth for which everything is being done, to which everything is being given . . . except a reason for living and building a socially useful life." ("Popular Taste and the Agonies of the Young", in *Voices of Dissent* [New York, 1958], p. 224.) A reading of the apolitical writers of the "Beat Generation" will also turn up some of the same sentiments: the emphasis will be different, and the enemy will have a different name ("squares", instead of "doctrinaire liberals", or "the *bourgeoisie*"), but the object of contempt will be the same.

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that can be opposed to those of the mass society and, more importantly, because it contains an articulate philosophical reply to the democratic and equalitarian philosophers whom they regard as the authors and exponents of the mass society. Since no genuine indigenous tradition of opposition to the growth of democracy has survived the Jacksonian era, it has been necessary to import one.[7]

The appeal of the New Conservatives to "Burkean conservatism" is the basis of their connection with political theory. Burke and the nineteenth-century British conservatives were actually facing a *political* challenge by the lower classes. Their replies embraced much more than the political aspect of society but, since they were replies to a political challenge, they were politically oriented. In appealing to, and in attempting to give reëxpression to, these arguments, the New Conservatives have entered the field of political debate.

Nevertheless, their situation is not the same as that of the aristocratic conservatives to whom they appeal. In America, the masses have arrived. Their moral position as the source of all

[7] Manning Dauer's chapter, "The Political Theories of John Adams" in his *The Adams Federalists*, should suffice to show the thinness of the interpretation, offered by Kirk and Viereck, of John Adams as a "Burkean conservative". But even if it were granted that Adams was such, the claim that there exists in America a tradition of "Burkean conservatism" would still be impossible. One man can found a tradition, but others are necessary to sustain it and pass it on. Observe the names to whom the New Conservatives are forced to resort in order to fill in the ranks of their "conservative tradition": James Madison, John Quincy Adams, John Randolph, John C. Calhoun, James Fenimore Cooper, Orestes Brownson, Nathaniel Hawthorne, James Russell Lowell, William G. Sumner, Henry and Brooks Adams, Paul Elmer More, Irving Babbitt, H. L. Mencken, George Santayana and T. S. Eliot. What a mutually despising company! And how dominated by malcontents, misfits, and the spiritually alienated! These "conservatives", it is true, possess some of the greatest minds that America has ever produced; but they still make a rather ludicrous "conservative tradition". I can do no better than to repeat Professor Schlesinger's words on this point: "An odd and often contradictory collection of figures has to be pressed somewhat desperately into service; John C. Calhoun, the great theorist of slavery and state's rights, and John Quincy Adams, the ardent apostle of abolition and nationalism . . . Irving Babbitt, the archbishop of the Genteel Tradition, and George Santayana, its urbane and devastating critic. This miscellany can hardly rise to the dignity of a tradition—certainly not to the dignity of a conservative tradition." "The New Conservatism in America", *Confluence*, December 1953, pp. 65-66.

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legitimate political power is unchallenged. In rejecting their aspirations and values, then, the New Conservatives are not merely rejecting a competing political ideology, as their nineteenth-century mentors were; they are rejecting a society and a culture. For America is what its masses have made it.

One might expect that those who occupy such a position would readily become a source of political philosophy, and the New Conservatives have in fact been identified as such. The validity of such an identification is here denied, however, because the New Conservatives have not come to grips with the traditional issues of political philosophy: the breadth of their criticism has not been matched by a reformulation of the problems of political philosophy corresponding to their own basic viewpoint.

The nature, responsibilities and limits of political authority, the nature of political knowledge and education, and of the rights and obligations of citizens, the proper form or forms of political leadership and of government—these and other problems which are the common heritage of Western political philosophy are discussed fragmentarily or not at all. In fact, aside from their polemical critique of liberalism and radicalism, there is little in their writings that is political at all—and less that is philosophical.

There is, to be sure, a more or less coherent set of political values that is implicit in their works: that of Burke and Disraeli. But these values never become explicit, never are clearly stated and argued for in a determined fashion. The reason is obvious: in the interest of remaining "conservative", the New Conservatives have abstained from political philosophy.

The way in which they have come into contact with political philosophy can explain a great deal about their treatment of it. In carrying "conservatism" as their standard into the arena of political debate, they have done so, not with the intention of applying any particular form of it in its full social implications, but only in order to use it as a polemical weapon. As cultural critics, as literary men, as poets, novelists and doctors of literature, their interest in political theory per se has been slight; and this fact has reflected itself in the quality of their commentary. Their political writing has almost uniformly been characterized by haste, unqualified generalizations, and an impatience with the close reasoning, fine attention to distinctions ("logic chop-

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ping"), and concern for precise use of language that have been the traditional desiderata of political theory. Kirk is typical when he tells us that the destruction of the Republic and of local liberties and private rights would be followed by the reign of "the General Will of Rousseau";[8] or again, when he attributes socialism to the power of envy. Their unconcern for accuracy manifests itself particularly in their tendency to impute to the modern liberal the illusions of eighteenth-century utopians. They are unanimous in their belief that liberals are "sanguine" reformers who are sure that man is inherently good, and who hold an oversimplified view of society, believing that its problems can be solved by the application of *"a priori* blueprints for reform." Phrases like "The uniformity and standardization of liberal and radical planners . . ."[9] are sprinkled through Kirk's pages, and he almost habitually places a "doctrinaire" or "sentimental" before the word liberal. Once he even went so far as to identify the liberal as "a man in love with constant change . . . [who] has tended to despise the lessons of the past and to look forward confidently to a vista of endless material progress, in which the state will play a larger and larger role, and a general equality of condition will be enforced."[10]

In his *Conservatism,* Mr. Viereck quotes with agreement a statement by Stanley Pargellis that "The rationalist or the liberal frames his political decisions in accordance with some theory derived from an abstract notion of universal truth."[11]

In view of the high regard for empiricism that has been professed by many of the New Conservatives, this is surprising, for the briefest investigation would cast some doubt upon these venerable opinions:

> [In the past, some men believed that] when the fetters of custom and law were removed, the heart would be free to display its natural goodness. Human nature, they thought, is good, but institutions have corrupted it; remove the institutions and we shall all become angels. Unfortunately, the matter is not so simple as they thought. Men who follow their impulses establish governments based on pogroms, clamor for war with foreign countries, and murder pacifists and Negroes. Human nature unrestrained by law is violent and cruel:[12]

[8] *The Conservative Mind* (Chicago, 1953), p. 424.
[9] *Prospects for Conservatives* (Chicago, 1956), p. 37.
[10] *Ibid.,* p. 23.
[11] P. 108.
[12] "Respect for Law", *San Francisco Review,* vol. 1, Winter 1958, pp. 63-65.

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These far-from-utopian lines were written, not by a New or an old conservative, but by Bertrand Russell, a confirmed liberal blasphemer. It has been a long time since liberals believed in the natural goodness of man. The thing that has been constant is their belief in the moral value of every individual. The humanitarian projects that liberals have been led to undertake as a result of this belief have been characterized by conservatives as "utopian". Actually, they have had about them the nature of moral imperatives. Professor Kirk has in several places referred to such liberal projects as "abstract humanitarianism". All that is demonstrated, however, is that humanitarianism is abstract to those who make such statements; to anyone who has had any contact with human suffering, the meaning of humanitarianism could hardly be more poignantly real.

As to the charge that liberals are still rationalists, in the sense of relying upon a priori assumptions and abstract logic, one would think that it would be silenced in the face of the mountains of empirical data being compiled in the social sciences, which are the main stronghold of modern liberalism. The abstractness of liberal thought appears to have become a conservative apriorism.

However this may be, the New Conservatives are confronted with a dilemma which had no parallel in the situation of the British Conservatives of the nineteenth century. The latter were defending an established order, and there could be meaningful debate over the issue of whether to yield or not to yield to democratic pressures. The New Conservatives are criticizing an established order, and their criticisms of it are of a fundamental nature: their objections—to its materialism and secularism, to the pervasive influence of mass opinion, to its equalitarianism and conformism, and to its degradation of older religious, aesthetic and cultural values, by reproduction and adulteration—constitute a rejection of many of its most characteristic features. A radical or a thoroughgoing reactionary is perfectly at home in such a situation: he spins out a prescription for a proper or just form of society and, if the conditions are right, makes preparations to bring it into being. The nonpolitical nature of the New Conservatives is demonstrated precisely in their refusal to go beyond their critical rejection of the American present.

If the New Conservatives had not appealed to British conservatism, then the essentially cultural concern of their thought

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would have been more apparent. But it is only natural that they should have done so, because many of the arguments developed by the older group still are, or appear to be, usable in the present situation. Further, there existed an unresolved contradiction in the language of political theory which formed an admirable trap for the unwary political writer. A brief look at this subject will complete the picture of the way in which these men came to regard themselves, and to be regarded, as conservative political theorists.

III

Few words in our political vocabulary have been subjected to more confused and contradictory use than the term conservatism. The New Conservatives are not to be condemned too harshly, therefore, for having been misled by it. If they have written books about a subject the nature of which they themselves did not perfectly understand, it can at least be said that they did not create this confusion, but inherited it from previous political writers.

The first thing that must be noticed by anyone who attempts to arrive at a definition of the word conservatism is that there are two separate and independent tendencies of meaning associated with it. The fact that they are only accidentally associated with each other—that one cannot be deduced from the other, and that they can conflict—is at the heart of the confusion in its use. The first tendency of meaning is represented by the definitions given in Webster's Dictionary: "conservative" is defined as "Conserving; preservative", and "conservatism" as "the disposition and tendency to preserve what is established; opposition to change." Derived from the verb "to conserve", this meaning is recognized in some degree by everyone who uses the word, and it forms the basis for the most common usage in everyday speech. The second tendency associates the word conservatism with a number of specific commitments about the best forms of society and government. These commitments cannot be defined precisely, but they may be characterized in a rough way as being, positively, aristocratic and feudal and, negatively, antidemocratic, antimaterialistic, and anti-individualistic.

Very often, commentators have picked out one or the other of these tendencies and identified it as "true conservatism", or the "essential" part of conservatism, and have expelled the other

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uses of the word from the pale of their approval.[13] This has been of little help, however, because no consensus has developed as to which of the two tendencies should be excluded—as to whether conservatism should mean the desire to conserve the established as such, or a commitment to a particular set of social values.

The position taken by the New Conservative writers has been that these tendencies are harmonious and complementary—that "true conservatism" consists, not of one or the other, but of both. Thus Russell Kirk's "six canons of conservative thought" include, on the one hand, a "Faith in prescription and distrust of 'sophisters and calculators'" and a belief that "innovation is a devouring conflagration more often than it is a torch of progress. . . . Providence is the proper instrument for change," and, on the other hand, the statements that "civilized society requires orders and classes. The only true equality is moral equality," and that "Society longs for leadership."[14] Similarly, Clinton Rossiter's "'twenty-one points' of the Conservative tradition" include "the indispensability and sanctity of inherited institutions, values, symbols and rituals," along with "the inevitability and necessity of social classes," and "The need for a ruling and serving aristocracy."[15]

The full extent of the confusion or disagreement that persists in the meaning of the term may be illustrated by citing some of the definitions that have been attempted by various political commentators.

According to Peter Viereck, "conservatism may be ultimately defined as the organic relationship of concrete to concrete in history, rather than abstraction piled upon abstraction."[16]

For William Buckley, "conservatism is the tacit acknowledgment that the truly important in human experience is behind us; that the truly crucial battles have been fought, and that it

[13] See, for example, articles by Samuel P. Huntington ("Conservatism as an Ideology", *American Political Science Review*, June 1957, pp. 454-473), and Gordon K. Lewis ("The Metaphysics of Conservatism", *Western Political Quarterly*, December 1953, pp. 728-49), which emphasize the defense of existing institutions as the core of conservatism, and the article by Norman R. Philips which emphasizes the opposite tendency ("The Conservative Implications of Skepticism", *Journal of Politics*, February 1956, pp. 28-38).

[14] *The Conservative Mind*, pp. 7, 8.

[15] *Conservatism in America*, pp. 61-62.

[16] "The Rootless 'Roots': Defects in the New Conservatism", *Antioch Review*, Summer 1955, vol. 15, p. 229.

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is given to man to know what are the great truths that emerged from them."[17]

Norman R. Phillips has characterized conservatism as "the attitude which stresses the value of authority and tradition."[18]

Lord Hugh Cecil defined conservatism as "a force called into activity by the French Revolution, and operating against the tendencies that that Revolution set up."[19]

One is driven to the conclusion that, in order to make meaningful statements about what should or should not be called conservatism, it is necessary to understand how these different uses of the word came into being. We will take a brief look, therefore, at the historical situation in which the word was born.

According to Mannheim, "It was Chateaubriand who first lent the word its peculiar meaning when he called the periodical he issued to propagate the ideas of the clerical and political Restoration, *The Conservative*."[20] Whatever Chateaubriand intended the word to mean, it was rapidly taken over by every group, Burkean and Catholic-authoritarian alike, which had opposed the progress of the French Revolution. The American National Republicans (Whigs) were calling themselves "conservatives" by 1830, and the term was adopted as the name of the British Tory party in 1832. It would appear at this point that Cecil had come closest to the mark when he defined conservatism simply as the opposition to the Revolution. The popularity of the term was due, not to its appeal to this or that philosophy or ideology, but to its expression of the fact that the opponents of the Revolution were trying to *conserve* the Old Order. The criterion for the application of the word was simply one's basic attitude toward the *status quo:* the "conservatives" were those who desired to preserve the established order of things. It may not be superfluous to emphasize here that when conservatism is used in this relational sense[21]—indicating the intention to preserve the *status quo*—then the ideas and attitudes that create this intention to preserve the *status quo* are *inciden-*

[17] Quoted in "The Isms in 1957", *The Saturday Review of Literature,* June 8, 1957, p. 37.

[18] "The Conservative Implications of Skepticism", *loc. cit.,* p. 30.

[19] *Conservatism* (London, 1912), p. 244.

[20] *Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology* (New York, 1953), p. 98.

[21] The term "relational" in this context was introduced by Huntington in his "Conservatism as an Ideology", *loc. cit.*

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tal. Any social or political philosophy could, in this sense, become a "conservative" position if its ideal scheme of things were adopted by a society.

The corollary to the last point is that any ideology that is "conservative" in the relational sense of the word will cease to be such and will become, in fact, radical, once the institutions that it has supported pass from the historical stage. Specifically, those whose support of the Old Order was motivated by a genuine belief or interest in its particular institutions were bound to become reactionary (which is to say, radical) as those institutions passed away. It is obvious that this group included the entire anti-Revolutionary opposition. There never has been, and never will be, a philosophy whose main tenet is opposition to change per se. That is a bloodless logical possibility and nothing more. To see this we need only ask ourselves whether Burke would have been willing to apply his arguments in favor of following prescription and avoiding radical change to the present state of the Soviet Union and China, had he lived in this century.

To put it another way, the term conservative in this relational sense is an adjective which can be predicated upon a given political position at a given point in history. It describes a quality that such a position can possess at a certain time. Obviously, when a position ceases to have the quality of "desiring-to-conserve", then it is no longer appropriate to describe it by the word conservative. This may seem like an unnecessary laboring of a simple point; but it is necessary, simply because the logical imperatives contained in this point have not been honored. The relational definition of the word is not the only one which can be employed, but when it is, those who use it must recognize that it describes an *accidental* quality which is acquired and lost in time—often in a very short time.

At this point, the main cause of the subsequent confusion in the use of the term can be seen clearly: *without displacing the original relational meaning, a "substantive" understanding of the word had grown up along side it.* The aristocratic and feudal ideas of certain parts of the anti-Revolutionary group had become permanently associated with the term conservatism. Writers began speaking of "conservatism" as if it were a set of ideas, an organically complete political philosophy. This was natural

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enough. If those who opposed the Revolution called themselves "conservatives" after the term came into use, then it would be reasonable to refer to the doctrines with which they justified their position as "conservatism". In periods of conflict there is a tendency to ignore differences between members of the same side. The next step, that of regarding this "conservatism" as a unified ideological position, was a short one. (It is true, of course, that if all of the opponents of the Revolution had happened by chance to hold a common set of convictions and values, then there would be some color of justification for employing the term conservative to designate that set of ideas—in spite of its "relational" origin. But even a glance suffices to assure us that no such consensus existed: what commitments could have been shared by the republican John Adams, the Whig-Tory Burke, and the Catholics de Maistre and Metternich? We are back where we started: *in logic and in fact, the only thing common* to the entire anti-Revolutionary opposition was opposition itself.) A cause that may have contributed to this "substantive" understanding of the word is the fact that men are accustomed to refer to social forces by names that are related to the central ideas of those forces, rather than related to their evanescent connections with the *status quo*.

In any case, "conservatism" now had two meanings, and they were coming increasingly into conflict as the Western World became more democratic and industrial, less aristocratic and feudal. On the one hand, the word referred to a desire to preserve existing institutions, without implying anything about the nature of the institutions to be preserved; on the other hand, it referred to a specific commitment to the aristocratic monarchic, feudal and religious institutions of the Old Order. The two meanings had been united in Burke: in opposing revolutionary change, he was at the same time upholding monarchic, aristocratic, feudal and religious institutions. But in the twentieth century, particularly in America, this can no longer be the case. To conserve the established order is to conserve precious few aristocratic values, and to be committed to aristocratic and feudal values and institutions is to be in opposition to what has been prescriptively established.

This, then, is the situation which awaited anyone who wished to employ the term conservatism in modern political debate, and which the New Conservatives have failed to recognize.

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Burke's teachings have a different meaning in the twentieth century from the meaning they had in the eighteenth and nineteenth; one can advocate Burke's social ideals, or one can play Burke's rôle as the conserver of the established: but one cannot do both without self-contradiction. Louis Hartz, speaking of the "Southern Conservatism" of the ante bellum South, has described the predicament of would-be Burkeans in America in a very lucid fashion:

> The more consistently a man advanced the anti-liberal arguments of Burke, the farther away he got from the traditionalist substance they were designed to protect. The more he cherished the traditionalist substance, the farther away he got from the anti-liberal arguments. The only question was on which horn of the dilemma he wanted to impale himself.[22]

It was because they had not recognized the terms of this dilemma that these men came to believe that there was a rôle for them to play as "new conservative" political theorists, advocating both the social ideals and the political style of Edmund Burke.

When the New Conservatives have tried to describe a positive program of recommendations, these have been directed to the individual level, rather than to the political; it has been the New Conservatives' hope that it would be possible to effect a rejuvenation of traditional values and virtues through an ethical and religious appeal to individuals of superior quality.[23] Viereck

[22] *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York, 1955), pp. 153-54.

[23] One frequently hears the claim made that conservatives of a "Burkean" temperament exist in large numbers in the American population, and that, confused by the all-pervasive liberal dogmas, they are lacking only in self-awareness. Whatever part of the population such people represent, it appears that they are bound to be a disappointment to anyone who hopes to make them the basis of a revival of either cultural or political conservatism. Studies made by Herbert McCloskey of people who exhibited "conservative" convictions similar to those expressed by Kirk, Viereck, Rossiter, and others seem to indicate that these convictions are very often accompanied by psychological, intellectual or educational deficiencies on the part of the people who hold them: "By every measure available to us, conservative beliefs are found most frequently among the uninformed, the poorly educated, and so far as we can determine, the less intelligent. . . . Far from being the elite or the masters or the prime movers, conservatives tend on the whole to come from the more backward and frightened elements of the population, including the classes that are socially and psychologically depressed." "Conservatism and Personality", *American Political Science Review*, March 1958, pp. 35 and 37.

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describes his "Unadjusted Man, a New Hero for Americans", who conforms "to the ages, not to the age." He hopes to see a gifted and cultured few rise independent of the mass and provide a political and cultural leadership for it that conserves the values that have been passed down from the previous ages of Western civilization. The appeals of Kirk and Rossiter differ in particulars and in the moral tone in which they are cast, but they are also directed at the individual.[24] It would be perfectly correct to say that this is no escape from the dilemma which Hartz has described, but merely an evasion of it. Yet in one sense at least it is an escape. For, in restricting their appeals and prescriptions to the level of the individual, the New Conservatives have tacitly withdrawn from the conversation of political philosophy.

IV

This attempt to set a new course in American political thought has not traveled far, then, from the place in which it began: cultural criticism. Its participants have been unwilling and unable to move from their criticism to the statement of a positive political theory, because of the ambiguity in their attitudes toward contemporary American society: they reject it, and wish it were other than it is, and even talk of reforming it; but at the same time, their original intention was not to reform, and even the theoretical position which they have assumed discourages it.

This dilemma, however, is only the result of a misunderstanding of the part that their own viewpoint requires them to play. If they did wish to engage in serious political theorizing, then they would either have to abandon their Burkean ideas about continuity and prescription and come out for a drastic reform of society, or, on the other hand, to abandon their aristocratic ideals and reconcile themselves with the present character of American society. Obviously, neither of these alternatives is acceptable to them. Political theory, then, is not an area in which they can be expected to play a creative rôle.

Nevertheless, as cultural critics, they can perform a valuable and significant function. Freed of the ambiguities forced upon

[24] See Kirk's *Conservative Mind*, pp. 424-26; also his *Prospects for Conservatives*, chapters 6, 7, 9, 10 and 12. See also the last two chapters of Rossiter's *Conservatism in America*.

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them by their task as political theorists, their criticism of the values and practices of the mass society could have a salutary influence upon its development. Surely there is still value in the old liberal idea that truth emerges and is maintained in an atmosphere of free and vigorous debate. The presence of the New Conservative criticism in the "market place of ideas" cannot fail to be productive of insights that would have been missed by other viewpoints. Some of the New Conservative writers will not appreciate being justified by Mill. But is that not better than being condemned by Burke?

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CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1958*

THE whole problem of civil-military relations is one which has recently received an unprecedented and perhaps a disproportionate amount of scholarly attention. Three factors have contributed to the intensity of the study. First, the post-war interest in the problems of the Third German Reich has largely centered on the part played by the German Army in facilitating Hitler's rise to power and the degree of responsibility which it must bear for formulating and executing his policies.[1] Secondly, the conduct of the Second World War, involving as it did the constant interplay of domestic administration and foreign policy with purely military factors, reëmphasized that interdependence of military and civil considerations in the formation of strategy which had been revealed during the First World War but had thereafter, by all save a few highly specialized administrators, been quickly forgotten.[2] Thirdly, the discovery by the United States that its new and inescapable world responsibilities could be sustained only by the maintenance of a large and permanent military establishment awoke a continuing discussion as to how that establishment could be absorbed into a community which was not only antimilitarist by temperament and tradition, but whose constitutional structure was devised to eliminate precisely

* This article is based on a paper read at the Conference of the International Political Science Association at Opatija, Yugoslavia, in September 1958.

1 The inclusion of German military leaders among the accused at the War Crimes trials at Nuremberg in 1946 raised a number of questions about the nature of military responsibility which have not yet been entirely solved. The first extended study to appear in Britain of the relationship between Hitler and his Generals was John Wheeler-Bennett, *The Nemesis of Power* (London and New York, 1953). Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army* (Princeton, 1955), provides a fuller historical background. The studies of the Weimar period by Henry J. Gordon, *The Reichswehr and the German Republic* (Princeton, 1957), and Otto Ernst Schüddekopf, *Heer und Republik* (Hanover and Frankfurt a/M, 1955), should also be consulted.

2 Some indication of the amount of thought devoted to this question in the United Kingdom is given by Lord Hankey, *Government Control in War* (Cambridge, 1945), and John Ehrman, *Cabinet Government and War 1890-1940* (Cambridge, 1958), but a full account must await the appearance of the first volume in the Grand Strategy series of the Official History of the Second World War (U.K. Military Series, ed. by Sir James Butler) by N. H. Gibbs.

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that unity of control which is generally held to be the first essential for any military organization.[3]

Civil-military relations appeared to those who inaugurated the study of the subject as a problem primarily of politics. How, they inquired, could the generals be kept under control and be prevented from giving too military a flavor to foreign policy or public opinion, from appropriating unnecessarily too large a proportion of the national budget or even, *in extremis*, from taking over the state?[4] In some eyes an efficient army in itself constitutes a political danger: not only in Germany, where the creation of the *Bundeswehr* has been hedged about with safeguards bordering sometimes on the ludicrous, but in the United States and even the United Kingdom, where proposals to unify the armed services under a single head have been greeted with prophecies of woe whenever they have been made. The events in France in May 1958, to say nothing of those in Egypt, Iraq, the Sudan, Pakistan, and the nations where the military pronunciamento has been hallowed by tradition, do indeed suggest that the political difficulty of keeping under control the potential "men on horseback" cannot yet be altogether discounted. In "successor states" in particular, communities which have been cut loose from their constitutional roots, where traditional patterns of obedience are disturbed and political régimes cannot count upon that automatic and unthinking obedience to constituted authority which only the habit of generations can breed, the danger of military intervention in civil government is constant.[5] Such intervention stems not so much from the political ambition of military leaders as from the impatience of men

[3] E.g., Jerome G. Kerwin (ed.), *Civil-Military Relationships in American Life* (Chicago, 1948); Burton M. Sapin and Richard C. Snyder, *The Rôle of the Military in American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1954); Louis Smith, *American Democracy and Military Power* (Chicago, 1951); Timothy W. Stanley, *American Defense and National Security* (Washington, 1956); W. W. Kaufmann (ed.), *Military Policy and National Security* (Princeton, 1956); S. P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957); Walter Millis, Harvey C. Mansfield and Harold Stein, *Arms and the State* (New York, 1958). A full list of articles up to 1952 is to be found in the bibliography on *Civil-Military Relations* published by the Social Science Research Council in 1954.

[4] For this approach see particularly A. A. Ekirch, *The Civil and the Military in the United States* (New York, 1956).

[5] It should be noticed, however, that neither the United States nor the U.S.S.R. passed through a period of military dictatorships after their national revolutions—largely through the deliberate care both took to avoid it.

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trained to order and obedience with governments incapable of preserving the one or exacting the other. The armed forces provide a pattern of order and security in an anarchic world, and the pressure for their leaders to take over the administration of a disordered state often comes as much from anxious civilian elements outside the services as from ambitious ones within.

The problem of keeping the military power in due obedience to the civil is not one which overtly troubles such settled communities as Great Britain and the United States. Yet like vestigial organs in the human body which seem to give evidence of its development from earlier forms of life, distinctions can be discerned in both communities between the military and the civil elements—distinctions of temperament and outlook which in the event of social crisis might assume a political significance which at present fortunately they totally lack. The principles of hierarchy and authority upon which the services rest are difficult to reconcile with the democratic practices of free discussion and the settlement of conflicting interests by agreement and compromise. It may indeed be suggested that a problem in civil-military relations arises only when society ceases to be organized on hierarchical principles to which the military hierarchy can correspond; when civil government, in short, becomes a matter of preserving order but not of preserving *an order*. The military even in democracies are likely to remain attached to the hierarchical elements in social organization. Government by compromise and agreement, reached by hard bargaining among great national interests between whose claims no authority is competent to pronounce any final judgment, is alien to minds trained to look for or give clear orders based on expert advice. In consequence the procedures of democratic politics will often strike the military mind as being inefficient or even immoral. In the higher reaches of the defense hierarchy, the expert who knows what should be done finds himself at the mercy of the politician who knows what can; and in these circumstances those qualities of decisiveness, clarity of view and strength of will which lead men to success in the armed forces can be positively harmful unless tempered with patience, shrewdness, moderation and tact.[6]

[6] The *Memoirs* of Field Marshal Lord Montgomery of Alamein (London, 1958) gives a frank picture of the difficulties experienced by an able commander in dealing with the political aspects of defense requirements. His lecture at the Royal United Services Institution in November 1955 (R.U.S.I. *Journal*, vol. 100, p. 509) is also illuminating.

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It is worthy of comment, however, how often in Britain and the United States these qualities are so tempered in the military leaders of the nation. Such spectacular *enfants terribles* as Field Marshal Montgomery and General Douglas MacArthur are the exceptions in a profession, the bulk of whose senior members seem to be at least as remarkable for their political and diplomatic skill as for their purely military ability. In men like Dill, Wavell, Tedder, Robertson, Marshall, Eisenhower, Clay and Norstad the vestiges of the Old Adam referred to above are faint indeed. The Anglo-American military leader of the mid-twentieth century has to be as skilled at organizing a service in a complex team of varied talents and nationalities as any business operative or political boss. But the inculcation of this skill is something which has to be deliberately pursued. The young officer is educated in careful isolation, not only from the civilian world, but from the other services. He is trained in an intensive but narrow group-loyalty which he is normally, as an adolescent, particularly ready to accept. The effect of this has to be deliberately counteracted by an emphasis in military education on political and economic problems, and even on organizational skills.[7] The promising young officer will be given a succession of staff appointments which involve collaboration with other services, other branches of the government, and other nations; indeed, the average officer today who has avoided purely regimental or operational employment has a breadth of experience which makes him welcome, on retirement, in the worlds of commerce, industry or diplomacy. The age of the purely technical military specialist which reached its climax in the day of von Schlieffen is now over. We must look back to the days of Wellington and Marlborough for parallels with the soldier-statesmen of today.

Simple tensions between "soldiers" and "statesmen", between Haigs and Lloyd-Georges, are thus rarely to be found in the contemporary world. The conflict between the "civil" and the "military" takes more subtle forms; and it can best be traced in two specific areas. One is the formulation of national defense policy; the other is the structure of defense organization. The problem in the first area has been well defined, by Mr. Walter

[7] No adequate study exists of the considerable activity of this nature now in progress in the United Kingdom. For the United States, see John W. Masland and Laurence I. Redway, *Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy* (Princeton, 1957).

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Millis, as being "how to balance a proper combination of the non-strategic or non-violent with the strategic or violent components of national policy".[8] In the second area, the question is whether the "National Defense Establishment" should in its higher reaches be subject to the strictly hierarchical system of command which applies in the lower echelons; or whether the multiple national activities and interests concerned with defense —diplomacy, production, manpower, finance—call for a degree of consultation and discussion which makes any simplification dangerous and unworkable. These two issues have agitated both Britain and the United States almost without respite since the end of the Second World War; and to neither does any simple or permanent solution seem possible.

The first problem in particular is eternal and insoluble. There is no adequate way of finally determining what attention or resources should be devoted to national security in peacetime. There never has been. The only new element in the situation today lies in the unprecedented size of the demands which security considerations make on national resources in the nuclear age. It is doubtful whether Britain and the United States, deeply as they are concerned about their defense problems, are in fact any more so than were the Powers of Continental Europe between 1871 and 1914, or any less obsessed than they were by the fear that inferiority in armament, in manpower or in military organization might result in rapid and irrevocable defeat. The difficulty now as then is that military security cannot *logically* be treated as one consideration among many competing national interests, whose demands can be ruthlessly scaled down by interministerial bargaining to the size of the national resources. It is not *an* interest, but *the* interest, to which all others should defer; or so it seems to the men directly charged with its protection. The officers of the German and French armies and the British navy in the late nineteenth century—as perhaps the officers of the United States Strategic Air Command today—felt themselves members of a dedicated group whose burden of responsibility for national survival was unimaginable to the uninitiated. For the civilians who shared their view, any questioning of their expert assessments or dilution of their demands was simply treasonable. The emotions which led large sections of the French public to support their Army leaders in their claim

[8] Millis, Mansfield and Stein, *Arms and the State,* p. 144.

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that the national interest forbade the reopening of the Dreyfus case are no less effective in rallying support in democracies today for the expert assessment of "national security". "If our military are not permitted to develop a defense or to fight a war . . .", demanded an American senator in 1954, "but their strategy is diluted by political considerations of the State Department, what chance . . . do we have to defend this country?"[9]

The attitude expressed in the above words is a significant one. When conflicts arise in democracies over the emphasis which should be given to military considerations at the expense of political or economic, the military are not to be found lined up on one side and the civilians on the other. When there is an argument over the allocation of resources in peacetime or the conduct of operations in time of war, the military leader who appeals to public opinion can rely on the support of that considerable section of the community which sees the success of national policy to lie in the mobilization and deployment of maximum military strength, on the nature and use of which the advice of the experts alone must be followed. During the First World War both Joffre and Haig retained their commands long after they had forfeited the confidence of their governments because the statesmen shrank from the political storm which would follow their dismissal. In 1948 the leaders of the United States Air Force, when their demand for a 70-wing force had been rejected by Secretary Forrestal and President Truman in the interests of balanced services and a balanced budget, could successfully turn to Congress to override the presidential veto and vote appropriations which the Department of Defense found a positive embarrassment.[10] Thus in Western democracies issues long debated between competent and informed officials and settled by ministerial or presidential decision may be reopened for public debate in press and legislature; and it is only when, as in Great Britain, the executive can command an automatic legislative majority that the defeated or disgruntled parties are prevented from reopening a *chose jugée* and throwing everything once more into confusion. In the United States the President,

[9] Senator Jenner, *Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments*, Hearings before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1954. Q.v. Timothy Stanley, *American Defense and National Security*, p. 4.

[10] Walter Millis (ed.), *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York, 1951), pp. 400-427.

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unable to control Congress, can only try to control the propaganda and mutual recriminations of his armed services, which between 1948 and 1958 reached peaks of alarming intensity.[11] President Eisenhower has worked hard to tame his generals and admirals and insure that, officially and in public at least, they should speak with only one voice; but it would be rash to assert that he had altogether succeeded.[12]

Yet these differences between the services are for the civilian statesman a considerable source of strength. If the experts *did* speak with one voice about the requirements of international security, it would be extraordinarily difficult for any cabinet to resist or reduce their demands and publicly to justify such action. It is the public realization that even the most authoritative pronouncement on defense-needs by a service leader is likely to have an *ex parte* flavor and is open to attack by authorities no less qualified that enables governments safely to ignore or modify the advice of their experts. Military specialists can rarely concern themselves with technical matters alone. They have also to take into account such variables as the political and military intentions of potential adversaries and the morale and political stability of friendly or neutral states; and about such questions as these the margin even of expert error is considerable. General MacArthur and General Bradley found themselves in total contradiction as to the significance of the Korean fighting in 1950-1951. For MacArthur it was the opening of a Communist bid to sweep the Pacific; for Bradley it was a feint to distract attention from the main attack threatening Europe. We do not yet know which, if either, was right, but their disagreement, and the growing rift between MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, enabled President Truman to reassert his authority as Commander in Chief and the principle of civil primacy in questions of military policy.[13]

[11] Each of the services gave trouble in turn. Forrestal had to deal with the Air Force in 1948, his successor, Louis Johnson, with the "Admiral's Revolt" of 1949, and Charles E. Wilson with the calculated leakages of information by the Army in 1956.

[12] See especially his attack on "legalized insubordination" at his press conference of 28 May 1958.

[13] This conflict may best be studied in Courtney Whitney, *MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History* (New York, 1956); Richard H. Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The General and the President and the Future of American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1951); the second volume of Harry S.

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It is questionable indeed how far such appreciations as those of MacArthur and Bradley can be considered as "military" judgments, and to what extent soldiers, even the best informed, are the best judges of such questions of grand strategy as the broad political intentions, stretching perhaps over decades, of potential adversaries. Military analyses tend to confuse capacity with intentions, to consider that the possession of weapons and forces is reasonable evidence of intention to use them. Equally they tend to read into the actions and plans of a potential adversary a pattern of logical coherence which the performances of very few governments are shown, once their records are available for examination, to possess. The training in military intelligence which equips the professional soldier to build up from a multiplicity of indications a clear picture of the dispositions and intentions of an opposing commander may mislead him when he is dealing with civilians whose policy is not shaped by any objective so clear-cut as military victory but rather by a general concept of the national good which is constantly modified by the pressure of specific interests or the need to solve particularly urgent problems. There can be considerable danger in governments relying upon quasi-military appreciation of the world situation based on military or secret-service sources of information, to the exclusion of normal diplomatic reports by trained envoys with long and sympathetic experience of the habits of mind and government of the nation to which they are accredited. Military factors are only one element in a far wider political picture and need to be treated as such.

Developments in the defense organization of the United Kingdom and the United States during the past ten years have shown increasing recognition of this. So far from the military element expanding at the expense of the civil in government, it is arguable that the civilian has constantly and inevitably encroached on the military. The main problem of defense in peacetime is the allocation of resources; and the decision as to what proportion of the national income should be devoted to defense purposes is clearly a civil one. Yet the size of the allocation, by limiting the weapons available, will largely determine the mili-

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Truman's *Memoirs* (New York, 1956); and the transcript of the Hearings by the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, *The Military Situation in the Far East.*

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tary policy of a nation. When in October 1948 President Truman attempted to hold the United States defense budget steady at $14.4 billion, Secretary Forrestal had to point out that with these resources the United States, in the event of a Russian attack on Europe, would be capable only of a strategy of reprisal against the Russian homeland and that all thought of holding the Mediterranean by naval forces or aiding allies with ground troops would have to be abandoned.[14] Very similar motives of economy compelled the adoption by Great Britain, in 1957, of a policy in which the size and structure of conventional forces were shaped by the decision to abolish compulsory national service and to rely to an increased extent on nuclear weapons.[15] Such decisions as these are taken by predominantly civilian bodies—by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet in Great Britain, and the National Security Council in the United States—in which the military leaders of the nation are at best a minority element or to which they may be summoned simply as advisers. The Service Departments have become confined in their activities to recruiting, procurement and administration. Wider questions of policy and strategy have become the concern of committees working directly under the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The civil and military heads of the service may still be consulted by the government—indeed in both countries special precautions are taken to insure that this should still be so—but normally these ministers and officers are subordinate to Departments of Defense which, having originated on both sides of the Atlantic as little more than coördinating secretariats, have developed into controlling bodies with central authority over planning and policy.[16] Even the ministry in charge of this Department is likely to be outvoted, at the National Security Council and the Cabinet Defence Committee, by colleagues more intimately concerned with economic policy or foreign affairs.

[14] *Forrestal Diaries*, p. 498.

[15] White Paper on Defence, *Outline of Future Policy*, Cmd. 124, 1957.

[16] In both the United Kingdom and the United States this tendency was intensified in 1958. In both it was decided that operational orders should go direct from the Department of Defense to operational commands, without being even formally routed through the individual services. *Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958*, and *Central Organization for Defence*, Cmd. 476, 1958.

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It must also be borne in mind—certainly so far as British defense organization is concerned—that military advice and civil advice do not come up through entirely separate channels to the bodies ultimately responsible for making decisions. In fact the formal institution of the interdepartmental committee and the informal influence of personal contact between the ministries at every level, especially within a Civil Service so closely integrated as the British, insures an intertwining of views so constant that the "purely military" will never be more than one element in a complex pattern. In such committees, indeed, the military members will usually be less concerned with urging any policy, whether pacific or bellicose, than with examining the implications in terms of logistics and supply of the various hypothetical situations which purely political changes might bring about, and in advising accordingly as to present dispositions and needs.

Such an adulteration of the purely military element in defense planning should provide no cause for surprise; for there can be few areas of the world or of national activity where a purely military assessment can sanely be made. Considerations of local politics, of national finance, of allied susceptibilities and of world repercussions have to be weighed exhaustively before a statesman can safely authorize the firing of a single rifleshot in the execution of a national military policy. It is this sophistication of defense questions that has called into being the interdepartmental policy-planning groups of which the British Committee of Imperial Defence was the first example and the National Security Council of the United States is now the best known. Yet as defense policy has become more complex and delicate, the demand has gone up for a simpler and more unitary type of organization to facilitate those decisions which this increasing complexity makes ever more difficult to make. The mechanism of inter-service coöperation has seemed in some eyes to be ever less adequate either for the planning of policy and the economical utilization of resources in peacetime or for the expeditious conduct of operations in time of war. The changes in defense organization in Britain and the United States since the Second World War have followed very similar lines in an attempt to meet these objections. The Minister and the Secretary of Defense are being transformed from coördinators into responsible executives, with enlarged staffs and direct control over operations. The Chiefs of Staff are no longer councils which each

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member attends primarily as a representative of his service, but have become instead Directories with their own staffs and secretariat; while their Chairman, an office originally created as an administrative convenience and filled in Britain by each member in turn, has steadily grown in importance until in Britain, in 1958, the post was transformed into that of Chief of the Defence Staff—effectively head of all the Armed Services, issuing all operational orders and acting as principal military adviser to the Minister of Defence.[17]

These developments have awaked considerable opposition. In the United States fears have been expressed that the creation of a strong Department of Defense will threaten such supervision as Congress has hitherto exercised through its Committees on Appropriations and the Armed Services over defense planning.[18] President Eisenhower's demand in April 1958 for the Secretary of Defense to be given a free hand in allocating funds among the services struck particularly at the detailed control which Congress could exert through the power of the purse. "Space-ships, satellites and guided missiles", proclaimed Representative Vinson, "cannot abrogate the Constitution of the United States."[19] The old fears of the man on horseback were not entirely dead; certainly in Great Britain the political enemies of Earl Mountbatten, the heir apparent to the post of Chief of Defence Staff, did what they could to arouse them. But more serious doubts were felt in both countries about committing to a single Minister and his military advisers anything like final responsibility for weighing and deciding issues whose gravity demanded both a higher court of jurisdiction and a wider area of public debate. The reorganization which took place in both countries in 1958, strengthening the position of the Minister of Defence and his Chief of Staff, made provision also for the Chiefs of the separate services to appeal over their heads, in Britain to the Cabinet and in the United States to Congress.[20] It is not easy to find a parallel to this curious check on ministerial power in any civilian department of the government. The fear which it was designed to assuage was that of the divorce of power from responsibility, of

[17] See note 16.

[18] See, however, Elias Huzar, *The Purse and the Sword: Control of the Army by Congress through Military Appropriations* (Ithaca, 1950) for the limitations of this supervision.

[19] *U.S. News and World Report,* 25 April 1958.

[20] *The Times,* 26 June 1958.

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a central staff formulating policy which it would not itself be required to carry out; and analogies were widely drawn with that ill-fated body the *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht*. But the intensity with which such arguments were urged suggests that the real objections to any centralization of authority in the realm of defense were based on doubts far more profound than any of the efficiency of the organization. The basic criticism was, as *The Times* worded it, that overcentralization would "put the defence machine at the mercy of one or two men."[20] Efficiency may be bought at too high a price. In wartime it is necessary and desirable that the maximum power should be concentrated in the hands of these one or two men, with sufficient authority as well as sufficient information to make rapid and far-reaching decisions; and the object of defense organization under these circumstances is to provide an unhampered supply of information and resources to the commanders and smooth channels of command down which their instructions can flow. In peacetime, in a democracy, such a pattern seems neither desirable nor necessary. The nonmilitary considerations to which the wartime commander inevitably allots a low priority enjoy in peace at least parity with the military, and a relationship merely of liaison is not enough to do them justice. The military virtues of expedition and decisiveness are less important than the ability to consider fully every relevant factor before coming to decisions which, without necessarily ever being put to the test of war, will determine the shape of the armed services and the military capacity of the nation for perhaps decades to come. Such decisions can be made only by the authority on whom lies the burden of ultimate responsibility in all other areas of national life. In Great Britain this is the Cabinet. In the United States it is an executive checked by a fully informed and jealous legislature. To these authorities the information on which their decisions are to be based must always be freely available. To locate the ultimate authority for defense anywhere save with the civil sovereign authority is to create another, and far more effective, sovereign power; and were that to happen neither Britain nor the United States would be likely to survive—as democracies or as anything else.

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SOVIET AGRICULTURE SINCE 1953

IN Soviet agriculture in the 1950's may be seen the same economic problems and ideological contradiction that have been evident ever since the Bolsheviks assumed power. In the 1920's, the existence of twenty to twenty-five million small independent landholdings was in serious conflict with the socialist view that agriculture must eventually pass to state control. In an economic sense, moreover, the realization of the socialist dream of rapid industrial expansion was made difficult by the countless number of peasants cultivating their numerous plots with the antiquated technology of Czarist Russia.

Awareness of the problems mentioned above led to the collectivization of agriculture which began in the 1920's and recurred sporadically in later years. Strong peasant resistance in the early period resulted in tremendous livestock losses through current consumption while in later years the *kolkhoznik* (or collective farmer) indirectly resisted the state by expending a disproportionate amount of time and energy on the tiny, privately owned plot granted to him outside the *kolkhoz*. The still sullen resentments of the peasants remained at the core of the agricultural problem in the 1950's.

I

In 1928, collective farms, state farms, and other "state-operated" farms comprised only 2.7 per cent of the total crop area of the Soviet Union; the bulk of the cultivated land (96.3 per cent) was accounted for by the individual peasant farms and the husbandries of other population groups. By 1956 the state and collective farms controlled 96.2 per cent of all developed land while privately owned farm land had dwindled to a very insignificant 0.02 per cent of the total.[1]

Collective farms, which dominate the Soviet agricultural scene, are, in theory, coöperatives that are operated by the peasant farmers. In practice the farms are supervised by a farm chairman

[1] Central Statistical Board of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, *Forty Years of Soviet Power in Facts and Figures,* translated from the Russian (Moscow, 1958), p. 160.

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who is supposedly elected by the *kolkhozniki* but is actually appointed by the local unit of the Communist party. In 1953 the total crop area of the collective farms exceeded 130 million hectares; in comparison, the total crop area of the state farms was only 15.2 million hectares. At that time each of the 9,000 Machine Tractor Stations was obligated to service an average of ten collective farms.[2]

At the beginning of the present decade there were over 250,000 collective farms in the U.S.S.R. with an average area of about 1,000 acres. By 1953 the number of units was reduced to 97,000 and in the process the average acreage more than tripled. Nevertheless, the heterogeneous nature of Soviet agriculture was permitted to survive throughout the duration of Stalin's rule simply because there seemed to be no satisfactory solution to the problem of creating a purely socialistic agricultural sector.

Legally all farm land was already owned by the state. The Decree on Land, adopted at the Second Congress of Soviets on November 8, 1917, abolished private land ownership for all time and the confiscated land became public, state property. Under the Articles of Association of the Kolkhozy all land remained the property of the state while the use of both collective farm land and smaller individual plots was guaranteed in perpetuity. This arrangement permitted the *kolkhozniki* to own a limited number of livestock and to dispose of the surplus produce from garden plots and *kolkhozy* allotments on the free market. Stalin pointed out in his reply to the letters of A. V. Sanina and V. G. Venzher that this "surplus collective-farm output must be excluded from the system of commodity circulation" if collective farm property was ever to be raised to the level of public property.[3] The desirable alternative to commodity circulation would be the extension of "products-exchange" between state industry and the collective farms. Elimination of any semblance of the free market would give the state complete control of all agricultural production and the farmers' incomes as well.

From its gross output, each collective farm was required to meet certain obligations to the state, the Machine Tractor Station, and the collective itself. The residuum, estimated to average 35 to 39 per cent of gross output, was available for

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 152.

[3] Joseph Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.*, translated from the Russian (New York, 1952), p. 70.

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distribution to the *kolkhozniki*. With it the farmers were able to "compete with the state in selling to the urban consumer, and in time of scarcity . . . create a black market so great that during the second world war the government could do nothing but legalize it as the so-called open market."[4] Excess produce from the individual subsidiary husbandries of the collective farmers (about 3 per cent of the total crop area) could also be sold on the open market in competition with the state stores. That such competition involved a serious ideological contradiction was clearly stated by Stalin. That it also constituted an everyday problem of far-reaching proportions may be judged from the fact that nearly half of the Soviet cattle in 1953 were privately owned and that this sector contributed about 25 per cent of the total marketable output of meat.

The 1953 inventories of cattle, sheep and goats were each below their respective levels for 1928; the Russians claimed greater success in the raising of pigs, however, with a slight gain noted in 1953 compared with the pre-collectivization inventory.

Vitally related to the livestock problem and of equal importance was the shortage of grain. While the area devoted to cereals was persistently increased by millions of hectares annually in the post-war period, it seems likely that the output in 1953 did not equal the record harvest of 1937. A slight decline in deliveries of grain by the state farms between 1940 and 1953 coupled with the fact that the collectivized area devoted to grain crops was not substantially enlarged during the same period would seem to indicate a tendency toward stagnation.

The long-run trends also provided the Russians with little encouragement. Between 1913 and 1953 grains increased by less than one third, hogs by about one fourth, sheep and goats by less than one fourth, and cattle by about one eighth. Furthermore, most of the gains had come in the pre-collectivization period while in subsequent years and until Stalin's departure from the scene, agricultural output per capita had not kept pace with the growing population. Because of the country's poor agriculture, the average Soviet citizen was worse fed in 1953 than before the revolution.

The government had vainly attempted throughout the Five Year Plans to increase farm production by mechanization and collectivization. But mechanization cannot alter the fact that

[4] Leo Gruliow (ed.), *Current Soviet Policies* (New York, 1953), p. iv.

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most of the agricultural land lies farther north than Minneapolis or that on most of the land moisture is as scarce as it is on the Great Plains of North America. Such unfavorable geographical conditions made it undesirable, until 1953, to cultivate more than about one tenth of the Soviet Union's huge expanse which was less than the cultivated area of the United States. The land normally produced only two thirds of the crop volume produced in the United States and was subject to droughts which destroyed as much as one fourth of the harvest every four or five years. Because of generally less productive soil and less efficient farming methods, six Soviet workers were required to match the production of one American farm worker. (However, such a comparison does not take into account the fact that a large part of the Soviet farm labor force is made up of women, children and older workers.)

The geographic environment has played an important but not a singular rôle in the retardation of Soviet agriculture. As previously mentioned, the deliberate policy of collectivization was so strongly opposed by the kulaks that they destroyed their livestock in order to prevent the government from taking it. The government thereupon liquidated the kulaks and, with them, much of the country's agricultural knowledge and skill. Before the Soviet Union could recover from this dual blow to agriculture, it was invaded by Germany, and a great part of its livestock was seized by the enemy. The result was that as late as 1950 the yield of animal products was lower than it had been in 1928.

II

The year 1953 marks the beginning of an era of agricultural revitalization within the Soviet Union. Although Malenkov initiated the "New Course" policies, the true bellwether of the reforms in agriculture was Nikita Khrushchev. Malenkov had pressed for temporary concessions to the peasantry including an increase in prices paid by the state to the collective farmers for additional output of certain items and a concomitant reduction and simplification of the compulsory payments in kind to the government. A new tax program relating to the peasant households called for a 50 per cent reduction in absolute terms and a general overhaul of the tax structure. In the future, the levy was to be determined by the amount of private land the *kol-*

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khoznik had available for cultivation; in the past, the tax had been in proportion to output. Along with the new tax came an invitation to the peasants to increase their holdings of privately owned livestock. Seemingly the peasant was to receive greater reward for his labor, both communal and private.

Khrushchev's initial report on agriculture was presented to the Communist Party Central Committee in September of 1953; the Soviet leader considered a multiplicity of topics including animal husbandry, grain yields, housing, population trends, the lag in agriculture, and the need for further incentives and quota reductions.[5] Shortly thereafter the committee responded to Khrushchev's proposals by drawing up a resolution which outlined a broad program for developing Soviet agriculture.[6] The resolution explicitly recognized that the level of agricultural production was not adequate for the increasing requirements of the population for foodstuffs and of light industry for raw materials. It reiterated an earlier charge of Malenkov that the volume of production did not correspond to the amount of farm equipment or the potentialities inherent in the collective farm system. The decree took particular note of the "especially bad" situation in animal husbandry: many animals were dying of disease; the fodder base for animal husbandry on the collectives was poorly developed; the livestock was unsatisfactorily provided with shelter; and, lastly, the labor-consuming processes in animal husbandry were not sufficiently mechanized.

The fundamental cause of the notable lag of the farm sector was succinctly revealed as the "violation of the principle of the workers' material interest in developing production." The committee also called attention to certain other reasons why agriculture was lagging. Many of the Machine Tractor Stations were charged with giving poor assistance to the collective farms in sowing and harvesting feed crops, in organizing livestock wintering, and in carrying out plans to mechanize labor-consuming processes in livestock sections. At the same time it was made glaringly evident that there was no shortage of trained personnel: an estimated 350,000 agricultural specialists were available but of this number only 50,000 had positions with the Machine

[5] *Pravda*, Sept. 15, 1953, trans. from the Russian by the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (hereinafter referred to as *CD*), V, No. 39 (1953), 11-12, 24-41.

[6] *Pravda*, Sept. 13, 1953, *CD*, V, No. 37 (1953), 1-5; also No. 38, pp. 3-7, and No. 39, pp. 8-13.

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Tractor Stations while another 18,500 were employed by the collective farms.

Leadership of the collective farms was also brought under searching scrutiny. It was disclosed that out of a total of 94,000 collective farm chairmen, only 2,400 had reached "higher" educational levels and only 14,200 had specialized secondary education. In Alma-Ata Province the ratio was ludicrous: only one out of 416 farm managers was a specialist.

According to the Central Committee resolution, a marked increase in the output of animal products was to be achieved within two to three years. Fulfillment of this aim was said to depend upon a sharp increase in meat and dairy yields, higher rates of increase in the herds, and a further improvement in breeds and strains. Imposing livestock goals were announced but the percentage increases were in some cases to be considerably less than those demanded earlier in the year.

In order to insure an adequate supply of vegetables and potatoes for the rapidly growing urban population, the resolution called upon certain strategically located state farms to begin to specialize in the production of these commodities. The shift was to affect 154 farms in 1953 and 1954.

III

By the end of 1953 there were indications that agriculture not only was lagging but actually constituted a brake on the further expansion of the economy. Malenkov may have been aware of the basic weaknesses of the agricultural sector although his famous statement at the Nineteenth Party Congress concerning the solution of the grain problem seems to support a contrary view. But a comrade was in the wings whose star was rapidly rising. On September 13, 1953, shortly after he reported to the Central Committee on the agricultural situation, Nikita S. Khrushchev was elected First Secretary of the Communist Party. Increasingly the problem of agriculture—and eventually all significant Soviet problems—resided in his hands. Early in 1954 the first obvious break with Malenkov came with Khrushchev's report to the Central Committee in which he presented the daring scheme of opening vast tracts of virgin and idle lands in a bold new attempt to solve the Soviet problem of an adequate grain supply.

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The new approach stands in sharp contrast with the long-standing desire of the Soviets to increase agricultural production primarily through increased yields. Thus it is not surprising to find that on January 28, 1953, the newspaper *Pravda* carried an editorial calling for output increases for all agricultural crops, the increases in the main to be achieved by raising crop yields. The Central Committee followed the same line in its September 1953 resolution while only a few weeks earlier Malenkov had noted that the major responsibility of the Machine Tractor Stations was to raise the harvest yields of the collective farms. In each case the emphasis was placed on increased yields.

The first noticeable departure came in February 1954 when, in an article primarily concerned with the soil feeding of plants, Academician T. D. Lysenko launched into a discussion of the two important possibilities for increasing grain output: through greater crop yields and through the development of new lands.[7] By "new lands" Lysenko was not referring to potentially irrigated farm land. Instead he clearly spoke out for the development of new virgin land in areas where irrigation would not be a prerequisite and he also indicated the desirability of cultivating communal and state farm land presently left idle. A harvest, Lysenko predicted, of 25 to 30 or more centners of wheat per hectare could be considered the average potential yield from good virgin land.

A few days later Khrushchev warned the Central Committee that there was still a shortage of grain in the country, especially on the collective farms. The solution to this problem lay in the development of virgin and idle lands (as Lysenko had proposed) and the party leader suggested that the development of 13 million hectares could be completed in the 1954-1955 seasons. The plan was to be carried out through the existing state farms and Machine Tractor Stations and by newly organized state farms.

The Central Committee Decree on Virgin and Idle Lands was adopted on March 2, 1954.[8] It called for extended sowing of grain crops on new land in Kazakstan, Siberia, the Urals, the Volga region and in some parts of the North Caucasus. A yield of 14 to 15 centners of spring wheat per hectare was predicted from the farms of Kazakstan and Siberia while it was suggested

[7] *Izvestia*, Feb. 20, 1954, *CD*, VI, No. 8 (1954), 20.

[8] *CD*, VI, No. 9 (1954), 3-6; also No. 10, pp. 18-20.

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that advanced farms would undoubtedly show yields of 25 or more centners per hectare. The Young Communist League was made responsible for the organization and dispatching of 100,000 machine operator volunteers.

The 1954 harvest of grain was better than in 1953 despite rather unfavorable weather in the Southern Ukraine and the Volga region; thus, the virgin and idle lands venture was undoubtedly a success, even in its initial stages. However, it seems quite probable that the diversion of farm machinery to Siberia from more fertile lands contributed to the crop failures in those areas usually having high production levels; and by January 1955 the expected grain yield of 14 to 15 centners per hectare that Khrushchev originally hoped for had to be replaced by a more realistic 10 centners per hectare. Nevertheless, one may question even this long-run outlook for these marginal lands since such an average would exceed the typical grain yield for the country as a whole in recent years. Precipitation in the new areas was exceptionally favorable in 1954 compared with the drought of 1955 which largely ruined the regional grain crop. Thus, while sufficient rain may lead to an important addition to total grain output, several years of poor rainfall (such as experienced in 1955) could conceivably create a huge Russian dust bowl.

While the Russians may get less in the long run than they expected from the virgin lands project, one must be careful not to underestimate the true success of the plan. As Lazar Volin noted recently, "while average yields per hectare are low, the multiplier of the huge acreage has meant a substantial increase in the production of food, of feed, and hence of livestock".[9]

IV

In an attempt to meet the increasing feed requirements of livestock, a research program was launched in 1954 aimed at extending the corn belt far north and east of the traditional bounds.[10] On many collective farms corn was planted for the first time; hundreds of thousands of hectares were devoted to this crop. As a result of the experiments the corn belt, which

[9] Lazar Volin, "Reforms in Agriculture", *Problems of Communism*, VIII, No. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1959), 43.

[10] *Selskoye khozyaistvo*, Nov. 12, 1954, *CD*, VI, No. 6 (1954), 25-26.

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traditionally extended across most of the U.S.S.R. but only slightly above 50 degrees latitude, received new boundaries. In the area near Moscow, corn was now to be grown far to the north of 60 degrees latitude, and only out beyond 70 degrees longitude was the boundary to extend south of 60 degrees latitude.

On January 25, 1955, the Party Central Committee at a plenary session heard Khrushchev's report containing his proposals for increasing livestock products in the Soviet Union.[11] The Party Secretary noted that in 1953, 4.5 billion poods of corn were harvested in the United States. Of the total United States grain area, 30 million hectares were sown to corn (which was about equivalent to the wheat area). This compared with only 3.5 million hectares of corn in the U.S.S.R. Khrushchev emphasized that while only 35 per cent of the total United States grain area was devoted to corn, this particular grain crop accounted for some 55 per cent of the over-all yield of grain of all varieties. Furthermore, the use of hybrid corn had enabled Americans to raise the 1953 yield to 25 centners per hectare which constituted an increase of about 70 per cent over the pre-war yield. It was estimated that about 83 per cent of the United States corn area in 1953 was sown with hybrid corn.

The high level of animal husbandry in the United States, Khrushchev continued, could be attributed largely to the fact that a high percentage of the total corn crop was used for feeding livestock. In 1953 from three to four million hectares were sown to corn for silage and green fodder in the United States which roughly equaled the total area sown to maize for all purposes in the Soviet Union.

With this picture of American results as a background, Khrushchev suggested that expanded corn sowing in the Soviet Union provided the best possible means for increasing grain production. The Soviet corn area in 1954 totaled only about 4.4 million hectares but this was to be increased to a minimum of 28 million hectares by 1960. Preparing in advance for any criticism, Khrushchev explained that, in regions subject to drought, corn (as an intertilled crop) would be more drought resistant and give higher yields. Then too, whereas in areas of high precipitation the harvesting of potatoes, wheat and other

[11] *Pravda*, Feb. 3, 1955, *CD*, VII, No. 6 (1955), 3-5.

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crops is difficult at times, corn may be gathered under any weather conditions.

Within a week after receiving Khrushchev's report, the Central Committee announced its Decree on Livestock Products. The Decree noted that "the present level of development in animal husbandry, particularly in terms of productivity and number of livestock, is not meeting the increased demands of the people for livestock products or those of light and food industry for raw materials."[12] Communal animal husbandry, the committee chided, continued to be the most lagging branch of agriculture. A sharp rise in grain output was viewed as a necessary prerequisite to any improvement. The resolution called for a minimum of 10 billion poods of grain annually by 1960 or 1961. The solution of the grain problem was said to depend on the following steps: (1) increased productivity in all areas, (2) reduction in losses during harvesting, (3) the development of virgin and idle lands, and (4) expanded corn sowings.

When 10 billion poods of grain became available annually, according to the committee, the country would be able to meet all grain requirements, establish larger reserves, expand trade with foreign countries and, at the same time, allot more than four billion poods of grain for animal husbandry each year. Thus, the demand for increased grain was merely a prelude to a mandate calling for at least a twofold increase in the output of basic livestock products in five to six years; this was now considered possible since all Soviet farms supposedly had already reached an "advanced" stage.

The Report on 1955 Plan Fulfillment showed that the total area sown to grain crops had increased 13 per cent over the 1954 figure.[13] Gross corn yield increased 3.6-fold in the same period while the yield of green mass of corn increased many times. This, according to the Soviets, made possible a 31 per cent increase in milk production on collective farms in 1955; supposedly the milk yield per *kolkhoz* cow had increased about 16 per cent.

Premier Bulganin, who replaced Malenkov in February 1955, reported that agriculture in the Fifth Five Year Plan had lagged behind other sectors of the economy and failed to reach estab-

[12] Adopted Jan. 31, 1955. *Pravda*, Feb. 2, 1955, *CD*, VII, No. 4 (1955), 17-25.
[13] *CD*, VIII, No. 5 (1956), 25.

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lished goals.[14] He admonished that a steep rise in agricultural output was absolutely essential. In particular, Bulganin suggested that meat production (based on recent successes) could be doubled by 1960 if efforts were concentrated on the raising of hogs.

Khrushchev, in his report to the Twentieth Party Congress, reiterated the need for four billion poods of fodder grain annually.[15] The shift to corn was to continue since its worth had now been proved; it had, according to the Party Secretary, contributed to a larger increase in milk production than ever before noted under Soviet rule.

The official Report on the Fulfillment of the Five Year Plan came several months later and listed the following commodities and the percentage increases which had supposedly been noted for each between 1951 and 1955: meat (all types), 30 per cent; pork, 66 per cent; milk, 19 per cent; eggs, 54 per cent; and wool, 42 per cent.[16] While these increases did not constitute a revolution, the report observed that other phases of agriculture accomplished even less; for instance, the increase in daily output per tractor and per combine was considered negligible.

Several months before the results of the Fifth Five Year Plan were made public, the party issued its directives on the Sixth Five Year Plan.[17] The announcement charged that the Fifth Five Year Plan goal for agricultural output as a whole had not been reached; this, in turn, prevented the further development of some branches of the light and food industries and it retarded the production of various consumers' goods as well. The shift back to heavy industry (if any real shift had occurred under Malenkov) was complete by 1955 and it was not surprising to learn that further growth of all branches of the economy was to be ensured "on the basis of preponderant development of heavy industry, continuous technical progress and higher labor productivity."

Once again the target of 180 million tons (11 billion poods) of grain annually by 1960 was announced. In addition, the gross

[14] *Pravda*, Feb. 22, 1956, *CD*, VIII, No. 11 (1956), 12; also No. 12, p. 21.

[15] *Pravda*, Feb. 15, 1956, *CD*, VIII, No. 4 (1956), 3-16; also No. 5, pp. 3-15, and No. 6, pp. 3-9.

[16] *Pravda*, April 25, 1956, *CD*, VIII, No.17 (1956), 6.

[17] *Pravda*, Jan. 15, 1956, *CD*, VIII, No. 3 (1956), 3-8; also No. 4, pp. 16-20, and No. 5, pp. 16-22, 54.

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harvest of technical crops, potatoes, vegetables, and livestock products was to increase as follows (1960 as a per cent of 1955): raw cotton, 156; sugar beets, 154; potatoes, 185; vegetables, 218; meat, 200; milk, 195; eggs, 254; and wool, 182.

The mechanization of agriculture was to be carried out at an unprecedented pace during the Sixth Five Year Plan. Not only were the expected annual increments to be more than double those of former years, but the total number of units in 1956 was less than the expected additions during the plan.

The Report on Fulfillment of the 1956 State Plan was released on January 31, 1957.[18] It was explained that although many collective farms, Machine Tractor Stations, and state farms still incurred considerable losses in harvesting, the gross grain harvest (barn yield) in 1956 increased approximately 20 per cent over the 1955 harvest, to a higher level than at any time in the entire history of the country, including the best harvest years of 1937, 1940 and 1952. The quantity of grain procured by the state (not counting payments in grain and substitutions of other products for grain deliveries) grew to an impressive 3.304 billion poods, a 1.4 billion pood increase over the 1953 level.

Pervukhin's Report on the 1957 Plan was published shortly thereafter and established the fact that the state farms were assuming a steadily increasing rôle in the production of grain.[19] Of the 3.3 billion poods of grain produced in 1956, state farms delivered 933 million poods (an amount exceeding the total delivered by the state farms in the entire period from 1953 to 1955). The state farms organized on virgin and idle lands contributed about 505 million poods in 1956.

But Khrushchev, never really contented with the results of his peasant farmers, launched a new propaganda offensive in 1957. Soviet agriculture was to concentrate on the task of overtaking the United States per capita output of milk by 1958, and the per capita production of meat by 1960, or by 1961 at the very latest. Khrushchev averred that by matching United States agricultural production "we shall have shot a highly powerful torpedo at the underpinnings of capitalism."[20] Sharply criticizing those Soviet economists who did not expect Russia to catch

[18] *Pravda*, Jan. 31, 1957, *CD*, IX, No. 4 (1957), 5.

[19] *Pravda*, Feb. 6, 1957, *CD*, IX, No. 6 (1957), 4-9.

[20] *Pravda*, May 24, 1957, *CD*, IX, No. 21 (1957), 9.

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up with the United States in per capita production of these commodities until 1975, Khrushchev warned:

> What does it mean if we postpone the solution of this vitally important problem until 1975? It means allowing the ideologists of the capitalist world a longer time to chatter against the socialist system, against collective farming and against the socialist countries . . . and yet some capitalist countries produce more provisions per capita than the socialist countries.[21]

This peaceful contest of economic counterparts was not destined to remain long in the limelight, however. On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik I. Behind the cloud of international publicity concerned with the Russian earth satellite, the Russian announcement that the Sixth Five Year Plan would be terminated two years ahead of schedule and replaced by a new Seven Year Plan (which would be in effect from 1959 through 1965) received little attention in most Western circles. Evidently many of the 1960 goals of the Communists could not be reached on schedule; Utopia was still "just around the corner," but now it would take five additional years to complete the expedition.

V

Although Khrushchev's name was not mentioned, an announcement in June 1957 that all farmstead holdings in the Belorussian Republic would be moved to collective farm settlements between 1957 and 1960 was certainly reminiscent of his earlier (1950) demands for the development of "agro-cities".[22] Belorussian officials claimed that low population density (15 to 20 persons per hectare), typical of rural settlements, gave rise to high costs for streets, roads, water systems, sewer systems and power lines. By limiting the size of the home garden plots in the residential zone of the collective farm centers to 0.15 to 0.20 hectares and enlarging the household units to at least the size of two-family units, the cost of developing such centers was expected to be sharply reduced.

Belorussian collective farmers who were resettled in the period from 1957 to 1960 were to be exempted from paying an agricultural tax and from making obligatory payments of potatoes

[21] *Ibid*, p. 8.

[22] *Sovetskaya Belorussia*, June 25, 1957, *CD*, IX, No. 27 (1957), 24-25.

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and livestock products to the state for three years, including the year in which resettlement took place. However, a decree of the Party Central Committee and the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers in July 1957 abolishing obligatory payments from the private plots of all farmers and workers, in effect, nullified part of the concessions originally granted to the Belorussians only.

In November 1957 at a special 40th Anniversary Session of the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev disclosed that several areas of the country had been hard hit by drought, especially the Volga area, the Urals and certain provinces of Kazakstan.[23] As a result, the 1957 grain harvest was lower in quantity than the record yield obtained in 1956. The Central Committee described it as a "difficult year for agriculture." Hardest hit was the middle and lower Volga region where it was reported that the drought was more severe than in the memorable year of 1921. Still, procurements of grain were about equal to the 1955 level and 18 per cent greater than they had been in 1953.

Milk and meat procurements were also up in 1957, and the goal of 1,700 kilograms of milk per *kolkhoz* cow was said to have been reached in 1957; the average of 1,857 kilograms went beyond the 1960 goal by a considerable margin. The prediction was again made that in 1958 the Russians would catch up with the United States in the per capita production of milk.

Accompanying the news of the drought in the Soviet press came a report that the first symptoms of wind erosion were evidenced in the virgin and idle lands as early as 1955 when about 4,500 hectares were lost. In 1957 an additional 7,000 hectares of wheat and millet were ruined. Furthermore, some lands, the account cautioned, could be expected to lose their fertility if cultivated for five years in succession.[24]

Nevertheless, in 1958 the Russians gathered a good harvest of grain according to the Report on Fulfillment of the Annual Plan.[25] The gross grain harvest (barn yield) totaled 8.5 billion poods including 4.6 billion poods of wheat, the most valuable food crop. This compared with an aggregate total of 8 billion poods in 1952 as announced by Malenkov in the following year. Late in 1958, however, Khrushchev (and later the Central Committee) disclosed that Malenkov's claim constituted a gross exag-

[23] *Pravda*, Nov. 7, 1957, *CD*, IX, No. 45 (1957), 7.
[24] *Izvestia*, Jan. 4, 1958, *CD*, X, No. 1 (1958), 28-29.
[25] *Pravda*, Jan. 16, 1959, *CD*, XI, No. 3 (1959), 11-16.

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geration (presumably because of terminology employed); the actual 1952 grain harvest (barn yield) was said to total only 5.6 billion poods.[26] From the committee's point of view it probably would have been inconceivable to retain Malenkov's estimate of the 1952 harvest; obviously, the five-year increase would then have seemed quite insignificant. But that such an error could go undetected, or at least remain unpublicized for five years, should in itself provide ample evidence of the nature of Soviet statistics.

In the November 1957 issue of *Oktyabr,* Ivan Vinnichenko reminded his readers of the views of the Soviet economists, Sanina and Venzher, concerning the relationship of the Machine Tractor Stations and the collective farms; they favored placing all the necessary means of production in the hands of the collective farmers.[27] Vinnichenko reasoned that Stalin had been wise in his rejection of their proposal, however, and he offered as a compromise a plan to place all the means of production "at the disposal of the collective farms."

In contrast, Khrushchev's Report on the Development of the Collective Farm System and the Reorganization of the Machine Tractor Stations provided little in the way of a compromise.[28] According to Khrushchev, the collective farms had arrived at a stage where they were large and economically strong, better equipped, adequately provided with cadres of field specialists, livestock experts and machine operators, and, finally, both the income and standard of living of the collective farmers were up sharply. Khrushchev felt that it was time to approve the Sanina-Venzher idea. The Central Committee agreed and responded with a proposal advising the Machine Tractor Stations to sell their equipment to the *kolkhozy* from time to time and then reorganize into Repair and Technical Service Stations. These new R.T.S. would become responsible for the repair of tractors and other machines; they were to provide technical services for the collective farms; and they were to act as distributors in the

[26] Krushchev, "On the Results of the Development of Agriculture in the Past Five Years and the Task of Further Increasing Output of Farm Products", *Pravda,* Dec. 16, 1958, *CD,* X, No. 50 (1958), 5. The committee report on the same subject was published in *Pravda* the same day, *CD,* X, No. 51 (1958), 4.

[27] *Oktyabr,* Nov. 1957, *CD,* X, No. 5 (1958), 3-10.

[28] *Pravda,* March 1, 1958, *CD,* X, No. 9 (1958), 5-13.

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sale of new equipment, parts, fuel, and so on, to the *kolkhozy* and the *sovkhozy*. It was suggested that one Repair and Technical Service Station could probably replace several Machine Tractor Stations. However, the old M.T.S. system was to be retained wherever it was found that the collective farms were not yet able to purchase tractors. Some Machine Tractor Stations were expected to continue operation for three to four years or more.[29]

In the interval between the announcement of the reorganization of the Machine Tractor Stations and the end of the 1958 calendar year, some 83 per cent of all Russian collective farms had acquired their own machines. A total of 482,000 tractors (79 per cent of those available) and 215,000 grain combines (67 per cent of those available) was purchased, enabling the collective farms to handle 73 per cent of the necessary tractor work with their own machines.[30]

Undoubtedly, agriculture has played an important rôle in the rapid development of the Soviet economy. The number of Russian farm workers is about the same today as it was in 1937, although the cultivated area is now considerably greater. But Russian agriculture is still highly primitive and inefficient; about 45 million Russians (nearly one out of every two in the working population) farm 480 million acres and yet food scarcities persist; approximately six million Americans (or about one out of eleven workers) cultivate 260 million acres and consistently add to the bulging surpluses by producing as much food as all the Soviet farm workers. Thus, there is no doubt that Soviet agriculture constitutes a tremendous reservoir of labor which (because of the current Soviet labor shortage) is desperately needed at the present time in other sectors of the economy. Yet, because agricultural efficiency is improving so very slowly, it is at this decisive moment in Russian history that the agricultural sector can least be relied upon to contribute a sizable number of workers to the industrial labor force.

The Seven Year Plan which is now in effect explicitly calls for a 70 per cent rise in gross agricultural output between 1959 and 1965.[31] The anticipated average annual increase of 8 per cent

[29] *Pravda*, Feb. 28, 1958, *CD*, X, No. 9 (1958), 3-4.

[30] *Pravda*, Dec. 16, 1958, *CD*, X, No. 51 (1958), 4.

[31] *Pravda*, Jan. 28, 1959, *CD*, XI, No. 2 (1959), 12-13; also No. 3, pp. 3-10; No. 4, pp. 17-25; and No. 5, pp. 13-20.

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would dwarf the annual increase in the United States in the past seven years (less than 2 per cent) but would fall short of the 11 per cent annual increment proposed under the Sixth Five Year Plan. The rate of increase for the major agricultural commodities including meat, grain, cotton, and wool has been reduced. By 1965, the following annual output levels are to be reached: grain, 10 to 11 billion poods; milk, 100 to 105 million tons; meat (slaughtered weight), 16 million tons; wool, 549,000 tons; and eggs, 37 billion. The task of overtaking the United States in per capita meat output was postponed until 1965 (originally 1960 or 1961.)

In view of the fact that agricultural advances proposed in the Seven Year Plan are to be accomplished primarily by intensification (rather than through expansion measures such as the virgin lands project) the 1965 goals must be considered with far more reservations than those, let us say, of heavy industry. A Tass dispatch at the close of 1959 reported that Soviet industrial production for the year had shown an increase of 11.3 per cent over 1958 which means that the annual plan was probably overfulfilled.[32] On the other hand, an apparent drop in agricultural output may have provided a sufficient stimulus for the Communist Party Central Committee to set up party control groups on collective farms. Earlier in the year similar groups were formed in Russian factories to correct shortcomings in the operation of industry.[33]

Soviet claims that United States butter production per capita has now been matched or surpassed are open to question. The basis for counting used by the Russians is apparently not the same as the American; the Russians have been accused of counting milk fed to calves as well as milk produced by goats, camels and other livestock besides cows. Butter production increased in both countries in 1959 (to 721,000 metric tons for the United States and 845,000 metric tons for the Soviet Union) which means that the Russians probably are close to, but have not yet matched, United States output per capita. However, if the recent trend in this country toward the use of close substitutes for butter continues, the Soviets should outstrip us in the near future; consumption of fat per capita (all

[32] Reported in the *New York Times*, Dec. 28, 1959, p. 3.

[33] Harry Schwartz in the *New York Times*, Dec. 28, 1959, p. 3.

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types) will remain higher in the United States for a longer period. While no specific statistics were cited, meat production was said to be 32 per cent better than in 1958 and Soviet chickens increased egg output by 25 per cent.[34] Thus, while meat production remains at less than half that of the United States on a per capita basis the Soviets have a long way to go, because of the difference in population of the two nations (United States about 180 million; USSR close to 210 million).

The problem of meat production continues to plague the planners for two basic reasons. First, more than half of all Soviet meat comes from the peasants' privately owned livestock. Production here is much less certain than on the collective or state farms. The second key element concerns the production of grain and here the Russians are once more in trouble. Drought reached into many regions, once again resulting in a harvest of 15 to 20 per cent below the record yield of 1958.[35] This is expected to be reflected in the 1960 livestock production reports.

Once again we face the question of whether or not the agricultural goals of the Seven Year Plan will be reached. It should be sufficient to recall that the 1965 goal of 180 million tons of cereals was also the 1960 goal of the Sixth Five Year Plan and originally the 1955 estimate of the Fifth Five Year Plan. Yet an increase in grain acreage from about 100 million hectares in 1950 to about 130 million hectares in 1958 did not bring about the planned fulfillment. In the next six years grain production is to be increased by nearly one half of what it must have been on the average for the decade preceding the Seven Year Plan (including the harvests of good and poor years). Whether nature will permit such an increase on lands subject to periodic drought is, of course, totally unpredictable, but the addition of about one million tractors, 400,000 grain combines, and considerable quantities of mineral fertilizer (35 million tons annually by 1965 against 12 million tons in 1958), if they are forthcoming, should improve yields somewhat.

The incentive measures begun in 1953 and consummated in the sale of the M.T.S. machinery to the collective farms in 1958 should produce positive results in the years to come provided that no future measures are introduced to decrease the already

[34] Max Frankel in the *New York Times*, Dec. 27, 1959, p. 1.

[35] *New York Times*, Dec. 28, 1959, p. 3.

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low income of the peasants. While the Central Committee reported in 1958 that the real income of the collective farmers was 60 per cent greater than in 1952, it is quite likely that the peasants' living standard is not as high as that of the average urban Soviet worker who earned about 785 rubles per month in 1958. This is expected to increase by 1965 to about 990 rubles per month or to almost 23 dollars per week (based on the more realistic "tourist" rate of exchange); furthermore, implicit in these figures is the fact that the average wage will increase only 26 per cent in the seven-year period compared with a 50 per cent rise in the 1952 to 1959 period.[36]

Obviously the Russian worker and the Russian farmer do not typically enjoy a life of plenty. Each will probably respond well to future monetary incentives; a shortage of consumers' goods, however, will necessitate a very gradual rise in incomes—and in the average standard of living. There are some indications that the day of reckoning for the Soviets is already here. The pace of the Soviet economy has definitely been slowed in recent years and this trend is likely to continue in the future. The agricultural sector, long considered of secondary importance in Soviet schemes, remains relatively backward and inefficient; the victim of an onerous institutional structure and the unwise policies of the Russian government, it probably cannot, in this crucial hour of Soviet planning, continue to aid in the rapid expansion of the economy. The Soviets are now reaping as they have sown for forty years.

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[36] Leon M. Herman, "The Seven Year Haul", *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1959. For a more detailed discussion of Soviet wage and price levels see Lynn Turgeon in *Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies*, Joint Economic Committee (Washington, 1959), pp. 319-340.

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OIL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN IRAN

IRAN, like the rest of the Middle East, is thought of in the United States primarily in terms of Russian ambitions and secondarily in relation to the importance of Iranian oil for the West. These are not necessarily the matters deemed most important within Iran herself. Although her government is firmly aligned with the West, the people are more interested in their country's attempt to rise from its age-old poverty than they are in the East-West struggle. Unless we of the West realize this and note some of the ways in which this rise is taking place, we shall fail to find the necessary balance between our own interests and those of Iran today.

The country is beginning to rise from its past of poverty primarily because of a determination to make the best possible use of its revenue from the development of its vast oil resources. Since the fall of Premier Mossadegh in 1953, there has been a changed relationship between the Iranian government and the foreign companies working in the country and between the component parts of the government itself. A large portion of the oil revenues is being ploughed back into Iran's economic development by means of a Seven Year Plan administered by the Plan Organization. Though an attempt to modernize and industrialize Iran had been made under Reza Shah, father of the present Shah, the oil monies had not been used for the work, and the Plan represents the first time the revenues from Iranian oil have been harnessed to the development of the country. Since the débâcle of a similar program of planned development in Iraq, the Iranian Plan remains the most important one now being carried on in the Middle East.

To understand the work of the Plan, it is important to note that Iran is a country of large resources and large problems, as well as of great beauty and great contrasts. Equal in size to Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and Colorado combined, Iran has the land and resources, many unexploited, to provide a higher standard of living for her nearly 20 million people than is available to them at present, and even to maintain a considerably larger population.

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The country is mainly a plateau 4,000 and more feet high, with two great mountain chains forming its major walls and joining like the base of a large V in the mountains at the northwest. One range, the Elburz, rises steep and jagged across the north, closely bordering the Caspian Sea; the other major range, the Zagros, runs parallel to the frontiers of Iraq. North of the Elburz are the green rain forests of the Caspian shores where the mountain wall acts as a brake to throw back the moisture and pour rains on the fertile soil. The Zagros Mountains in the southwest contain some of the richest oil lands in the world. From them the plateau falls away to the Persian Gulf, with desolate mud flats resembling a bare lunar landscape. This southwest section consists of the vast Khuzestan area. This is barren and arid now but some 2,500 years ago it was the center of the great Persian Empire, the capital of which, Susa, lay in the midst of miles of grainfields and sugar plantations which are now desolate and uncultivated. Like a larger kind of Tennessee Valley, Khuzestan presents great possibilities for rehabilitation and growth.

Most of the people of Iran live in isolated communities in or near the mountains where there are poor—if any—roads, in many cases amounting to nothing more than tracks for camel caravans. Some three quarters of the people work the land but so much of the country is mountainous and parched that agriculture is concentrated in the widely scattered localities where water is available. Almost half of Iran is desert or unsuited for agricultural development and barely 10 per cent of the arable land is actually under cultivation. There are various reasons for this. Rainfall is so scarce everywhere except on the Caspian shores that other water must be made available if the land is to become productive; the lack of roads and communications has isolated the agricultural population, severely limiting its markets and leaving it dependent on such primitive methods of ploughing and harrowing as in the days of the Medes and the Persians; the shortage of fertilizer has been so great as severely to limit the kinds and amounts of production.

Iran is tackling many of these problems with vision and careful planning. It has been easier to solve the physical problems than to change the social mores which frequently hold back progress. For instance, under the traditional agricultural system of Iran, a fifth of every crop goes each to the landowner, to

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those who provide the draft animals, the seed and the water, and last to the laborer. In a social system where landowners frequently own whole villages, any attempt to raise agricultural production, productivity and earnings means that a landowner, providing four fifths of the necessities for cultivation, receives a much greater proportionate return than the men who provide the labor. The system is difficult to change, but a small beginning has been made, led by the Shah in his distribution of sizable amounts of the crown lands directly to the peasants, but thus far his example has been followed at a snail's pace and by too few other great landlords.

Iranian industry is in its infancy as yet, employing less than two per cent of the people, with the larger proportion of even those classified as working in industry employed in the traditional handicrafts of carpet-making, weaving and pottery-manufacture. Large-scale industrial investment by private capital has been almost entirely lacking, for traditionally money has been invested in land or loaned in the bazaars for a high return. The government, therefore, beginning with Reza Shah, has tried to encourage industrial expansion, either by granting subsidies for factory construction or by direct government building.

1. *The Oil*

The oil of the Zagros is the great source of Iran's wealth today, and to it is due in large measure Iran's own ability to lift herself to a higher standard of living. The country contains some 13 per cent of the total estimated oil deposits of the world and today is the sixth country in oil production. The existence of Iranian oil was known far back in history but the possibilities for its development and use were not seriously investigated until the latter part of the nineteenth century.

The British were first on the scene and long remained the sole occupants of the field. On May 26, 1908, an English company found oil in commercial quantities in the Zagros Mountains, not far from the ruins of a Zoroastrian temple, Masjid-i-Sulaiman, where, many centuries before, escaping natural gas had kept its eternal flame alight. The next year the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, later called the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, was formed, control of which was purchased by the British government in 1914. The same year saw the beginning of the

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great Abadan refinery at the head of the Persian Gulf, and in two more years, a pipe line had been completed from the oil field to the refinery.

On March 20, 1951, the wave of post-war Iranian nationalism culminated in the expropriation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's properties in Iran. This meant that the refineries and other physical properties formerly belonging to the British came into the hands of the Iranian government, though the oil in the ground had always been the property of Iran. Under the new régime of those years, oil production and export declined to such a small trickle that vast injections of United States foreign aid were necessary to keep the economy alive. The flow of oil was resumed only in the fall three years later when Iran signed an agreement with a Consortium of American, British, Dutch and French oil companies[1] for operation of what formerly had been the Anglo-Iranian oil properties. Oil deposits and production, transportation and refining facilities, including the Abadan refinery, still remain the property of the Iranian government but the Consortium operating companies run them and buy the oil at the wellheads from the government through its agent, the National Iranian Oil Company, popularly known as NIOC. It too distributes within Iran gasoline and fuel oil from the Abadan refinery and from the Iranian government's own small refinery at Kermanshah near the Iraq border. NIOC also handles those activities somewhat equivocally called "non-basic" to oil operations, such as health and educational services.

Although the government of Iran has turned over large areas of the country for oil operations by the Consortium and more recently by other smaller foreign operators, it has done so with a time limit, as is common in all other Middle Eastern arrangements. The agreement runs until 1979, with possibilities for

[1] The companies were: Gulf Oil, Socony Vacuum (now Socony Mobil), Standard Oil (New Jersey), Standard Oil (California), and the Texas Company, with 8 per cent each; Anglo-Iranian Oil (now British Petroleum), with 40 per cent; the *N. V. Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij* (Royal Dutch Shell), 14 per cent; and the *Compagnie Française des Petroles*, 6 per cent. On April 29, 1955, the Consortium members and the Iranian government agreed to a division of 1/8 of the percentage interests of each of the American members among nine American oil companies, the American Independent Oil, Atlantic Refining, Hancock Oil, Pacific Western Oil, Richfield Oil, San Jacinto Petroleum, Signal Oil and Gas, Standard Oil of Ohio, and Tidewater Associated Oil.

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extension until 1994, conditioned on performance of certain requirements by the Consortium. During this period, the area of Consortium activities must be reduced progressively until ultimately it will be about half the present size of some 100,000 square miles. The areas allotted to other companies since 1957 are also to be reduced progressively in size.

The government of Iran, through NIOC's subsidiary, the Iran Oil Company, is also in the business of oil exploration and production in the areas it has selected to keep for itself. It was in the government oil fields near the sacred city of Qum, just southwest of Tehran, that in 1956 a great gusher blew out of control and threw up some 80,000 barrels of "black gold" a day so that it covered the ground for many miles around, while the railroad and many roads had to be closed off until the flow could be brought under control. Even now the ground is still black with oil remains. As there was no equipment in the Middle East or Europe sufficient to control the pressure, specialists and equipment were flown to Iran from Texas. Today the Iran Oil Company is still working near by trying to "delimit the area" as the oil men call the determination of potential production and reserves of oil, thus making possible decisions as to whether a pipe line is desirable to get the oil out.

Iran is encouraging other foreign companies, aside from the Consortium, to take part in the development of her oil potentialities. In the days of Premier Mossadegh, Iranian government officials were forbidden even to discuss oil with representatives of foreign companies. By a law of 1957, a changed attitude was reflected, for two thirds of the country in addition to the Consortium area was made available for oil agreements as the government saw fit. That year offshore areas in the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman and in certain parts of the Zagros Mountains were opened to bids. Again in the summer of 1959, a new section of the great northern Iranian desert, the Dasht-i-Kavir, was offered for tenders and a few companies have already indicated interest.

Even before the ink was dry on the 1957 offer, the Italian government enterprise, AGIP-Mineraria[2] snapped up three possibilities that seemed promising, one each in the offshore areas of the Persian Gulf, the Zagros Mountains and on the sweltering

[2] Subsidiary of *Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi*, the Italian General Petroleum Corporation.

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Gulf of Oman. It appeared that there were good prospects in all, for the Persian Gulf Zone of the Italians lies between Iran's developed oil fields and those of Kuwait and the Neutral Zone not too far across the Gulf; the Zagros Mountains contain the vastly rich oil fields of the Consortium; the Gulf of Oman to the south has a geological formation which appears promising for the discovery of oil.

The next year, Standard Oil of Indiana (not a member of the Consortium), represented in Iran by Pan American International Oil Company, moved into an area granted them next to the Italians in the Persian Gulf, and Sapphire Petroleums, Ltd. of Canada made an agreement for a section next to the Italians on the Gulf of Oman.

The division of profits between the foreign oil producers and the Iranian government is a crucial question for the country because of the use of the major part of those profits for its planned economic development and because of the political and psychological ramifications of the division. In the early days of oil production in Iran, the country received only 16 per cent of the profits while the Anglo-Persian Oil Company got the rest. Gradually the percentage was increased[3] and with the establishment of the Consortium in 1954, the 50-50 principle for division of profits was introduced in Iran for the first time, though it had already been used in Venezuela, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Under the present agreement between the Consortium and the Iranian government, one half of Consortium profits on operations in Iran are paid that country in taxes. The agreement also requires the payment of royalties of 12½ per cent on all oil produced. These are set off against the tax payment so that the combination of taxes and royalties results in the 50-50 formula, of half of the profits to the government and half to the Consortium companies.

The Italians were so anxious to secure a foothold in the country that they were willing to accept what appear at first

[3] The revised 1933 convention of Anglo-Iranian Oil and the Iranian government provided a payment of 4 shillings a ton together with a sum equal to 20 per cent of any distribution to the company's stockholders in excess of a certain agreed amount. As there were no posted prices for crude oil in that period, realizations on sales are not known. It is difficult to calculate with accuracy the exact percentage of profits then accruing to the Iranian government.

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glance to be much better terms for the Iranian government. They were followed in those terms by Pan American and, at least on paper, by Sapphire.[4] These new arrangements not only take Iran as a partner by setting up a joint company in which the National Iranian Oil Company and the foreign company each holds a half interest, but also provide a formula for division of profits of 75-25 in favor of Iran. When and if oil is found, the Iranian government will receive its half of the profits of the joint company in the form of taxes, while the other half will be divided between the two partners in proportion to the capital held by each. Thus Iran and the other partners, whether it be AGIP-Mineraria, Pan American or Sapphire, will each receive 25 per cent from the remaining 50 per cent if oil is found. The Iranian government in effect will secure a total of 75 per cent. On the other hand, once oil is found, Iran must pay her partner for half the costs of development, whereas under the 50-50 agreement, the Consortium bears the entire cost and no capital contribution is required by Iran.

That the end of the story of the division of profits has not yet been reached in Iran is indicated by the Russian offer of November 1959, which is reported to give 85 per cent of profits in return for oil exploration rights in northern Iran, conditioned on the exclusion of foreign military bases there.[5] This is but one more indication that other than financial rewards are involved. The offer was unacceptable for obvious political reasons.

None of the three newcomers to Iran has found oil as yet and none has a market which compares in size to the markets of the Consortium companies. It may well be that the Iranians will make less proportionately under the new arrangements than under the old; for, as the former Chairman of the Consortium asks: "Do they want less of more or more of less?" In a world of strong national consciousness, there is nevertheless a great psychological value to Iran in having been taken in as a partner.

If the newcomers on the Iranian scene find oil in commercial quantities they will be faced with the costly and difficult problem of getting the oil to market. At present, all oil exported from Iran moves by ship from the Persian Gulf. For the West,

[4] No information of any sort is available from Sapphire Petroleums, Ltd. It is reliably reported that by January 1, 1960, they had not begun work in Iran.

[5] *Christian Science Monitor,* November 13, 1959.

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the oil must go through the Suez Canal or around the Cape as it did during the Suez crisis. If the newcomers strike oil in their offshore concessions, a terminal for loading ships on the shore of the Gulf would seem to be needed. If the Italians find oil, however, in their Zagros Mountains operations, a pipe line would have to be built over rugged and difficult terrain to the Gulf shore. But there may be an alternative.

A pipe line to the Mediterranean has long been under consideration by Iran. To avoid crossing Arab countries where uncontrolled nationalism has proved pipe lines to be vulnerable, Iran concluded a provisional agreement with Turkey in October 1958. This calls for the construction of a line across northwestern Iran and southeastern Turkey to the Turkish coast of the Mediterranean. Whether this project can go forward will depend partly on political events but also on whether Iran's own oil field at Qum and neighboring concessions will produce enough oil and have enough reserves to warrant the high cost of the pipe line, and whether there will be assured prospects for markets for the oil produced. The North African oil discoveries may well affect the pipe line possibilities.

A price cut for most Persian Gulf crude oil announced by the Consortium in February 1959 came at a bad time politically. Just then the Shah was at work to cement Iran more firmly to the West by negotiating a bilateral defense treaty with the United States. The price cut meant that on the basis of the 1959 level of anticipated exports, the Iranian government would receive $26.5 million less for its oil that year than otherwise would have been the case. The loss in revenue to Iran would prove such a serious blow to the country and especially its Seven Year Plan of development that the Shah urged the Consortium to produce and export enough additional oil over the quantities planned for the year to compensate for the drop in prices. The Consortium lent a sympathetic ear to the Iranian request.[6]

The cut, however, has not been without its effects on public opinion in Iran. Although there had already been price cuts in crude oil in other Middle Eastern countries, in the United States, and in the Caribbean, Iran appeared unprepared for

[6] It appeared early in 1960 that payments to the Iranian government for 1959 would approach $260 million, which had been the figure used earlier in the year to estimate probable oil revenues for the Iranian calendar year from March 1959 to March 1960.

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the action taken concerning her oil. After the initial shock, the National Iranian Oil Company clearly explained the reasons for the price cuts, but some newspapers jumped to the conclusion that the cuts discriminated against Iran. The matter was discussed in Parliament where at least one speech attacked the Consortium as the responsible party. The psychological climate was not improved by the announcement of the mandatory control of American oil imports given President Eisenhower in the winter of 1958-59, even though the amount of Iranian oil imported by the United States is small.

2. *The Plan and Plan Organization*

Oil and the money from its sale are basic to the development of Iran today. The idea of raising the Iranian standard of living is not a new one but the use of oil revenues for the purpose of a planned program began only in 1948. In one sense Reza Shah had taken the first steps when he initiated a program of modernization in Iran but his method of payment was different. He had ordered women unveiled and established industries, especially cotton, woollen and sugar mills; he had put roads through mountain and desert; he had pushed the first railway in Iran across some of the most difficult terrain in the world and had completed it in 1938, thus connecting the port of Khorramshahr on the Persian Gulf with Bandar Shar on the Caspian Sea. This railroad was destined to perform Herculean service for the Allies in World War II by carrying Lend-Lease military supplies from the Gulf to the Caspian whence they were taken by truck, ship or air the rest of the way to the U.S.S.R. These forward steps had been paid for by a series of special taxes, notably on sugar, the most important element in the Iranian diet except bread and tea, and the oil revenues for the most part went to pay the general government expenses.

Reza Shah's attempts to modernize his country came to an end because his pro-Germanism led to his forced abdication and flight from Iran. World War II set back the program of industrialization still further, though war shipments did bring development of the port facilities of Khorramshahr, improvement of the railroad and its rolling stock, building of more much-needed roads, and above all brought Iran into greater contact with the outside world.

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The original Seven Year Plan of 1948 for the economic development of Iran was barely started when it came almost to a standstill as the cessation of oil exports during the period of crisis reduced her income to a trickle. Largely through support given by United States foreign aid, a few scattered activities were carried on until after the resumption of oil revenues in 1954. With oil income again available, Parliament (the *Majlis*) made a study of planning already completed and projects under way and early in 1956 set up a Second Seven Year Plan. The original Plan had called for an expenditure of a total of $400 million, or $58 million per year. It was assigned the entire income from oil, and loans were authorized to meet deficiencies. As the government was unable to operate without some of the oil money, the Plan Organization never received the entire amount.[7]

The law for the Second Seven Year Plan called for an expenditure of $1,100 million by 1963 "for increasing production, developing exports . . . agriculture and industries, discovering and exploiting mines and resources, improving and completing means of communication, improving public health, fulfilling any operations designed for the development of the country, raising the educational and living standards of the people and improving living conditions."[8] In the eyes of the planners, roads and communications are the all-important necessity, with public health, education and other projects to raise living standards coming close behind and vying with the crying need for irrigation and agricultural improvements for second place, while the development of industry and mining came next in importance.[9]

The great innovation in the concept of the Plans lay in the use of oil revenues for their financing. The law for the Second Plan provided that 80 per cent of the oil revenues paid to the

[7] In 1949 the Plan Organization received $15 million out of a total of $38 million oil revenues. In 1950 it received $32 million from oil income of $45 million. *U.S. Aid Operations in Iran: First Report* by the Committee on Government Operations, January 28, 1957, U.S. Government (Washington, 1957).

[8] The Second Seven Year Plan, Article 1.

[9] The Plan allots 32.6 per cent of its total revenues to communication and transportation; 26.3 per cent to education, health, etc.; 25 per cent to agriculture and irrigation; 12.1 per cent to mining and industry.

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government were to be appropriated yearly to the Plan.[10] It never actually received that percentage partly because the total oil income available far exceeded the original estimates and partly because there was fear that the regular government departments would be starved if the Plan were given the lion's share of the income from oil. In less than a year, therefore, after the Second Plan got under way, its share of the oil revenues was cut to 60 per cent and, by 1959, it was allocated a flat $130 million instead of any percentage of total oil income. However, it was helped by the authorization to borrow from domestic and foreign banks and international agencies, and to obligate future oil revenues to repay these loans.[11]

The law establishing the Second Plan requires the Plan Organization to spend just over a quarter of its funds on projects designed to have an immediate practical effect, but there have been differences of opinion from the outset as to whether or not this amount is enough. People living in towns without water supply, electricity, medical services or teachers, whether in Iran or elsewhere, inevitably feel little concern for what will help only their great-grandchildren and not their children and themselves today. Dams, however, cannot be built overnight. When they eventually rise between the high walls of Iran's great gorges, they will be able to lift the level of living of many a poverty-stricken, waterless area.

There has been a large measure of agreement in the Plan Organization that roads and communications to break down the barriers of isolation in Iran are the greatest necessity of the country. When the Plan got under way, there were only some

[10] Oil revenues in 1955 were $89.5 million; 1956, $152 million; 1957, $214 million; 1958, $246 million. William S. Evans, *Petroleum in the Eastern Hemisphere* (New York, 1959), p. 21. Estimated 1959 revenues are $255-$260 million. The law contained the limitation that the amount allocated to the Plan could not exceed $144 million the first and second years and $188 million the third. Both of these amounts were less than 80 per cent of the oil revenues or even of the 75 per cent to which the law allowed the percentage to be reduced under certain circumstances.

[11] In March 1957, the International Monetary Fund made a loan of $17 million to the Plan Organization and the World Bank made another of $75 million. In 1959 the latter made a second loan of $78 million especially to finance the Plan's badly lagging road construction and repair program. In the latter year, the United States Development Loan Fund loaned $47.5 million to the Plan.

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13,000 miles of roads in all of Iran, and of these, few had any semblance of hard surface since many of those which were built during World War II had been completely worn down by heavy trucks. The Plan therefore called for over 5,000 miles of new roads and for repairs to existing roads.

The second crying need of the country is for water, upon which its agriculture and even its life depend. The Iranians long ago devised their own methods of irrigation which have proved effective but the country south of the Elburz is dotted here and there with silent villages, deserted because the sources of water finally disappeared. A widely used method of irrigation, purely indigenous to Iran, is the underground system of *qanats*. As one flies over Iran's central plateau, hundreds of small, crater-like openings can be seen running in straight lines into the plains from the base of the mountains. These are access wells leading to subterranean canals dug by hand to carry water from its sources in the mountains some thirty to forty miles away. So skilled are the builders that they incline the *qanat* to permit the water to flow at just the right speed to avoid undue erosion but fast enough to keep silt from filling the *qanat*. While a number of deep-well pumps have been installed in Iran, and while animals are still used in the south to turn water wheels, the *qanat* remains an effective means of transporting water without evaporation. The usefulness of the system is such that the Plan has loaned almost $4 million to nearly a thousand applicants for *qanat* construction since 1956.

Irrigation by means of dams, however, has long been carried on in Iran, and it is this method that the Plan has supported the most heavily. Remains of dams and barrages built during the Sassanian period, between the third and seventh centuries A.D., still exist in large sections of the south and west and some of these are still in use for irrigation.[12] Some are close to the areas where the Plan envisages new dams in Khuzestan in the southwest. Great in size—about half as large again as the Tennessee Valley—Khuzestan is a region capable of restoration from its present desolation by some of the methods used with the Tennessee River and throughout its valley. Accordingly, an American firm, the Development and Resources Corporation of New York, was called in primarily because its two chiefs, Drs.

[12] Donald N. Wilber, *Iran: Past and Present* (Princeton, 1958), p. 234.

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David Lilienthal and Gordon Clapp, had both been former chairmen of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).[13]

The Development and Resources Corporation devised a plan for a system of dams for irrigation of some 2,560,000 square acres of the Khuzestan plain, for flood control and for generation of electric power on a scale large enough for both industrial development and domestic use. Its program was also designed to develop the mineral resources of the region and to make use of the great quantities of natural gas produced at the oil fields and now burned as waste.

The key project of the Khuzestan development is a system of dams in the headwaters of the region's rivers, including the Karoun, the largest river in the Middle East flowing entirely within one country. Above Ahwaz, capital of Khuzestan, this river is joined by another, the Dez, which leaves the high mountains to take its way through comparatively clear country, then suddenly enters a narrow gorge with great perpendicular walls over 1,400 feet high. This Dez gorge would provide the site for a large dam and the open country would be the reservoir for the water. In dry years, this dam would provide irrigation for some 360,000 acres and would control floods which formerly submerged lands between Ahwaz and Khorramshahr, including the only road and rail communication, now under water for almost a third of each year.[14] By controlling the wide fluctuations in the amount of water in the lower Karoun, the dam would help navigation and reduce the silting of the Shatt-el-Arab into which the Karoun flows and which is the main entry to the Persian Gulf.

The costs of the Dez dam would be as great as its importance, for at the beginning of the Plan they were estimated at $59 million, exclusive of irrigation facilities, which could cost an additional $50 million. Dam plans were completed, bids solicited, and in the autumn of 1959 agreement was reached on the principle of a World Bank loan to make construction possible.

Until the Dez dam power plant is ready for service, electric

[13] See Gordon R. Clapp, "Iran: A TVA for the Khuzestan Region", *The Middle East Journal*, vol. II, No. 1, Winter 1957; David R. Lilienthal, "Enterprise in Iran", *Foreign Affairs*, October 1959.

[14] O. M. Marashian, "Construction Spotlight Shifts to Iran", *Engineering News Record*, Sept. 25, 1958.

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power is purchased from the Consortium at Abadan and transmitted to Ahwaz over a power line just completed by one of the Plan Organization's subsidiaries, the Khuzestan Energy Authority. Eventually it is hoped the flow will be reversed and power from the Dez dam will light the streets of Abadan and neighboring towns.

To make use of the natural gas now being burned off at the wells, it is planned to construct a petro-chemical plant at Ahwaz that will use the gas as raw material in the production of various chemicals. For a time, too, it was planned to build a nitrogenous fertilizer plant that would also utilize the natural gas. Unfortunately, this project has been abandoned both because of lack of funds and because another government fertilizer plant, sufficient in size for present needs although more remote from the Khuzestan area where it can be most useful, has been constructed at Shiraz. Test programs, however, are being carried on at Ahwaz to determine which are the best types of fertilizers to bring back sugar cane and other crops to their ancient importance.

As Iran is primarily agricultural, the Second Seven Year Plan gives only slightly over 15 per cent of its total funds to the development of mining and industry. One important undertaking is an exploration of Iran's mineral resources. Although mining has not yet been developed to any great extent, the country is potentially rich in minerals. In the past, attention was concentrated on the search for oil and no complete mineral survey has ever been made.

The Plan Organization's stated policy is to promote private enterprise. Included in the law is a provision for low-interest loans for the development of private industries, and under this provision loans aggregating some $3 million have been approved.[15] There is, however, a certain amount of state industry, including plants for the manufacture of glass, textiles, cement, vegetable oils and cigarettes. Much of it was inherited from the days of Reza Shah but a number of private concerns have been taken over by the Plan Organization when it has wished to prevent setbacks in employment or production. One of its first acts was to engage an American management consulting firm for several years to improve management and manufacturing

[15] "The Plan Organization of Iran", *Historical Review*, Sept. 25–Mar. 20, 1958 (published by the Plan Organization, Tehran), pp. 10 and 47.

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methods in government-owned plants,[16] many of which were enlarged and modernized. It was not intended, however, that these establishments will continue indefinitely under public ownership. Once they have been developed into profitable enterprises, it is hoped their sale to private investors will be recommended. This part of the program has not made real progress, mainly because the Plan Organization has required full cash payment at the time an industry is purchased. This has been so hard to obtain that the Plan Organization is now at work with the Prime Minister on an arrangement whereby payments may be extended over periods as long as ten years.

The Plan Organization is slowly beginning to bring about many improvements in the towns and villages. Ten years ago there was probably not a piped water system anywhere in Iran. Instead of pipes, there were open canals *(jubes)* in the streets through which ran the water for washing, cleaning and drinking. Nor were there many municipalities with electric power or with paved streets. Now water and sewage disposal systems, public bath houses, electricity, paved streets and asphalt roads can be provided by the Plan Organization in coöperation with the towns and cities themselves. Yet the work has not been without its difficulties. Many of the cities and towns are almost, if not entirely, devoid of funds. It is a slow process to work out the loans and grants which have proved necessary so that the municipalities can pay their required share (50 per cent) of the cost. By 1959, however, work had been begun in a large number of cities and towns. These activities are considered so important that even under the Plan Organization's curtailed finances, no reduction in them is contemplated.

The Plan Organization has made a practice of calling in from different foreign countries various firms and experts who have specialized knowledge, not to mention freedom from local entanglements. To avoid favoring any one country over any other, a wide range of countries is represented. Thus, just as the Development and Resources Corporation of the United States was called to work in Khuzestan, the Italian firm of consulting engineers, *Italconsult,* was given the task of handling the problems of the isolated, always barren sections of Sistan and Baluchistan near the Pakistan and Afghanistan borders. For its munici-

[16] George Fry Associates.

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pal development program, the Plan Organization divided the country into three zones of operation, each under the supervision of a firm of consulting engineers of a different nationality —American, French and German. An extreme case of division of work between different countries is found in the contracts for the new Trans-Iranian highway from Khorramshahr on the Persian Gulf to Pahlevi on the Caspian coast. Discouraged by lack of progress when the contract was given to one company, the Plan Organization has now turned over the construction of the road to three different teams of consulting engineers, one from West Germany, one from Italy, and one from the United States.[17]

The use of foreign concerns has permeated the Khuzestan development to an interesting degree. The Development and Resources Corporation as the agent of the Plan has turned to different national and even some international organizations to carry out specific projects. For example, Montecatini of Italy has worked on the possibilities for making use of natural gas now being burned off as waste at the wells for lack of other use; the British firm, Hunting Aerosurveys, Ltd., did aerial mapping; and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization is carrying out a special mission, paid for by Iran, for necessary experimentation in soil fertility.

Foreign experts are resented by many Iranians who feel that Iranian firms should be obtaining the contracts now awarded to outsiders. This sentiment was emphasized when in June 1959 the Plan Organization, in a sudden and unexpected move, announced that it had cancelled its contract with the German firm F. H. Kocks for the engineering supervision of municipal development projects in northeastern Iran. Although the Plan Organization stated clearly that the reason was lack of proper attention to its work by the contractor, the abruptness of the move, coupled with the financial difficulties in the Plan Organization, caused some uneasiness among the numerous foreign firms working in the country.

The work of the Plan Organization was kept alive by the United States foreign aid program during the economic collapse of the Mossadegh régime and would probably have had to be abandoned without our support. From a small beginning early

[17] Marashian, *op. cit.*

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in 1951 with a modest appropriation of $1.4 million for technical assistance, the aid program was catapulted almost immediately into financing the all-out effort to save Iran. The technical assistance program was increased to over $20 million a year, including some financing for the Plan Organization's projects, and $5 million a month more was added to meet Iranian budgetary deficits from 1953 through 1957, though these were caused only in part by the appropriation of oil revenues for the Plan.[18] The present emphasis is on loans, however, and in 1959 a loan of $47.5 million was given from the United States Development Loan Fund.

Any organization as large and ambitious as that of the Plan is bound to hit snags. A perennial difficulty of all plans, and of Iran's no less than any other, arises when the planning agency enters into operations to carry out specific projects. In strict administrative theory, a planning organization should do only what its name implies and leave execution to government departments. Actually when a plan organization is new, its administrative machinery is free from accumulated red tape and it can carry through its work to completion with more speed and efficiency than the tradition-bound regular government departments, though in time it too develops its own kind of red tape. In Iran an attempt was made to straddle the immediate difficulty. The law requires that almost half the Plan Organization's funds be channeled through the existing departments of government. If no governmental machinery exists to carry out a certain program, however, or if it is deemed—by the Plan Organization—to be too large or complex for a government department to handle, consulting or other engineering firms may be employed—again by the Plan Organization—to administer the program. The Plan Organization thus has had large powers in carrying out a project and it appeared to use them increasingly as time went on.

[18] While the need for aid to pay the running expenses of government is now past, United States aid to Iran still remains high, largely because of military commitments. The amount of military expenditure is not known, but, aside from it, United States aid to Iran from 1951 through June 30, 1959, amounted to the grand total of $411.4 million. This includes $338.5 million developmental assistance, Export-Import Bank loans of $53 million and surplus agricultural commodities of $19.9 million. In 1959 the only form of economic aid was technical assistance amounting to $3.6 million. The programmed aid for 1959 is $6 million.

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There is no denying that some of the work has been carried on sluggishly, notably in road-building. Under the new arrangement for the Trans-Iranian highway with three firms from three different countries, there are still delays, occasioned by the difficulty of making the different segments of road dovetail with each other. As a result no significant continuous stretch of the road is yet completed. In addition, the difficulties of the terrain are so great that the road is costing more than was anticipated. In the late spring of 1959, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in concert with several private American banks, loaned the Plan Organization a total of $72 million out of the $185 million it estimates the roads will cost.

Many objections to the work of the Plan or complaints about its lack of progress are really expressions of a fear that it became too powerful at the expense of the various Ministries of the government and so must have its wings clipped. A target of jealousy was Mr. Abdol Hassan Ebtehaj, former head of the National Bank of Iran, later an official of the International Monetary Fund in Washington, who had been appointed Managing Director of the Plan just before the expiration of its first seven years. Able, devoted, honest and incorruptible, Mr. Ebtehaj breathed and dreamed nothing but the Plan, and his appointment soon attracted able and ambitious young men from various Ministries of the government. His driving force sometimes made him appear dictatorial but he long had the strong backing of the Shah.

Early in the winter of 1959 Mr. Ebtehaj lost that backing, for in February Parliament suddenly transferred the duties and responsibilities of his office to the Prime Minister and laid down requirements for its reorganization and for the establishment of new government agencies to supervise its affairs, especially its finances. Director Ebtehaj resigned on the spot and the Prime Minister took personal charge, replacing Mr. Ebtehaj by Mr. K. H. Hedayat, now Deputy Prime Minister.

Under new management, the Plan Organization followed much the same path as before, though with a more careful eye to its finances. The government still looks upon the Plan Organization as Iran's main instrument of economic development, though on a reduced financial scale.

In view of this shortage of funds, the Plan began to curtail some of its important work in the summer of 1959. No major

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new projects were initiated, though most of the large undertakings already begun were being continued, such as the Karaj and Sefid Rivers dams, and the highway from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea. Most regional developments, together with municipal improvements such as electrification or water systems, are being continued, as are programs for improvement of agriculture, health and education.

3. *The Oil and the Plan*

There are still many people in Iran who regard all foreign oil companies as intruders. The relationship between the Consortium and the Iranian government, however, has been successful enough to make not only the government of the country but many of its people believe the participation of foreign oil interests necessary to the economic life of the country. In many ways, too, the oil companies have learned the lessons of the cataclysmic past of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. In fact, some of their representatives in the Middle East appear to be more successful in understanding the problems of Iran than many Western politicians and diplomats.

With the emergence of the concept of Iran as a partner, seen in the Italian, Pan American and Sapphire Petroleums contracts, a new factor came into the relations between Iran and foreign oil companies. The success of the new formula financially remains to be seen when the companies have discovered and begun to market their oil. The capital investment made by Iran in the joint companies, furthermore, for many years could conceivably exceed the country's income from those companies. No matter what the financial effect, however, the psychological factor of the partnership idea remains, and to a lesser extent that of increased percentages of profits to the country from which oil comes. In the world today the importance of raising a country's status in its own—and other—eyes is as important as monetary reward. The recent Russian offer does not fail to play on this theme, to the accompaniment of political overtones.

The psychological factor should never be neglected. Such moves as the cut in oil prices announced by the Consortium, necessary though this may be economically, inevitably weakens the prestige of foreign oil companies in Iran, unless the volume of oil exported westward increases enough to make up the loss.

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Another example is the effect on Iranian psychology of the mandatory control of oil imports to the United States, even though the amount of Iranian oil involved is not large. Such tariff barriers inevitably cause anti-American sentiment to grow.

In this period of world surplus, there may be further price cuts ahead. If the three new oil companies in Iran are forced to reduce their prices to sell whatever oil they may find, their contracts might prove a boomerang to them and might make necessary further cuts in Consortium prices. Much may depend on the results of the Sahara oil finds. If the world oil surplus proves temporary, as it may well be, the situation will ultimately right itself. But the impact of the formula remains.

The allocation of oil revenues is basically important in the development of Iran's economic Plan. The Iranian government has already decided to devote a larger share of its oil income to the running of government departments than had been envisaged when the Plan Organization was established. Instead of the 80 per cent of the oil income originally hoped for, the Plan is now receiving less than half. This change will help make the government self-supporting and will lessen the inflationary pressures necessarily resulting from large government deficits. These could also be lessened, however, by better public administration, toward which Iran is now striving, and thus a larger share of the available income could go to economic development under the Plan Organization.

It is an encouraging fact that the wisest Iranian officials know that even the most satisfactory relationships and the most profitable financial arrangements with the oil companies do not mean real economic progress if they are offset by government mismanagement and waste, and by the immense corruption so long characteristic of the East.

Curtailment of Plan funds is an unpopular move in Iran, particularly as so much more money is being devoted to military expenditures than many Iranians consider necessary for the welfare of their country. They believe that no amount of military preparedness can lessen Iran's extreme vulnerability to aggression by her neighbor to the north. Even those who dislike that neighbor most either regard the pro-Western orientation of Iran as dangerous for their own country and for the West as well, or believe in "a plague o' both your houses." The point on

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which all agree is that Iran needs further economic development, and consequently that the Plan's activities, in spite of their shortcomings, ought not to be curtailed.

Because of the proportionate cuts in Plan funds, however, the Organization needs more international loans to continue its work. If the recent advances by the World Bank and the United States Development Loan Fund are a reliable indication, these will be forthcoming as long as the Plan maintains its past high level of operations.

To do so, the Plan Organization must be able to overcome the difficulties created by internal politics and external crises. It must solve such technical and political problems as that of keeping a proper balance between long-term planning and response to immediate needs. Above all, it must survive the very difficult readjustments of social values that follow upon economic change —readjustments that take longer and are far more difficult than mere physical developments.

But if it is able to finish its work, the Plan will ultimately raise the standard of living of the Iranian people and change the face of their country.

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PHILANTHROPY AND THE WELFARE STATE IN EUROPE*

AMONG the many ideologies in Western culture which condition thought and action is the belief that the strong, the fortunate, and the well-to-do have a responsibility to alleviate the sufferings of the weak, the unfortunate, and the poor, to provide for the formal education of the young, and to support and encourage creative work in the arts and sciences.

At one time the sums necessary for these purposes came largely from private sources. But today men are turning more and more to the state for financial support of such activities. In fact, the modern state has been christened the "welfare state" precisely because it performs so many of these services.

In this shift in financing from private philanthropy to state action, Western Europe has taken the lead, as it has in so many phases of human activity, and the rest of Western culture has lagged behind, albeit that it is moving in the same direction. Consequently there seems to be merit in studying the experience of Europe to ascertain how far the shift has gone, what the reasons for it have been, and what its consequences may be.

Although the statistical record is far from adequate, the best data available indicate that philanthropic contributions in Western Europe, for all purposes—education, social work, religion, scientific research, and art—amount to less than one-half of one per cent of national income per annum, whereas in the United States they amount to some two per cent of national income.[1] Either percentage is small when one recalls that, in both Europe and America two hundred years ago, tithing was not uncommon, nearly all education was private, artists were frequently spon-

* In 1958 Donald Young, Director of the Russell Sage Foundation, invited the author of this article to make a survey of European philanthropy. In doing so the author visited every country of Western Europe in the quest of information on the subject. He interviewed representatives of all the major foundations in Europe, many important philanthropists, the recipients of philanthropic funds, social workers, and tax experts. The materials which he collected are presented here in a brief synthesis. His findings are evidence of the extent to which the welfare state has assumed the functions once performed by private givers.

[1] F. Emerson Andrews, *Philanthropic Giving* (New York, 1950), chap. 4.

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sored by rich patrons, research workers labored in private establishments, hospitals were private, private charities endeavored to cope with the problems of orphans and the destitute, and friends and neighbors pooled their resources to aid those who had suffered some sudden misfortune, such as the loss of a breadwinner.[2] It may well be that in the middle of the eighteenth century five to six per cent of national income was devoted to philanthropy, although statistical data do not exist to allow more than a rough estimate of the proportions.

That philanthropy, measured as a percentage of national income, has declined in the last two hundred years, and particularly in the last hundred, is attested to by all competent authorities—and that it has declined more in Europe than in the United States can be substantiated by an abundance of evidence.

Once these generalizations regarding the extent of philanthropy have been ascertained, the question arises as to why these changes have taken place. The answer is certainly a complicated one, but perhaps the chief reason is that the Leviathan state has grown far beyond anything ever conceived by Thomas Hobbes, and that in the process it has taken over many of the social responsibilities once assumed by private philanthropy. In other words, the rise of the welfare state explains in large part the decline of philanthropy.

About one hundred years ago both socialist and social-reform movements began to acquire political power and as this power increased it was used to obtain, or to induce other political groups to concede, benefits for the poor and underprivileged by state action. At first the benefits which were sought were education and poor relief, but gradually they were expanded until they comprised a vast body of services affecting many aspects of life. Indeed, the state came to provide social insurance that covered a wide range of risks from pregnancy to death, education from the nursery to the research institute, public hospitals, guarantees of employment, care of orphans, incurables and destitutes, and subsidies to artists and scientists.[3] As though this was not enough, religious organizations came to play a lesser rôle in society as nationalism began to absorb some of the emotional

[2] W. K. Jordan, *Philanthropy in England, 1480-1660* (New York, 1959), chap. VII.

[3] George R. Nelson (ed.), *Freedom and Welfare: Social Patterns in the Northern Countries of Europe* (Stockholm, 1953).

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energies of people and as schools and other secular agencies supplemented or supplanted churches as centers of social intercourse.

The various services which were being rendered by the welfare state cost an enormous amount of money; and the wealthy were called upon to bear much of the new burden. In fact, along with their program for welfare states, the new socially- and socialistically-minded political groups were urging a fiscal policy of progressive taxation—the wealthier a person is, the more able he is to pay and the more he should pay.[4] As income and other progressive taxes were adopted, the wealthy had less to give for philanthropy and less inclination to do so. Among them there developed an attitude that, inasmuch as they paid heavy taxes to the state for social services, the state should provide such services; and furthermore that by paying their taxes they had discharged their obligations to their fellow-men and did not want to be called upon for further contributions. In fact people of wealth had relatively little "psychic surplus", after taxes, for philanthropic purposes.

This coolness toward giving has been strengthened by the fact that European states have not permitted deductions, at least not important deductions, from taxable income for money given for philanthropy.[5] The socially-oriented political elements which drafted tax laws apparently feared that such allowances either would encourage giving to religion, to which many of them were opposed, or would facilitate tax evasion in which they thought the rich would indulge, in any case, to an unconscionable degree. Then, too, many potential givers turned from philanthropy because of the threat of, or actual, inflation. They came to realize from bitter experience how many of the traditional forms of accumulated wealth were diminished or destroyed by the loss of the purchasing power of money.

These various trends in philanthropy which have become visible in the recent past will undoubtedly be projected into at least the near future and will, in all probability, be accentuated as time goes on. For one thing, social-reform and socialist parties are strong enough to get nearly a majority of votes in

[4] Henry Laufenberger, *Finances comparées* (Paris, 1950), Part II, chap. I.

[5] Hermann Gross, "Wirtschaftswichtige Forschung und Wissenschaftsfinanzierung in Deutschland und den U.S.A.", *Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft*, Sonderdruck des Stifterverbandes für die Deutsche Wissenschaft, 1955.

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free general elections and would perhaps be governing in several states if they were not divided into many splinter groups. In spite of their divisions, they are strong enough and united enough to get all manner of social legislation enacted. Indeed, they have pushed their program to a point where, it is said, about 25 per cent of gross national product in France and Italy is turned out by state-owned enterprises and where some 30 per cent of a worker's total "wage" consists of social benefits obtained from the state—percentages which are typical of many European countries.

Then, too, states have undertaken to provide medical and social welfare services on such a scale that it is impossible to see how such activity could be taken over and supported by private individuals without something bordering on a revolution in taxation and giving. For example, in the Netherlands at the present time about 90 per cent of all moneys spent for social work and social welfare come from the state, and only 10 per cent from private sources, whereas fifty years ago these percentages were reversed, even though there has been no decrease in the money volume of private giving. Nevertheless, private giving for social welfare and social work in the Netherlands is not great, for it amounts to only some $2.30 per capita per annum compared with $55.00 per capita spent on tobacco and alcoholic beverages every year. Finally, the Netherlandish state has gone to extremes to stop gaps that might lead to hardships for the working class. It even provides insurance to cover workers who might lose days of employment because of heavy snow![6]

States have also been providing education for ever larger numbers and it is inconceivable that this could be financed by private sources. To be sure in the Latin countries of Europe, perhaps a third of the students of elementary and secondary school age go to church establishments, but in other countries the proportions which go to private schools are very small. In all countries except England higher education is almost entirely dominated by the state. Even research institutes, like the Institut Solvay in Belgium and the Max Planck Institut in West Germany, which are privately directed, have come to rely heavily on state grants in order to maintain their activity. In Germany, the government spends sixteen times as much for research, other than atomic and military research, as do philanthropists, and industry spends

[6] J. Everts and A. Treurniet, *Gids voor Maatschappelijk Werk* (Alphen, 1954), vol. I, chap. I.

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some ten times as much for its own scientific research as is obtained by philanthropy for general scientific research.[7]

Lastly, private gifts for religion appear to have declined considerably, although in this field the falling off is to be attributed not to an increase in state activity but to a decrease in the importance of religion in public life. Although statistical information on the financing of religion is sparse, there is some available about the situation in Sweden, where the Lutheran church is an established church. There in 1951 some 118,600,000 kronor were paid out by the national treasury for religious purposes and some 185,000,000 kronor were earned on church investments. From all sources about 354,000,000 kronor were available to the church, a sum roughly equivalent to $70,800,000. If to this amount is added what is spent by other religious groups in Sweden, the total comes to something over 400,000,000 kronor or $80,000,000. This amounts to about one per cent of national income and to some $11.00 per capita and should be compared with the sums spent for tobacco and alcoholic beverages which run to $72.00 per capita.[8] Even so, it is likely that the expenditures for religion are higher in Sweden than in most other countries, especially in France and Italy where there is a considerable amount of anticlericalism.

In spite of the fact that philanthropy in Europe is not so great as in America—apparently because of a greater development of the welfare state and because of a greater decline in religious fervor—private giving for socially desirable purposes does indeed exist. There, as here, the greatest volume of gifts comes from the extremely wealthy, on the one hand, and the lower income groups, on the other. Middle income groups appear to be less generous with their funds, perhaps because they have such high ambitions for themselves and their families that when these have been satisfied they have very little left over for others.[9]

Giving by lower income groups is obviously in small individual amounts and is usually directed toward some local activity in which the giver has a close personal interest, like a church or a youth organization. Philanthropy in sufficiently large volume to serve as a catalyst in society comes almost exclusively from the very wealthy, and almost without exception rich individuals who

[7] *Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft*, Spring 1958, p. 6.

[8] *Sweden's Statistical Yearbook, 1952* and *Statistical Yearbook, United Nations, 1956*, table 164.

[9] Andrews, *op. cit.*, chap. 4, and *Bolletino della DOXA*, Dec. 15, 1957.

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have given away large sums for socially desirable purposes are persons who have risen from lower income levels to the very top in one generation. They are all men who made their fortunes in producing, usually by a new process, some article for mass consumption—motor cars, dynamite, petroleum products, pharmaceuticals, beer, or electricity.

Corporate giving has not reached the magnitude in Europe that it has here, but again it does exist. In countries like Italy it is usual for large corporations to make donations to worthy causes. Throughout Europe business concerns have gone in for housing, which is in short supply, nurseries for the children of employees, and summer camps for workers. To be sure, such enterprise is undertaken in large part to create a more contented labor force, but it usually involves a certain amount of risk, if not of loss. However, such gifts can frequently be regarded as "business expenses" and hence are deductible from taxable income.

The only country of Western Europe that grants appreciable tax advantages to those who give is West Germany. There a change in the tax law in 1950 made possible a deduction for philanthropy by both corporations and individuals up to 10 per cent of taxable income, or up to other limits based on payrolls, and this has contributed to a quintupling of corporate giving in the last eight years. In fact, a German agency for soliciting funds for scientific research and the training of advanced scientists endeavors to get corporations to give at the rate of one per cent of the dividends they have paid out.[10]

Another aspect of corporate giving in America for which there is no real European counterpart is the tax-free foundation which is used to hold the stock of a company so that a group of individuals, usually a family, may, by avoiding inheritance taxes, retain control of a business. Why recourse to such a device has not been had in Europe is not clear, but the usual explanation is that control can be maintained in other ways. However, there are cases where an entire business has been turned into a foundation so that profits actually go for good works—as for example, the Carlsberg Brewery and the Egmont Petersen Co. in Copenhagen and the Wellcome Company in London.

For the most part gifts by large donors have been used in recent times mainly for pioneering projects—for striking out in

[10] *Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft,* Spring 1958, p. 3.

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new directions—with the avowed intention that the experience thus acquired would guide the state in its more elaborate financial expenditures. For example, the Nobel Foundation through its prizes has endeavored to bring honor to those who have made significant achievements in the arts and sciences or in the cause of peace; the Wellcome Foundation in London has sought to improve medical education and the study of medical history; and the Institut Solvay in Brussels has tried to develop the field of sociology. The advantages of having grant-making institutions of these kinds have become so obvious that in some countries where philanthropy is at a minimum, governments have created state grant-making bodies, such as the *Fonds de Recherche Scientifique* in France.

To judge whether or not the trends in philanthropy which are visible in Europe will be continued or will become established in the United States is an exceedingly risky task. Yet the specialist should undoubtedly venture his opinion, with the *caveat*, however, that the variables which operate in any phase of human activity as complicated as modern philanthropy could be easily altered and that, if this happened, present projections could be drastically changed.

It seems very likely that in the forseeable future the basic ideology in our culture of assuming responsibility for the weak and the infirm, the youth and the aged, the undeveloped and the underdeveloped will continue to be strong. It is also probable that the division of labor in society will continue to be accentuated so that the individual will be to an ever greater extent the creature of the society in which he lives. This being the case, he will very probably continue to seek protection and advantage for himself and people of his kind through the state. The state's rôle in welfare, and indeed in all aspects of life, will undoubtedly keep on growing so long as we have a democratic way of life. Private philanthropy will very probably continue to play a pioneering rôle and will not undertake massive tasks in welfare, research, or education. The best that can be expected of it in Europe, at least, is that it will manage its own affairs so well that it may keep its overhead down and otherwise set a good example for governmental action. It can, and probably will, be a powerful force in giving direction to the welfare state.

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THE DYARCHIC PATTERN OF GOVERNMENT AND PAKISTAN'S PROBLEMS

THE PAKISTAN Constitution of 1956 was supplanted by military rule in September 1958. This was the first time in history that democracy has been abrogated in a self-governing member of the British Commonwealth. An examination of this Constitution, therefore, as well as of the charters that preceded it, is appropriate at this time. Such an examination of political institutions, especially of those of an underdeveloped community, must pay careful attention to the historical background against which and to the social and economic setting in which government is carried on. A historical approach is particularly valuable in the case of Pakistan (as well as in that of India and of Burma) because many of the institutions of British rule have continued to play an important part even after independence. It would be incomplete and lifeless, however, if it were confined to institutional history; it must also show the effects of institutions on the minds and imaginations of the people who were governed by means of them.

The Foundations

British government in India reflected the commercial origin of East India Company rule. The business of the "factory" was managed by a council whose senior member was called President or Governor.[1] All power was vested in this council collectively and decisions were made by majority vote. Then as the need for more vigorous government was felt more keenly during the time of British expansion the power of the Governor General increased. As early as 1786 the Governor General was empowered to act on his own responsibility in respect of situations, "whereby the interests of the Company, or the safety or tranquility of the British possessions in India, or any part thereof, are or may in the judgment of the Governor General be essentially affected."

Two points are noteworthy about this provision. First is the fact that its language keeps on reappearing in later legislation all the way to independence in 1947. Secondly, it should be

[1] A. B. Rudra, *The Viceroy and Governor General* (London, 1940), p. 55.

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noted that this is the first time that the pattern of dual government was imposed on the subcontinent. There was to be one type of government in normal conditions and another in emergencies. Ever since that time, normal and crisis governments have been alternating on the subcontinent—so consistently, in fact, that after a time crisis government lost its exceptional character in the eyes of men and came to be considered a regular part of the legal machinery of the state. However far-reaching the concession to popular government might be, the presumption was always that it could not be entirely trusted; that there must remain some residue of power in the hands of an impartial "monarchic" power in the Hegelian sense which would return to assume authority in case of need. It would not be entirely inappropriate to define the basic principle of subcontinental government as "residual autocracy".

Origins of Parliamentary Government

The Governor General presided over the central Legislative Council. At first these councils consisted of bureaucratic officers. After the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 nonofficial members were included. Britain's intention was now to educate the people gradually toward local self-government. This end was served first by the introduction of the British system of education, but also by the growing acquaintance of the people with the machinery of a modern western state. Native people were recruited to the civil service and local men were allowed to participate in the legislative councils. This had to be done in stages. During the long-drawn-out process of emancipation it was a settled policy to keep a firm grip on the government, and not to permit obstructionism by those who were dissatisfied with the slow progress of reform. For example, interpellations by nonofficial members might be allowed, but no supplementary questions; the annual budget would be placed before the Legislative Council for discussion, but no vote would be permitted.

It was not till the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909 that elected members entered the provincial councils and the central Legislative Council, and in the former were even allowed to form a majority. Now further concessions were made. Supplementary questions were allowed and reductions of items in the budget could be moved, as well as resolutions on administrative questions.

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After World War I, the movement toward more popular responsibility and the relaxation of British control accelerated. The Government of India Act of 1919 was a major milestone on the road to independence. There was now an elected majority in both the houses, though the executive, consisting of the Governor General and his Executive Council, was not subject to removal by the legislature, a limitation that gave rise to a sense of impotence and frustration, often expressing itself in irresponsible obstruction on the part of the legislators. It was now that the adjournment motion, which is still popular on the subcontinent, became the frequent manifestation of a purely negative attitude. It permitted a show of radicalism by lawyer-politicians which was safe and a help both in securing votes and in attracting clients.

The Act of 1919 left the Viceroy (Governor General) with extensive powers that were both negative and positive. He could summon, prorogue and dissolve the legislature at his discretion. He could withhold his assent to bills passed by the legislature or reserve them for the signification of His Majesty's pleasure. On the other hand, he could secure the passage of a bill without legislative assent and in time of emergency he could rule by ordinance.

The salaries of senior officials were not subject to control by vote of the legislature. The reason was obvious—in a poverty-stricken country such as India no elected politician could possibly have refrained from attacking grants that appeared monstrously large to a man earning four or five dollars a month.

In the provinces, the Act of 1919 introduced the so-called system of "dyarchy". This was a scheme of dual rule. By it certain subjects of legislation and administration were "transferred" to the control of ministers responsible to the provincial legislature. Other matters were still "reserved", that is, they remained in the discretionary control of the governor. Even with respect to "transferred" subjects both the Viceroy and the provincial governors retained important powers. For example, a bill passed by a provincial assembly must be assented to both by the governor and by the Viceroy.

All these provisions were parts of the British policy of trying to introduce democracy into India by safe installments. The intentions of that policy were benevolent. It was based on the hope that a grass-roots democracy would eventually grow up.

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It was also based on the parallel belief that until democracy had taken firm roots, Britain was entitled and even morally obliged to keep a firm grip on the substance of power.

Many of the political arrangements just described found their way into the constitutions of Pakistan, India and Burma. In a way, it might be said that the peoples of those countries found themselves to be prisoners of institutions which experience had led them to regard as necessary parts of any form of government.

Origins of the Executive

From the beginning to the end of British rule in India, all executive powers were in the hands of the Governor General and his Council. In practice, the Governor General would normally consult his Council on important matters, conflicting views would be expressed at will, but in the end the Governor General's decision would prevail. This overriding power was not an unmixed blessing, for it meant that almost everything was referred to his decision and responsibility.[2]

All this led to congestion and delay. The origins of the cabinet system in India are found in the desire of the Viceroy to save himself from drowning in a flood of paper. It was for this reason that Lord Canning in 1861 proposed the system of departmentalization, by which each member of the Viceroy's Council was put in charge of some specific department or departments except for those that he kept under his direct control.

Under the member of the Council in charge of each department there was a secretary who was the principal civil servant in the department and hardly less influential than its head. For he, too, met the Viceroy regularly and often took a matter over the head of his departmental superior. Since the Mutiny, the Indian Civil Service to which he belonged had acquired a degree of efficiency, prestige and exclusiveness that is perhaps unrivaled in history. An élite of some 1,300 men, it was the "steel frame"

[2] This tendency was enhanced by the mentality and techniques of Indian clerks (babus, as they are called). Many of them are inclined to fortify their personal prestige and importance by referring to the supreme boss whenever possible. The intention is to bring oneself to the boss's notice and simultaneously to achieve a maximum security at a minimum cost of responsibility. Within the shelter of his self-created fortress of paper files the babu can be the most helpful, and also, at times, the most obstructionist, scribe on earth.

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and in fact the effective government of India. Its powers were all-pervading. It was of profound importance, too, that as indigenous members were gradually added to the "Service" they took over its professional code and superb *esprit de corps*. This was destined to have great influence on Pakistan's politics and administration, for long before independence the practice developed of appointing civil servants as governors and councillors.

Thus Britain pursued a policy of gradually injecting democratic elements into an autocratic structure, and for a while autocracy and democracy were allowed to lead an almost self-contained existence side by side. When the local people entered this structure they too became habituated to this parallelism.[3] While many of them came to appreciate the undisputed help which parliamentary government rendered to national emancipation, other more practical men saw that there was more substance of power in the "safeguards" through which the British exercised effective control. Till the last days of British power the real power and prestige of government remained attached to the offices of the Viceroy, the commander in chief, the governors and the senior civil servants. Independence meant that these positions went to indigenous men, to men, that is, who both feared and admired the system they had fought so long. Would it not be too much to expect them to become mere constitutional figureheads now that they had won the battle? Were not their intimate knowledge of their own fellow countrymen, and their inability to check executive power, temptations too strong to resist? Many of these politicians were in danger of acquiring a dual political personality, one that combined the public preaching of extreme democracy as a vehicle for gaining political power with a private desire for autocratic plenary powers. This partly explains also their tendency to cling to power by trying to evade periodic elections.

The Act of 1935

The extension of self-government which the new Constitution of 1935 granted was twofold.[4] Whereas "full responsible government with adequate safeguards" became the principle of pro-

[3] For future reference, the term "parallelism" is to be understood in the above-mentioned sense.

[4] For the Act of 1935, see S. M. Bose, *The Working Constitution of India* (London, 1939).

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vincial government, the dyarchic system was now to be tried out in the central government. There was a substantial list of matters at the center in which the Governor General was expected to use his individual judgment or his discretion. Important from our point of view was the fact that he *remained the sole judge* of whether he was to apply his discretionary powers or was to consult his ministers, and that the courts were walled off from any jurisdiction in this respect. Thus, while there was a substantial extension of self-government, its limits were soon reached.

Certain other provisions—or omission of provisions—in the 1935 Act deserve comment. For example, there was no mention of a prime minister. This is striking since the Simon Commission, upon whose Report the Act of 1935 was based, had said that "there should be a member not overburdened with departmental work, whose primary function would be to 'lead the House' ".[5]

Another important point about the 1935 steps was their failure to transfer the defense portfolio from the commander in chief to the member of the cabinet who would be leader of the house. This would have put some stop to the rise of the commander in chief in the governmental structure before independence, a rise that dates back to the early practice of making the commander in chief an ex-officio member of the Governor General's Council and especially to the 1909 change whereby he supplanted the military member of the Council as head of the defense department. His might be called the second highest political office in the country, a rival indeed to the office of prime minister when it did come into existence.

The severe restrictions on the powers of the elected legislatures and the wide range of free action left to the executive, both at the center and in the provinces, along with other "safeguards" that slowed down the march toward self-government, were all aspects of the "dual government" that continued to be found in the Constitution of 1935 as in earlier ones. There was a genuine desire among the British rulers for a gradual evolution toward democracy, but there was also a suspicion that democracy could not always be relied upon with safety. What the framers of the Act forgot was that the social and historical background

[5] Simon Commission Report, vol. II, p. 140.

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of indigenous politicians predisposed them to the working of the undemocratic rather than of the democratic parts of the institutions they were to inherit.

Autocratic Residues in Democratic Constitutions

It is no coincidence that the constitutions of the Indian Union, Pakistan and Burma were all based on the concept of parallelism as it was expressed in the Government of India Act and the the Government of Burma Act of 1935. When Britain granted independence to these countries, power was transferred in each case to one political party, which represented the freedom struggle of the nation concerned.[6] These parties thus became heirs to the far-reaching powers of the British administration. The British were aware that they were transferring power to what was essentially a one-party system which was nevertheless expected to function in the British parliamentary tradition and therefore to tolerate an opposition that would ultimately become an alternative government.

The British choice of the political parties to which the power was handed over was moderately successful. In all three cases the leaders held a belief in liberal and social democracy. Their ideology foreshadowed a not too distant future when they might themselves take the initiative in the development of a democratic opposition. It was important, however, that this development should not occur too quickly, that the opposition should not be one based on an ideology that was intolerant and fundamentally against the ideology of the state, and that it should not be composed of a multiplicity of splinter parties following ambitious leaders but without set programs.

Both in Pakistan and in Burma, the constitutions based on the 1935 Acts broke down at the very moment when the one-party state disintegrated. Only in India has the one-party system survived and with it the semblance of democracy—though the emergence of a strong Communist party as apparently the only possible alternative to Congress rule does not augur well for the future.

[6] For India, consult *The Transfer of Power in India* by V. P. Menon (Princeton, 1957); for Pakistan, R. Symonds, *The Making of Pakistan* (London, 1951); for Burma, John F. Cady, *A History of Modern Burma* (Ithaca, 1958).

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The relative success of one-party democracy in India may be explained by the Indian propensity to unquestioning obedience—the Bakhti spirit of devotion—which has been noted both by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar and by Rupert Emerson.[7] To this may be added the social education provided by the caste system which made for social cohesion and the acceptance of leadership by a religiously sanctioned group—the Brahmin priestly intelligentsia. There is no doubt that the unquestioning acceptance of Gandhi's leadership was also greatly due to the social control of religion.

Yet even in India the autocratic powers, implied in the system of parallel government, were not infrequently used. There too the President retained his power to act in case of a failure of constitutional machinery in a province, as he did in the East Punjab in 1951, and in Andhra in 1954 when the Congress Ministry was defeated by an alliance of Communists and Socialists.

The Example of Pakistan

It was, however, in Pakistan that the implications of the Act of 1935 worked themselves out to their logical conclusion. In a way this was a simple and natural consequence of the fact that there the Act, though amended in 1947, continued to be operative till 1956, that is, during the greater part of the state's existence. Moreover, Pakistan, unlike India and Burma, did not have a compact group of politicians who had taken part in her liberation movement; for this reason the civil service and the army, both very familiar with the working of British Indian government, retained a greater share of influence than in those countries.

The Independence Act of 1947 by which the British Parliament had transferred sovereign powers to Pakistan had envisaged full parliamentary government. It had given them to the Constituent Assembly, and its Section 8 c abolished the discretionary powers of the Governor General and governors and their powers to act in their individual judgment. Still, dual government was too powerfully entrenched. For the very next Section, 9, empowered the Governor General, as far as he deemed necessary or expedient, to modify the constitution, or the jurisdiction of any legislature, court or other authority in the new Dominion, and

[7] Morris Jones, *Parliament in India* (Philadelphia, 1957), p. 328.

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to create new legislatures, courts or authorities.[8] It is true that this provision was intended only for a transitional period and principally for bringing the terms of the Independence Act into operation. But the powers were very great and much would depend on the spirit in which they were used. The British legislators cannot be blamed much for this handle they gave to autocracy. They could hardly foresee that the work of constitution-making would take as long as nine years. Yet the very fact that it was done so slowly showed that there were powerful influences at work that were content with the continued operation of the Government of India Act, as amended in 1947.

Continuing Dyarchy

The continued dyarchy vested in a one-party system was accurately symbolized in the person of the creator of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah himself. As president of the All-Pakistan Muslim League he became both Governor General and President of the Constituent Assembly. Thus during his lifetime a clash between legislature and executive was ruled out. Parallelism continued but remained dormant. Yet as soon as there appeared cracks in the structure of the one-party system (for reasons I have elucidated elsewhere[9]) it revived. This was first shown when Governor General Ghulam Mohammed dismissed the Nazimuddin Cabinet in 1953, while it still had the confidence of the legislature, and replaced the head by a prime minister from outside the ranks of parliament. Then followed the supersession of the United Front Government in East Pakistan after its sweeping electoral success in 1954, with the help of Section 92 A, the emergency provision of the 1935 Act.

A definite step back to the arrangements that had existed before 1947 was taken when the first Constituent Assembly was dissolved in flagrant contravention of the working constitution. The second Mohammed Ali Cabinet presented a typical dyarchy-picture. Its key positions were occupied by military officers without any connection with the political life of the country, while a seasoned politician, H. S. Suhrawardy, occupied the Law Ministry. What was most revealing in the situation was that har-

[8] See Government of Pakistan, *Unrepealed Legislation* (Karachi, 1951).

[9] K. J. Newman, "Pakistan's Preventive Autocracy and Its Causes," *Pacific Affairs*, March 1959.

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mony prevailed in a cabinet so put together. Indeed, Mr. Suhrawardy remained on the best of terms with Governor General Ghulam Mohammed. It is known, in fact, that he favored the adoption of a presidential form of government in which the power of the Governor General and the Services would have been even greater than they already were.[10]

During the years 1954 and 1955 there were numerous supersessions of provincial governments with the assistance of Section 92 A of the 1935 Act. Mr. Ghulam Mohammed even undertook to resuscitate the system of Governor General's legislative enactments when he attempted to abolish West Pakistan's provinces by ordinance.[11] At this moment, however, his physical and mental powers failed and popular opposition was too strong for open autocratic rule to continue indefinitely. Even after his successor, President Iskander Mirza, reverted to parliamentary rule, the veiled dyarchic character of government remained obvious to all.

The draft constitution passed by the Constituent Assembly in January 1956 was an experiment with mixed institutions.[12] While parliament sought to assert itself by sponsoring a unicameral legislature and establishing cabinet rule with a prime minister at its head, the President's powers remained strong. His strength was in the lack of clarity with which the relationship between him, the cabinet, and the legislature was defined. The cabinet, according to Article 37 of the draft constitution, was there to aid and advise the President in the exercise of his functions, but there was no sanction to keep him from disregarding its advice. While the cabinet was to be collectively responsible to the Assembly, there was no stipulation that it had to resign in case it lost the confidence of the Assembly. On the other hand, the ministers held office during the pleasure of the President, all executive authority was to be vested in him and he continued to make rules for the transaction and allocation of business.

[10] The presidential type of executive has been frequently advocated by people who can have had very little experience of its workings and implications, but who see in it a return to viceregal institutions, under a republican nomenclature.

[11] See the Emergency Powers Ordinances, Ordinance No. IX, 1955, Government of Pakistan.

[12] K. J. Newman, *Essays on the Constitution of Pakistan* (Dacca, 1956), pp. 125-128.

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Moreover, there was a revival of the Viceroy's powers in the rule that the President was entitled to dissolve the National Assembly in his discretion.

A similar relationship persisted in the provinces between the governor and the provincial cabinets and their chief ministers. The provincial governors were to be appointed and dismissed by the President, who had also the right of an absolute veto against national and provincial legislation, could pass provisional legislative ordinances when the Assembly was not in session, and appointed some of the most important dignitaries, for example, every judge of the Supreme Court and the High Courts.

The Constituent Assembly reacted violently against conferring these strong powers on the President and the governors. Its committees which studied the draft amended it radically. They eliminated the President's discretionary power to dissolve parliament and with some exceptions made it obligatory for him to act in accordance with the advice of his ministers.[13] They also attempted to curtail his power to dismiss the Prime Minister by stipulating that the President "shall not exercise this power unless *he* is satisfied that the Prime Minister does not command the confidence of the majority of the Assembly." It seems that while the legislators had every intention of curtailing the powers of the President, they had some inhibition which kept them from going too far.[14] Some thought the reason was the knowledge of their own de facto limitations. Others felt that the politicians looked to the future when they hoped to make use of what was left of the President's powers. Indeed, experience proved that those politicians who paid most lip service to democratic principles were often the first to rely on the presidential prerogatives.

The inherited tradition by which senior civil servants often overruled their political ministers was very strong in Pakistan from the beginning. It found its natural outlet in the general secretary at the center and in the chief secretaries in the provinces. The Secretary General was subject only to the Prime Minister, the chief secretary only to the chief minister. But the

[13] See Article 37, Section 7, in the *Constitution of Pakistan*, Government Publications (Karachi, 1956).

[14] The author happened to be present during some of these committee meetings.

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chief secretary, the eyes and ears of the central government in the provinces, was in direct communication with the Secretary General at Karachi, and through him with the Prime Minister. The chief secretary of a province had also direct access to the governor through whom he had a direct channel not only to the Prime Minister, but also to the President—for the governor had always a secret personal telephone line to the President's house.

Whenever there was a disagreement between a provincial departmental minister and his secretary, the latter might refer the matter to the chief secretary, who might put it before the chief minister and the cabinet. If the minister would not relent or if he got the backing of the provincial cabinet, the matter might be referred to the central government. Considering that the provinces had few independent funds, the displeasure of the central secretariat was something which no provincial minister could take lightly. While the Muslim League's one-party rule lasted, such questions might occasionally be found on the agenda of the Central Party Committee.[15]

After the coming of coalition governments, however, the position of the political heads became stronger, as their defection from an unstable cabinet was something the chief minister and even the Prime Minister had to guard against. Yet as far as the central government was concerned ministers continued by and large to adhere to the advice of their secretaries, who might not even always inform them of all the business under their jurisdiction.

The instability of democratic government in Pakistan as well as the political and social degeneration that accompanied it provided good grounds for continued use of the dyarchic pattern. The democratic politicians ruled without principle or consistency. They displayed an uncontrollable ambition to retain office no matter at what cost. They were indifferent to party discipline, freely changing sides when tempted by the promise of ministerial posts.[16] In such conditions, no coalition government could last even though coalitions had become indispensable after the breakdown of one-party government. Some ministers and

[15] Keith Callard, *Pakistan: A Political Study* (London and New York, 1957), criticizes the Muslim League caucus for dominating the first Constituent Assembly (pp. 86-88). Yet this is a natural corollary of one-party rule.

[16] See Newman, "Pakistan's Preventive Autocracy and Its Causes," *loc. cit.*

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legislators were guilty of conduct bordering on high treason because of their habit of seeking favors and support of their policies from countries hostile to Pakistan's foreign policy.[17] They often displayed a callous disregard for the needs of their constituents in times of famine, disease or floods and this undermined the respect of the common people for democratic government.

So did the irresponsible handling of financial matters. In East Pakistan, for example, it became a habit after 1954 for the government to delay the presenting of the budget to the Assembly until just a few days before the deadline and for the Assembly to respond by refusing to pass the budget when presented.[18] There was a cynical disregard for the people's needs on both sides, financial measures being passed only by exercise of the governor's emergency powers. Other forms of financial demagoguery contributed to ministerial corruption. One of the few electoral promises which the United Front Government fulfilled after coming to power in East Pakistan in 1954 was to reduce the ministers' salaries to $200 *per mensem*. This merely meant that in future the ministers had to seek alternative sources of income to meet their not inconsiderable financial obligations.

Such behavior more than justified the apprehensions about the working of democracy in the Indian subcontinent that had been expressed by the Simon Commission. It provided almost a textbook demonstration of the correctness of the Platonic and Aristotelian theory that radical democracy turns into anarchy.[19] It gave moral justification for a swing to autocracy.

The preceding discussion should make it clear, however, that it is wrong to call the present government of Pakistan a military dictatorship. It merely represents a highlighting of one facet of traditional subcontinental rule. It is a harking back to the Act of 1935 or even the Act of 1919. It is in keeping with the tradition that only the executive side of parallel government can stamp out corruption, improve administration, bring down prices and provide food. It is quite natural also that the commander in chief, always the dignitary ranking next to the Viceroy, should become the President.

[17] H. Feldman, *A Constitution for Pakistan* (Karachi, 1956), pp. 58-59.

[18] *Pakistan Observer*, Dacca, April 1 and 2, 1958; *Dawn*, Karachi, September 24, 1958.

[19] See editorial in the *Times*, London, September 25, 1958.

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The Basic Democracies Order of 1959[20] with its four-tier system of local self-government may be an attempt to synthesize the two aspects of parallel government—the democratic aspect and the bureaucratic aspect. It aims at a democracy at the grass roots by the creation of smaller and more workable units of local self-government—much in the spirit of Lord Ripon's liberal reforms of 1882.[21] It provides also for a fourfold hierarchy of councils in which elected and nominated nonofficial councilors will work together with trained civil servants.

The elections to the Basic Democracies took place on a nonparty basis in both parts of Pakistan during December 1959 and January 1960. The pronouncements made by the government suggest that these elected members are likely to form an electoral college which will choose both the President of the Republic and the members of the Legislature.[22] Definite recommendations on these points will be made by the Constitution Commission. Elections in Pakistan will be indirect, not unlike presidential elections in the Fifth French Republic. By western standards this may hardly be a democratic achievement, but according to recent announcements it is merely a realistic return to the policy of "democracy by installments"—the policy which was ended so prematurely after World War II by the imposition of full-fledged parliamentary systems on newly independent peoples who were not yet ready for them.

The new Constitution is likely to follow those of the United States and France in dividing the legislature from the executive, though even the Assembly's power to vote on the budget may be curtailed. Strong emergency powers will probably remain in the hands of the President. One of the first acts of President Ayub Khan was to abolish the office of prime minister. The legislators will no doubt still be confined to their primary task of discussing and passing legislation, and to certain control functions.[23] The legislature is to remain of moderate size and unicameral. The superiority of bicameralism is admitted, but it is thought there are "not enough capable persons in the country to run two houses."[24] On the other hand, political parties will

[20] Government of Pakistan Press, Karachi, 1959.

[21] N. C. Roy, *Rural Self-Government in Bengal* (Calcutta, 1936), p. 10.

[22] *Pakistan Observer,* Dacca, January 28, 1960.

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] *Ibid.,* January 26, President's statement of January 25, 1960.

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be permitted, though attempts may be made to avoid their former destructive effects.[25] The dyarchic system is too deeply ingrained to exclude a return of most of the former legislators.

A presidential system based on the division of the legislature from the executive guarantees more stable government. While it allows the executive to govern, it also continues the slow development of education for democracy. As ministers are excluded from the legislature, the sterile pastime of unmaking cabinets purely for the sake of personal ambition may disappear. It might be conducive to a stable party system if legislators wishing to change their party could do so only after resignation and reëlection.

It is still a debatable point whether an appointed executive alone provides the permanent remedy; for, in a country with a strong bureaucratic tradition, an executive of this type is more apt to subordinate the democratic side of government than to educate for democracy. This is surely one lesson of the long-continued operation of dyarchic parallelism.

For a party system to work well, not only basic consent and the acceptance of the democratic ideal are required, but also much patriotism and honesty. Among politicians in general there must be that type of selflessness that will put the nation first, the party second, and the individual ambition last. A statesman or reformer may overcome the temptations of unlimited power, but will the country's average legislators and civil servants be able to unlearn their deeply ingrained habits of thought and action? The ultimate success of Pakistan's revolution will be measured by its ability to effect these deeper psychological changes.

K. J. NEWMAN

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[25] President's statement of January 27, 1960.

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REVIEWS

The Economic Mind in American Civilization. Volumes Four and Five: *1918-1933.* By JOSEPH DORFMAN. New York, The Viking Press, 1959.—x, 398, xxxiv; xxxv-xli, 399-776, xlv-lxxxviii pp. $12.50.

Professor Dorfman's five volumes on *The Economic Mind in American Civilization* constitute one of the most original contributions to economic thinking in our generation. Dorfman examines all the current economic creeds, slogans, analytical theories and basic attitudes which contributed to the molding of our business and social organizations since colonial times. His book shows the process by which abstract economic theory becomes vulgarized into simple economic slogans. These slogans are accepted with absolute faith, regardless of their practical consequences, by men who have no acquaintance with the complicated literature in which these theories are explained. Once generally accepted by prevailing public opinion, it can no longer be contradicted by showing they have no application to the actual situation. Dorfman's books show the power of such economic rituals and slogans in leading a nation to act even against its own self-interest.

The last two volumes deal with revolutionary changes in economic attitudes, particularly with respect to the relationship of government and business, which occurred between the two wars. Take as an example the concept of balancing the budget. It is a picture of the government as a thrifty head of the family with a duty to save money for its old age. No concept has been as devoutly believed by Americans as this one. The author points out that sound investment opinion prior to the First World War considered that one hundred million dollars was all the national debt this country could stand. At the end of the First World War the debt had risen to twenty-six billion dollars. The idea of national planning had been born out of the necessities of the war. Those who had had a part in the war planning felt that the use of credits was justified to make reconversion to peacetime economy easier. The idea was rejected. The automatic processes of monetary theory were relied on to accomplish the change.

There followed the depression of 1920-21 which ruined the farmers and from which the small farmers have never recovered. Out of farm distress there arose the economic idea of parity

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prices which finally reached fruition during the great depression. This irrational method of solving the farm problem is still with us and no effective economic measures have yet been devised to get rid of it.

Then came the golden era of the twenties. Again the notion of planned industry came to the front, only it was not government planning; instead it was planning by a combination of monopolies and quasi monopolies. All this, however, could be controlled by monetary theory operating through the device of raising rediscount rates and balancing the budget. American production increased by leaps and bounds. Schools of business management grew rapidly to train men how to conduct the nation's economy; and each year not only was the budget balanced but a huge surplus was accumulated until just prior to the depression the national debt had been reduced from twenty-six billion dollars to nine billion dollars in ten years. Thus the tried and true principles of American economic thinking had been religiously followed and President Hoover was able to announce that an era of permanent plenty had arrived.

Then came the great depression which sound economists, examining the economic structure through their theories, thought of as a beneficial readjustment. So strong was the power of these magic economic slogans that Roosevelt, running at a time when economic disaster instead of prosperity was just around the corner, stated as a primary objective that he would balance the budget.

As the depression deepened men lost faith in the economic idea of national thrift while others still clung to it. Dorfman gives a fascinating account of the babble of conflicting economic creeds and the bitterness of those who thought practical measures were an economic sin.

Today we are at it again. We cannot afford adequate schools, we are losing the scientific race with Russia, our public services everywhere are woefully deficient as compared with Europe. The Potomac River in our nation's capital is an open sewer, to the amazement of the Frenchmen who can swim in the Seine—all as a tribute to the magic symbol of budget balancing.

These are only a few highlights in these fascinating volumes. No economic idea which had any current effect or gathered any following whatever is neglected by Dorfman. The great contribution of the books is that we see these ideas operating not in a vacuum but against the confused current events and the necessities out of which they were born.

The author closes with the hope that economic thinking can become more of a science than it is now. Certainly his study is

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scientific in the truest sense. But it is anthropological science, which is not the kind of science that economics claims to be. If Dorfman means that economics with a big "E" will be a science which can mold industrial organizations and affect their relations with government, I see little support for his hope. The actual wealth of a nation consists in its productive capacity. The industrial revolution of the twentieth century has expanded that wealth beyond all previous conceptions. We are losing hundreds of billions of dollars because we think it is dangerous to plan that production through any government agency. But planning as it is carried on in communist countries, however successful, means the destruction of human freedom. It would indeed be dangerous if the economic idea of planning became so dominant that we lost our faith in the vague but very necessary ideal of private capitalism and competition between independent business enterprises. We have got to be able to keep the essence of this vision of industrial freedom and at the same time prevent it from becoming a regressive and stagnating force. The old slogans must somehow be retained because of their spiritual value and at the same time adapted to the industrial revolution of the twentieth century. Such an adjustment cannot, I believe, be accomplished by that kind of precise thinking which we call scientific. There must be a spiritual change which gives confidence that our liberties will not be lost and our economy will not become bankrupt by encouraging the fullest possible production. When that takes place we can safely have "capitalism" and full production at the same time.

In other words, Economic thinking (with a big "E"), as the author so brilliantly shows, is not science. It is a religion. By saying that, I do not mean to deprecate our reverently held economic creeds and slogans but rather to demonstrate their supreme importance in preserving human freedom.

THURMAN ARNOLD

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Political Power and Personal Freedom: Critical Studies in Democracy, Communism, and Civil Rights. By SIDNEY HOOK. New York, Criterion Books, Inc., 1959.—xviii, 462 pp. $7.50.

These thirty-four essays, written during the last decade and printed in varied places, present Professor Hook in two major rôles. In the first, he is primarily a student and exponent of democratic theory. One of the collection's best essays, "The Justifications of Democracy", makes explicit Mr. Hook's conviction that "the successful defense of democracy does not rest

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primarily upon the analysis of its nature and presuppositions." In turn, Mr. Hook picks up and discards religion, metaphysics and natural law as justifications of democracy. At a time when popular fashion so readily equates God and democracy, Mr. Hook's cool dismissal of the relation is pleasantly refreshing. His own attachment to democracy derives from the belief that democracy and empirical method are congenial mates. As he puts this key point, "if empiricism is a generic term for the philosophic attitude which submits *all* claims of fact and value to test by experience, then empiricism as a philosophy is more congenial to a democratic than to an antidemocratic community, for it brings into the open light of criticism the interests in which moral values and social institutions are rooted." In short, democracy encourages us to employ the method of scientific inquiry, our best hope of widening economic prosperity and increasing cultural variety.

This vision of democracy as essentially a set of procedures and attitudes rather than a structure of beliefs leads Mr. Hook to stress the primacy of political democracy and the only subsidiary value of specific economic arrangements. Where democracy reigns, the procedures are always available to change economic institutions. Where democracy is absent, the most desirable economic arrangement is subject to the will of the state's political masters. If Mr. Hook is still able to describe himself as a socialist, it is because what he stresses in socialist tradition is the drive toward human equality. What he regards as primary in achieving that goal is the maintenance of free democratic institutions and procedures. Understandably, therefore, the Karl Marx whom Mr. Hook venerates is a democratic Marx. The appealing figure who emerges from Mr. Hook's selective representation is a cultivated western scholar whose criticism of capitalism is the effect of his passion against political and economic restraint. Needless to say other selections from Marx's voluminous writings can assemble a different portrait of the historical Marx.

In his second rôle, Mr. Hook is one of our leading controversialists, a deft wielder, as Max Eastman has said, of both rapier and bludgeon. The list of his arguments is both a record of his own activity and a handy summary of the debates in recent years among liberals and socialists. There is first Mr. Hook's celebrated castigation of the "ritualistic liberals", his own term for those who, according to him, are so blindly attached to the outmoded formulas of the past as to ignore the need to reconcile today liberty and security. In the 1920's those German democrats were ritualistic liberals who allowed the Nazis to subvert

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the civil service and the schools rather than defend democracy by restraining its enemies. In the 1950's, Mr. Hook identifies Robert M. Hutchins as a prime target. In "The Fallacies of Ritualistic Liberalism", Mr. Hook subjects to intense attack Mr. Hutchins' stated willingness to hire a Communist as an employee of the Fund for the Republic, under appropriate conditions.

Mr. Hook's views on the employment of Communists in government and colleges are clear and firm. Because Communists are conspirators not heretics, proper security procedures designed and administered by liberals must exclude them from public employment. Because Communists surrender to the party their freedom to inquire, they have no place in universities dedicated to free investigation. In a discussion with the then Secretary of the AAUP on this last point, Mr. Hook departs slightly from the consistency of his position. He does not advocate automatic dismissal of the Communist college teacher. He seems to be close to Harvard's conclusion that party membership obliges the Communist professor to explain himself to his peers.

In contrast to a good many other liberals, Mr. Hook sees little probability of change in the fixed purposes of the Soviet Union. He is perhaps too ready to assume that those American intellectuals who do see such prospects are dupes yet again of Soviet peace propaganda. Mr. Hook is among those who believe that McCarthy's impact upon college campuses has been much exaggerated. He is convinced also that McCarthy would never have gone as far as he did if liberals in and out of office had not neglected the legitimate demands of security.

Mr. Hook engages in an entertaining controversy with Max Eastman over the meaning of socialism today. Finally, he crosses swords with Lord Russell over nuclear disarmament. The two, good matches for each other, arrive at contrasted postures. Mr. Hook would face nuclear devastation in preference to Russian slavery. Lord Russell would accept Russian slavery in preference to nuclear devastation. Since this is Mr. Hook's book, not Lord Russell's, it is appropriate to close a review of a contentious volume with part of its author's dedication:

> "IT IS BETTER TO BE A LIVE JACKAL THAN A DEAD LION—FOR JACKALS, NOT MEN, . . . THOSE WHO ARE PREPARED TO LIVE LIKE MEN, AND, IF NECESSARY, DIE LIKE MEN, HAVE THE BEST PROSPECT OF SURVIVING AS FREE MEN AND ESCAPING THE FATE OF BOTH JACKALS AND LIONS."

ROBERT LEKACHMAN

BARNARD COLLEGE

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Leadership and Political Institutions in India. Edited by RICHARD L. PARK and IRENE TINKER. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959.—x, 486 pp. $10.00.

"Deputation—a noun of multitude signifying many but not much." This was Mr. Gladstone. He might have said the same about a symposium. But this symposium, about how leaders come to the fore in India today, is altogether different. It is much—nearly 500 pages by twenty-eight contributors—but its content is also much: much information and much insight. It consists of a selection from papers presented at a seminar at the University of California on leadership in India. For an English reader it shows how much more thoroughly and systematically the American universities are studying contemporary Asia than are the British universities. England may know more about the past of India, but her academics, if not her business men, are growing out of touch with the present. The contributions to the seminar have been edited to make a whole, so that the book is well balanced, comprehensive and easy to read.

The essay on Jawaharlal Nehru, by Margaret Fisher, of the University of California, is outstanding. In twenty pages it gives a satisfactory picture of him, and how he came to be what he is. It is concise, sympathetic, imaginative, accurate; it is a remarkable feat of getting inside Nehru's mind.

> Nehru partakes of the character of the pedagogue rather than of the demagogue. He consistently couches his appeal in rational terms, and the enthusiasms which he seeks to rouse are large, generous and all inclusive. He is thoroughly aware of the danger latent in the exercise of power. . . . He does not beg for votes, nor does he pander to prejudices.

A governing idea in the symposium is that the western apparatus of government is still very new in India. Officially, India is a parliamentary democracy. But the parliament does not control the leaders or make the leaders, nor does it make the main decisions in the country. If parliament were under strain, parliamentary government might quickly be subverted: a determined government which was overthrown by parliamentary vote might refuse to resign. The book therefore does not accept the view that the parliamentary system has necessarily come to stay, and looks back to study how leaders were created in the past under the older traditions of Indian politics. One writer, Mackenzie Brown, reaches the alarming conclusion that these may lend themselves to communism. The theme of the individual versus the state is never stressed in traditional Hindu thought.

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Some Indian visitors to China have been impressed favorably by the assumption in Communist China that what is good for the state must really be good for the individual. But nearly all the contributors recognize the impediments which the Gandhian doctrines have put in the way of communism.

Myron Weiner analyzes the conflict between the Westerners and the traditionalists. He admits that western institutions in India are still fragile. But he thinks that the Westerners may win. "The Hindu-minded have lost much of their traditional authority, and therefore find it necessary to accept the weapons of the more westernized élites. The possibility exists that the Hindu-minded parties will not only be forced to accept western political forms, but in time may come to accept them." Mr. Weiner notes a fact about Indian politics which has escaped other observers. Party workers are usually devoted to their party work and to nothing else; as a rule they do not belong to other social groups—social, religious, or friendly. Their whole life is concentrated on the party. In future this may make political life in India rather savage.

More might have been said in the book about the ideas and stature of Vinoba Bhave and Jayaprakash Narayan. More illumination might have been gained by contrasting the politics of India with those of Pakistan. But the book does not pretend to be exhaustive. Few recent works on India can teach so much about her politics.

GUY WINT

ST. ANTONY'S COLLEGE
OXFORD

The Economy, Liberty and the State. By CALVIN B. HOOVER. New York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1959.—445 pp. $5.00.

Professor Hoover is concerned as to how much individual liberty can be preserved under modern industrialism.

The political and economic systems of the western capitalist countries rested on private property which, especially when combined with unlimited private inheritance, was vulnerable from the point of view of social equity. Convenient as it was for capitalists, private property did provide for the accumulation of capital and its mobilization and operational direction. It also induced more withering away of the state than under socialism in Soviet Russia and less, though severe, restriction on the freedom of workers.

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But western capitalism depended for its economic defense on the maintenance of individual enterprise and competition, and neither has completely survived. When the courts accorded corporations the status of legal persons they made way, not only for the large-scale administration of industrial resources, but also for basic modifications of competition and, therefore, of the determination of costs and prices. The separation of ownership from control in these corporations, although inevitable, may impair the functioning of the system, and the modification of profit maximization by managerial concern for public service obscures the direction the economy takes while leaving "public service" to interpretation by a number of managements. Subsequently other large organizations appeared until those in control of large labor unions, farm organizations and large industrial corporations make decisions formerly governed by the impersonal free market. In fact in Western Europe outside Britain tripartite condominiums of governments, managements of corporations and managements of labor unions have emerged. Marxist social movements have achieved no general move toward a socialist system by nationalizing industry. The movement in this direction in Britain has lost momentum with the realization that it contributes little to increase the productivity of labor, or to reduce inequality of income, while it presents difficult problems of parliamentary control.

For some time the inequality of incomes remained within tolerable limits especially where incomes were rising. But the basic flaw in capitalism was its built-in susceptibility to periodic collapses of production and to unemployment. Criticism crystallized around this flaw and all western governments have been compelled to increase their control over their economies. This movement accelerated during the great depression of the thirties.

These new subcenters of power inevitably impel the state to arbitrate the demands of the organized groups for shares in the national income. At the same time the persistent problem of restraining inflation while maintaining full employment persists and the organizational economies have so far failed to solve it. Nor is it clear what allocation of resources they will achieve, nor whether the resulting distribution of income will prove acceptable. Looking over these economies Professor Hoover is forced to conclude that no particular organizational forms seem to be the most effective: different organizational forms appear to be necessary in different countries and all are groping their way forward. He estimates that the national product has increased under the centralized economic system of Soviet Russia about 6 per cent per year or about twice the rate in the United States

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so long as it is recurrently necessary to put the brakes on business expansion to prevent inflation.

In relation to his chief concern, namely the compatibility of liberty and industrialism, Professor Hoover is less than satisfying. It is relatively easy to discuss the effect of economic centralization of the Soviet type on liberty and he does so in the liveliest part of the book. He emphasizes the failure of both Marx and Lenin to provide a plan for the economic organization of a communist state. The notion of a two-stage transformation through socialism to communism, dictatorship of the proletariat essential in the first stage withering away in the second, has provided a cover for dictatorship but not of the proletariat. A small self-selected nonproletarian group claims to act on behalf of the proletariat without any effort to ascertain whether its actions are acceptable to the proletariat. Rather it controls the proletariat through a terror more tyrannical than that of the Tsarist government. Exploitation has not been eliminated but surplus value has merely been annexed by the ruling oligarchy which has become the administrator of state property. While there is no protection for liberty in the absence of representative government, the control of a centralized economy by such a government presents "almost insoluble difficulties". Thus there is little hope for liberty even in the future in the socialist countries.

The impact of organizational changes on liberty in the western countries is much less clear. Professor Hoover decides that there is no close correlation between the degree of state intervention in the economy and the net limitation on personal liberty in the United States and Western Europe. The new economic system in the United States, as consolidated under President Eisenhower, is not very different from that under the Labor government in Britain and neither has dangerously impaired individual freedom. But this reviewer finds it difficult to array countries as to degrees of state intervention or to measure the degree of liberty in each.

These western countries evidence no popular dissatisfactions likely to lead to the overthrow of present types of organization. But they are still in process of change, and a procession of gradual changes might imperil liberty. Some such changes he believes to be inevitable and some liberties have to be sacrificed as economies change in character. But there is a wide area for experimentation before net personal freedom is critically diminished. Socialist parties are becoming welfare-state parties, and further state control to ameliorate the position of the lower income classes and to keep modern economies functioning on a

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tolerable level is inevitable. "The maintenance of personal liberty will turn upon whether or not these extensions of the powers of the state can be restricted to those which are truly necessary." But it is not clear to this reviewer why changes necessary to achieve these broad purposes should not impinge seriously upon individual freedom, appealing as are the objectives, and necessary as may be the means to achieve them. Professor Hoover concludes that the achievement of acceptable relations among the economy, liberty and the state depends on whether those who guide modern states possess the "sometimes contradictory traits of tough mindedness, good-will and responsibleness", which comes nearer to a reformulation of the question than to an answer. It also avoids the question whether the necessities of industrialism can be avoided even by such guides.

Finally this reviewer finds it difficult to accept Professor Hoover's lengthy argument that the greatest weakness of modern capitalism is that it lacks support among a large part of the intelligentsia.

The book is intended chiefly for the general reader and he will find it stimulating. It focuses upon liberty which is of no mean importance. It also measures the fate of liberty in terms of the functions needed to be performed to keep any modern industrial system going.

ARTHUR ROBERT BURNS

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Campus and the State. By MALCOLM MOOS and FRANCIS E. ROURKE. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959.—xii, 414 pp. $6.00.

This book deals with the controls exercised over state universities and colleges by constitutions, laws, legislatures, governors, and, especially, centralized state administrative agencies. It is the fruit of a special two-year study for the Committee on Government and Higher Education, jointly created and sponsored by three leading national associations representing public institutions of higher education, and financed by the Fund for the Advancement of Education. This distinguished Committee, consisting of laymen as well as leaders of both private and public colleges and universities, was headed by President Milton S. Eisenhower of Johns Hopkins, from the political science department of which were drawn the Director and Assistant Director of the investigation, the authors of the present report.

The method of inquiry included a search of the relevant litera-

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ture (voluminous, as the excellent bibliography reveals), the use of questionnaires addressed to various categories of officers both of state government and of state universities and colleges, and interviews with 440 such persons in 39 states.

The report is a solid, thorough piece of work, systematic in its coverage, fascinatingly documented, informed as regards the character and problems of both the states and their institutions of higher education, evenhanded in its discussion of them, and enjoyable to read. It will be widely studied, by state legislators, governors and bureau administrators as well as by college and university trustees, presidents, business managers and faculty members. It is inconceivable that it should not have a salutary impact.

The central problem is how to find a proper balance between the right of a state, on the one hand, to exercise fundamental controls over that which it has created, and the right of its creature, on the other, to be free to realize its best essential self. The report leaves no doubt that this problem is soluble, but its accounts of the harassments to which colleges and universities are not infrequently subjected—often with the best will in the world—are sometimes positively hair-raising.

Much illuminating attention is given to the consequences of the rise of centralized state budget offices, purchasing departments, personnel bureaus and building agencies, created in the name of "economy and efficiency". Such centralization, as the authors note, is now subject to mounting criticism on the broadest grounds. As respects its influence on institutions of higher education, the point is justly made that the character of the academy does not permit the latter, without damage, to be subjected fully to "standard" procedures. Freedom, the authors emphasize in their concluding chapter, has its efficiency, too.

One chapter is devoted to the small colleges—chiefly those that began as normal schools, became teachers colleges, and now are rapidly taking on liberal arts and other functions. These colleges, it is shown, are often accorded second-class treatment, operating under special laws and subject to far more hampering controls (including, uniquely, those of state departments of education) than the state universities. It is clear that such discrimination will not do. The small state colleges, like the big state universities, are an essential, and increasingly important, part of the American system of higher education. All must be enabled to do their proper job.

KARL W. BIGELOW

TEACHERS COLLEGE
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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Massachusetts People and Politics, 1919-1933. By J. JOSEPH HUTHMACHER. Cambridge, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1959.—xvi, 328 pp. $6.50.

Here is a book that makes especially timely reading for 1960. As in the 1920's, ethnic voting, ticket-balancing, the cultural contrast between urban and small-town America, and the issue of religion in politics (a Catholic in the White House?) are again agitating the electorate. Indeed, we can learn a good deal from comparison of domestic politics in the 1920's and 1950's: both eras saw "Red scares" (Palmer and McCarthy), an unpopular Democratic administration turned out of office in large part because of frustrating international commitments, repeated GOP presidential victories, general economic prosperity (with complaints from farmers and New England), a sense of cultural malaise and intellectual dissatisfaction ("left bank" expatriates and "beatniks"), and a heightening of voter concern over ethnic, religious and other noneconomic aspects of candidates and their policies. This last phenomenon—which Richard Hofstadter has characterized as "status" politics—is the author's central concern.

This reviewer admired Professor Huthmacher's skillful analysis of Massachusetts politics greatly, but found his more general comments on political and intellectual trends of the era much less satisfactory. By 1920 the old split in Massachusetts between Protestant Anglo-Saxon Republicans and Catholic Irish Democrats was being complicated by the increased importance of what Mayor Curley was wont to call "the newer races" (Italians, Poles, French-Canadians, Jews, Portuguese, Negroes). The author balances his analysis of shifts in registration, turnout, and partisan alignment among these ethnic groups with close attention to party organization and strategy. The latter came to revolve more and more around what Samuel Lubell has termed " 'league of nations' politics"—balancing state tickets so as to provide "recognition" for all major ethnic groups. This provided the means by which Massachusetts Democrats were able to regroup after the débâcle of 1920, and carry the state for Senator Walsh in 1926 and for Al Smith in 1928. The surge in New Immigrant registration, especially among women, narrowed the advantage which the author shows the GOP to have enjoyed from operation of the 19th Amendment.

Political scientists might appreciate a more complete analysis of the Massachusetts political system. Huthmacher gives little attention to the legislature, courts, local government, governorship, governor's council, interest groups, and so forth. Fortu-

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nately, Duane Lockard's recent *New England State Politics* (reviewed in the December 1959 issue of the QUARTERLY) helps fill some of these gaps (and indicates that the better-disciplined GOP now plays the ethnic game in Massachusetts more expertly than the Democrats).

As an intellectual historian Professor Huthmacher is less successful. "Cultural conflict" was not so unique to the 1920's as indicated; surely it is misleading to date the origin of the KKK as "during the First World War" (p. 86), and one is shocked in a book on ethnic tensions in Massachusetts to find *no* mention at all of Sacco and Vanzetti! In trying to be fair to all races and creeds we should avoid the subtle insult of leaning over backward to reinterpret American history as the struggle of New Immigrant saints versus "old stock" sinners. In his treatment of "cultural liberalism", which was hardly the issue agitating most of the Newer American voters, Huthmacher comes close to doing this. The ethnocentrism of *both* "old stock" and Newer Americans stands out in the author's own data—at the polls *both* discriminated in support of their own—and once in power the Newer Americans were as quick to impose their mores in regard to birth control or "anti-communism" as had the "old stock" in regard to liquor or the Sabbath. Indeed, the McCarthyism which swept Massachusetts in the early 1950's, cowing even Senator Kennedy into silence, was strongest precisely among the Newer American voters. Our complex ethnic mixture is doubtless contributing to tolerance and pluralism, but by a process as unintended here as in the Geneva of John Calvin.

DOUGLAS PRICE

COLUMBIA COLLEGE

Political Life: Why People Get Involved in Politics. By ROBERT E. LANE. Glencoe, The Free Press, 1959.—374 pp. $7.50.

American Voting Behavior. Edited by EUGENE BURDICK and ARTHUR J. BRODBECK. Glencoe, The Free Press, 1959.—475 pp. $7.50.

In both of these volumes an attempt is made to give the reader a general perspective of the present state of behavioral studies. Professor Lane's book is a careful and thoughtful summary of many studies of a great variety of aspects of the American voter's political behavior. Because he has pulled together and organized a vast amount of material Lane has produced a study that deserves to be widely used by all students of politics.

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The Burdick and Brodbeck book contains twenty-two pieces by twenty-four authors. The point of departure of all of the essays is an attempt to evaluate some aspect or another of the well-known voting studies made by Lazarsfeld, Berelson, Gaudet, Campbell, Gurin, Miller and their associates. While a number of interesting propositions are developed in both volumes, it is possibly not unfair to say that the conclusions drawn by the contributors are widely contradictory. Whatever else the people who are putting the science into political science may be doing, they do not seem to be bringing certainty to the discipline.

The difficulty with grass-roots studies of politics such as these is that there is a tremendous lot of voting going on in the country and that the materials are so abundant that scholars are tempted to become specialists in voting behavior who study voting as an end in itself.

Perhaps it is for this reason that almost no reference is made to anything else that might have been going on in the political system while the voters were voting, attitudinizing or cogitating. Maybe the grass gets greener the farther one gets into left field, away from home plate. At any rate, it is amazing how many things disappear from view when people go after the low, low-down on politics. As the worm said to the politicial scientist, "When I get way down here among the grass roots I can't see **nothin!**"

What these studies lack is perspective, an overview of the voter within the political system, what the voter is reacting to and behaving about, what is going on in the universe all around the voter. Doubtless the voter perceives reality dimly, but don't we all? No amount of grass-roots research is *ever* going to show us what politics is about.

A generation ago the pollsters assumed that the connection between public opinion and public policy was so close, immediate and compulsive that they polled the public about everything. The results justify the proposition that people who ask silly questions get silly answers. Now, we seem to have taken the government out of politics altogether. Once upon a time we assumed that the rear end of a horse ought to be studied closely because it was the prime mover, the cause of causes. Now we like to think that the two ends of the animal are not connected with each other at all but we are still studying the hindquarters of the beast, though we have forgotten why.

The gist of politics lies precisely in the connection between the attitudes, opinions and behavior of the public, on the one hand, and what is going on in public affairs, the government and the management of the community, on the other hand.

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Scholars cannot afford to take their eyes off the nexus of the two halves of the equation. The early pollsters greatly oversimplified this connection, but we shall not get very far if we now substitute a new oversimplification for the old one.

The relation between public affairs and public opinion is enormously difficult to describe but it is the heart of politics. The reader of these 800 pages of behavioral studies is occasionally aware of the distant rumbling of the battle, but there is an air of unreality about the whole account because only a very slight attempt is made to refer the behavior of the actors to what is going on in the world about them.

It seems to the present reviewer that grass-roots studies of politics can become significant only when they are tied into studies of the whole struggle over the management of the community vastly more comprehensive and sophisticated than any that have been made so far. The study of "issues" in the Elmira study and in the Campbell studies do not get very far beneath the surface of the subject and Lane's "paradigm" of political behavior (p. 6) hardly makes contact with the problem. Nor does Berelson's statement of democratic theory or Burdick's criticism of Berelson's statement provide a satisfactory basis for relating public opinion to the political system. In the beginning there must have been some reason why political scientists, rather than statisticians or psychiatrists, got into this field at all, based on some kind of impression that political scientists knew something about the government, the political system, the nature of the political struggle that might shed some light on why voters act as they do.

The most hopeful thing about this kind of research is that it seems likely that scholars are going to get tired of chasing a headless horse. After all, if there is no connection between voting behavior and the political system, why should anyone study voting behavior?

E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER

WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY

Legislative Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research. Edited by JOHN C. WAHLKE and HEINZ EULAU. Glencoe, The Free Press, 1959.—xi, 413 pp. $7.50.

Books of readings are a specialty of the Free Press. This one contains thirty-seven essays selected from social science journals. Two selections are from published works and three are printed for the first time. A fourth essay was printed herein for the first time but a slightly revised version has since appeared in a

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journal. The selection is organized in three sections on legislative behavior which are titled "Historical and Institutional Context", "Political Bases", and "Social and Psychological Bases". A fourth section is titled "Research Orientations and Techniques", and the seven essays in it demonstrate the application of several novel methods of studying legislative activity.

The selections are for the most part excellent discussions. The oldest essay was published in 1925. (It is Stuart Rice's famous method of measuring cohesion in legislative voting.) A few appeared in the thirties and forties, but most of the essays have appeared in the past decade. A student of this *Reader* will gain an understanding of many facets of the legislative assembly: its origins and some current trends, problems in managing its internal operating practices, the origins of its members, and a smattering of the differences between American legislative assemblies and other democratic assemblies. This volume is not concerned with legislative assemblies in non-Western and nondemocratic countries. It is primarily concerned with American legislative bodies.

The editors have contributed an Introduction to the volume and an Introductory Note to each of the sections. In the main the latter seeks to locate the particular selection of articles in the universe of the legislature as an ongoing political institution. These Notes and the Introduction make a great deal of the difference between the study of the legislative "institution" and the study of legislative "behavior". For instance, they assert: "Political science as a discipline has only recently come to recognize the place of political behavior study in the study of government." Since many students of government have considered that they were studying political behavior, such a statement requires explication. In so far as that is provided by the editors, it runs along the line: the study of the legislature as an institution in the political system has been limited to the "mechanics of parliamentary rules and procedures," lengths of terms, size of houses, the executive veto, and similar "legal technicalities". Such matters, they concede, "undoubtedly describe much of the activities of legislatures by prescribing some actions and proscribing others. . . ." In fact, such provisions "may be considered parameters of legislative behavior." But attention to these items never gets to explaining how or why one member votes aye and another no, and it is explanation of these and other behaviors that "is of concern to students of politics." In short, the editors seem to be saying that institutionalists stop short of studying the activities of legislators that are not in the legal rules, and that the important materials to be studied are in the patterned

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behaviors beyond such rules. This is an astonishing assertion, if it is what they intend to say.

The description of parties and pressure groups was developed before the current concern with behavior was widespread. That members of legislative bodies tempered their voting to accord in substantial measure with their constituencies has long been recognized. In fact, legislative assemblies have been constructed so as to accomplish that result. That the committee system has significant consequences in the enactment or nonenactment of legislation and that political parties have different degrees of cohesion were operating propositions in describing legislative behavior a half century ago. Each of the essays in this collection could just as accurately be called "institutional" description as "behavioral" description. A few of the essays perhaps would not have been written by the older institutionalists, but it is difficult to see how these essays have added to systematic knowledge about the legislative process. Indeed their authors are reticent about their contributions to such knowledge.

CHARLES B. HAGAN

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

Diplomacy in a Changing World. Edited by STEPHEN D. KERTESZ and M. A. FITZSIMONS. Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1959.—viii, 407 pp. $7.50.

Diplomacy takes on new importance, Hans J. Morgenthau points out in the second of the twenty essays in this timely volume, as the cold war gives way to fundamentally changed international relations. In his view, this change derives from the decreased dependence of second-rank states on the Superpowers, the rise of Germany and Japan as great Powers, the promise of atomic power and the colonial revolution. Almost every author of this book perforce writes against the background of these factors which serve to connect their essays.

An initial presentation of general issues includes eight comments, ranging from those of Professor Morgenthau through Louis J. Halle's reminder that morality cannot be entirely divorced from state behavior to views of history and diplomacy by a former diplomatist, George Kennan, and a professional historian, Raymond J. Sontag. William T. R. Fox points out how the gulf between soldier and diplomat has narrowed in America and Britain, while a brilliant article by Jacques de Bourbon-Busset describes the massive pressure on the foreign minister who must alone bear responsibility for policy. Quincy

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Wright, noting the close relationship of diplomacy and international law, finds that each can benefit the other.

A section on major Powers includes Philip E. Mosely's expert opinion that Khrushchev, who thinks in Stalin's grooves, intends to deploy augmented military power to raise "a major strategic challenge to the strength and cohesion of the free world." How the diplomats of the Superpowers deal with each other is considered by Professor Kertesz, who insists that Soviet negotiators have usually had an inflexible purpose and uniform behavior while Americans disadvantageously had to depend on their liberal heritage. Sir David Kelly hails a return of British diplomacy to a realistic national policy and deplores "the failure to adjust policy to effective strength." A valuable examination of post-war French diplomacy comes from J. B. Duroselle who pictures the organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The developing diplomacy of Canada, India, Germany, the Middle East and small states makes up a useful section, titled "New Actors and Changing Roles". Annette Baker Fox's chapter on how small states stay alive poses interesting and original questions of self-control and leadership, while John C. Campbell suggests means by which the collection of Middle Eastern minor Powers can resist Soviet pressure. The central theme of Canadian diplomacy—dealing with both the United States and Britain—is reviewed by Edgar McInnis. Indian policies and diplomatic organization and practice come under the scrutiny of A. Appadorai, who points to the hard task of a would-be peacemaker. Herbert Krüger describes German diplomatic organization after a murky discussion of "imponderables".

The fourth section, "The United Nations", also seems the weakest. Dag Hammarskjöld supports both the public procedures of the United Nations Charter and parallel "quiet" discussions in traditional diplomatic style. Although the Secretary-General views negotiations within the United Nations frame as "classical diplomacy" in a new setting, Sir Pierson Dixon thinks that what he does as a British representative at the U.N. is a special—not a traditional—kind of diplomacy. Neither writer, however, presents the concrete detail which would permit a choice of his view over another. Walter H. C. Laves contributes a final chapter on UNESCO which he calls a "center of cultural diplomacy".

A question which one raises timorously in the face of the high quality and even brilliance of many of these essays cannot be suppressed after the final section. It is: precisely what is diplomacy? This book contains almost as many answers as there are essayists, some of whom identify diplomacy with foreign policy

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while others concentrate on the technique of and organization for international negotiation. At the same time, new uses for old methods of negotiation (or perhaps the subject matter has dictated new methods) get little space in these essays. For example, does the negotiation of economic assistance agreements with underdeveloped countries require a novel technique? Or is such negotiation perhaps only an extension of the Soviet-American struggle, which, incidentally, seems to be regarded by most of the essayists as changing in every aspect but the important ones? Moreover, there is no analysis of "alliance diplomacy" and "regional organization diplomacy", both of which represent innovations of great importance. Such criticism, however, leaves untouched the high merits of this collection.

LEON GORDENKER

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Law in Diplomacy. By PERCY E. CORBETT. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959.—xii, 290 pp. $6.00.

Professor Corbett, with his accustomed scholarship and lucidity, undertakes in this volume "to study and in some degree measure the influence of legal notions on foreign policy without assuming or elaborating a system of international law". With this end in view he begins with three chapters devoted respectively to the attitudes toward international law of Britain, the United States and the U.S.S.R., and then examines in turn the freedom of the seas, the diplomacy of arbitration, international organization, and human rights and the world community. His general approach is profoundly, and in the view of the present reviewer quite excessively, pessimistic. It is of course true that, among all the Great Powers, law has too often been the handmaid of policy, but Professor Corbett's selection of illustrations, which is necessarily arbitrary in view of the breadth of his own knowledge and the wealth of material at his disposal, may be not unfairly described as that of a skilful advocate convinced of the validity and practical importance of his own view of the secondary rôle which the law can at present hope to play in world affairs rather than that of an entirely dispassionate judge. An account such as he gives of the seamy side of arbitration from the Jay Treaty Commissions through the Alabama and Alaska Boundary Arbitrations to the Buraimi Oasis Arbitration (in which the present reviewer has detected no inaccuracies and which could indeed be made more complete in the same vein) may be a healthy corrective to some wishful thinking, but it does

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not give a balanced general picture of the progress and prospects of international adjudication. Professor Corbett concedes that "not a few" of the legal advisers of foreign affairs "bring to their work a conviction of mission to speed the coming of a universal legal community" and that "if with this conviction they combine courage and a shrewd sense of the possible, they can exert steady pressure in that direction upon their governments", but he nevertheless regards the law of nations as having been historically "less a code of rules for observation than a supply of materials from which a clothing of legitimacy could be fashioned for State claims."

Professor Corbett's skepticism has something of the quality of hard steel and his writing is never lacking in shrewd and penetrating comment on the nature of our present difficulties and possible lines of development which probes directly to the essence of the matter. Thus in discussing the law of the seas he suggests that we have reached a stage at which they should be regarded as *res publica* rather than *res communis:* "Effective implementation of a conception of the high seas as the public property of a universal community is of course still far ahead. With each step in that direction, the freedom of the seas must become increasingly a freedom of use subject to conditions and restraints defined and imposed by something analogous in the international sphere to the public law of States." In his survey of collective action in restraint of aggression he goes straight to the heart of the matter by remarking, *à propos* of Manchuria, that one of the vital lessons to be drawn "is the complex interaction of the plurality of major problems with which our world is constantly faced." He welcomes "the conviction that the value of all human organization is ultimately measurable in the addition it makes to the welfare of the individual" and its corollary, the conception that the contemporary law represents "the common law of mankind in an early stage of its development."

Why, then, is so able and scholarly a book—so essentially sincere and so progessive and humane in its fundamental outlook—so profoundly disappointing as well as disconcerting? It is because there is so wide a margin between the "complacent self-deception" that "we are within sight of an effective world community with its necessary general submission to law and collective monopoly of force", against which Professor Corbett so rightly warns us, and the consistent frustration of his own approach. "The lawyer's craft", he tells us, "can never supply the wanting social and political basis for an effective legal system." As to this there can be no question, but this is not what the international lawyer is required to do. His task is to exploit

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empirically the opportunities afforded by political, social, economic and technological developments and changes, and deep-rooted moral forces, which do afford the basis for an effective international legal system, in such a manner as to consolidate the legal structure and foundations of the world community which these forces have made both possible and, if civilization is to survive, inevitable. Such a result can be achieved only by many lines of approach mutually reinforcing each other and pursued patiently over long periods. None of these lines of approach should be dismissed as secondary because it is not self-sufficient. In respect of most or all of them the lawyer can play some constructive part, but he is unlikely to do so effectively if he starts from the proposition that "in a congeries of sovereign States, all that can be achieved is at best a rough approximation to a legal order." The admitted limitations and weaknesses of the law afford no justification for approaching our contemporary opportunities in a spirit in which constructive initiative is so severely paralyzed.

C. WILFRED JENKS

GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II. By ANNETTE BAKER FOX. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1959.—xv, 212 pp. $5.50.

At first view, the title of this book may appear strange. Are not small states almost by definition powerless? But there is strangeness in the very fact that small states continue to exist in a world in which power apparently has come to be concentrated ever more highly in a decreasing number of international units, until two of them emerged as the two Superpowers of our present, bipolar system. Still, here they are, the small ones, steadfastly refusing to disappear—indeed, increasing in number so as almost to create, in the world of nations, the same impression of overcrowding which the well-known "population explosion" creates in regard to individual human beings. Mrs. Fox assembles convincing evidence of their capacity to survive by narrating the story of the diplomacy of five small countries—Turkey, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Spain—in World War II, and of their survival as independent states in that war.

It is a fascinating story. How much of it is new to the historian I cannot say, and it must be left to the specialist in the history of the Second World War to assay whether all available sources have been used (to me their use seems exhaustive). To the nonspecialist it brings back to memory the often phan-

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tastic and almost incredible maneuvers, machinations, tergiversations of big and small, the shrewdness and the folly of the actors, the intertwining of ideology and power politics that characterized the great struggle. For the five countries here dealt with, it was above all a problem of how to stay neutral in a war in which the big ones created or exploited crisis upon crisis to draw them in at their side. Three of the five succeeded to the end and emerged not the worse off for not having sided with the victors. Of the two others, I have some hesitation concerning Finland and how genuine her desire to stay neutral was in her second conflict with the Russians. Finland, by the way, makes one recall the perhaps most absurd incident of all those which World War II witnessed: The Western Allies' plan to send an expeditionary force through Norway and Sweden to assist Finland in the "Winter War" of 1938-40 against the Soviets; only the steadfast refusal of Sweden to give them transit permission saved them from a condition in which they would have found themselves at war with both Germans and Russians when the former attacked the latter!

In summing up, the author lists those factors which help the small states in a big war "to ride out the storm . . . rolling and pitching but not slipping their moorings." Her generalizations from their experience constitute a veritable "little man's Machiavelli": for instance, how "to set off the demands of one side against those of the other while extracting concessions from each"; how to make oneself "small" when one wants to appear too insignificant for a big Power's bother; how to appear "important" when one has to draw a big Power's attention to one's cause in order to be protected against another Power; and so forth. The experience of the small states in World War II may continue to be interesting, not only in view of some future war, especially a non-nuclear one, and not only for the parallels it offers to cold-war situations (Yugoslavia and other "fence-sitters"!), but also because it may conceivably foreshadow the type of diplomacy all Powers, big and small, will have to engage in, in the event that force, one day, should no longer be available to them as *ultima ratio nationum*. What other means will then be at their disposal for the defense of their interests? The diplomacy of the small Powers in conventional war, a policy operating above all with economic pressures, appeals to opinion, etc., may then point the way. If only for this reason, the book should prove of absorbing interest to the student of international politics.

JOHN H. HERZ

THE CITY COLLEGE, NEW YORK

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Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat. By PAUL KECSKEMETI. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1958. —ix, 287 pp. $5.00.

The midsummer madness of 1958, in which a United States senator charged that in producing this book government funds had been used to study what to do if the United States in a future war were brought to the point of surrender, ought not to obscure the merits of this solid, substantial and subtle analysis.

Even though the most cursory inspection of the inside of Paul Kecskemeti's book would have shown Senator Styles Bridges that the author was not advocating surrender, strategic or otherwise, to the Russians or anyone else, the title on the outside may have confused him. This is more a handbook for the prospective victor than for the prospective loser, but there is something in it for both and perhaps something for both sides in a war in which there can be no genuine victor. It is for war what a book on the end game is for chess. The chess analogy must not be pushed too far, however, for in chess total victory and total defeat are the only possible outcomes. In war it is time to adopt an end-game strategy whenever additional rounds of fighting offer gains to neither side which are commensurate with the probable losses in further fighting.

"Strategic surrender" is the orderly capitulation of a beaten foe who has nevertheless some residual fighting and governing capacity. This residual capacity gives his act of surrender some value to the victor. Because it has some value, the vanquished may extract some price from a rational victor. American doctrine in World War II forbade either negotiation about the terms of surrender or recognition of the vanquished government as a government at the moment of surrender. Trumpeting the formula of "unconditional surrender", Kecskemeti concludes, did relatively little direct harm; but operating in the terminal stages of war under the rules of "unconditionality", nonnegotiation and nonrecognition was costly; for the victors were the prisoners of the formula of unconditional surrender even more than the vanquished.

Kecskemeti studies four World War II cases: the capitulations of France, Italy, Germany and Japan. Although he does not give high marks for morals or for long-term prognosis of the war's outcome to either Hitler or the men of Vichy, the two sides in June 1940 played the rôles assigned to them by Kecskemeti's analysis with much greater fidelity to the script than did the Western Allies with Badoglio, Doenitz or Suzuki. Interestingly, Stalin in Rumania and Hungary showed no more inhibi-

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tions than Hitler in France in violating the cardinal rules of unconditionality. He negotiated before surrender and he used the defeated governments after surrender until it was convenient to rid himself of them.

With Italy and Japan the Western Allies tried using radio broadcasts to the people rather than negotiation with the government to evoke surrender. In neither case was a government that was anxious to surrender at first able to find a way to communicate that fact to the victor, much less to sell its residual fighting capacity for the appropriate price. Harry Hopkins' opinion that it was "awfully hard to throw them overboard later" reflected the prevailing doctrine.

Hitler, on the other hand, was playing for all or nothing. The rules of unconditionality blighted no chance of strategic surrender by him. They may, however, have prevented giving the needed encouragement to Hitler's internal political foes.

At best, only time was lost when the Western Allies demonstrated so little finesse and so little insight in their end games. But if the time lost was in the summer of 1943 when the Germans occupied Rome, in the "dark December" of 1944 in which the Battle of the Bulge was fought, or in August of 1945 when A-bombs were used and the Soviet Union entered the Far Eastern war, it was a great deal more than time that was thrown away.

In the contemporary literature of international relations there are too few genuinely comparative studies. Few of these demonstrate that even the weakest have some elements of strength and even the strongest stand to gain from recognizing what strength they have. Paul Kecskemeti's book is welcome on both counts.

WILLIAM T. R. FOX

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Peaceful Co-Existence: An Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy. By WLADYSLAW W. KULSKI. Chicago, Henry Regnery Company, 1959, in cooperation with Foundation for Foreign Affairs, Inc.—xxi, 662 pp. $12.50.

The title of this volume does not do justice to the broad range of problems to which Professor W. W. Kulski, of Syracuse University, addresses himself. He here attempts to do for Soviet foreign policy what he did for Soviet internal affairs in his earlier *The Soviet Regime.* Hence we find once again thorough documentation with ample quotations from Soviet sources, considerable familiarity with the subject matter, and an informed, disabused and at times relentlessly bitter critique.

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The book's architecture is puzzling. In his search for Soviet "patterns", the author weaves back and forth between the Soviet view of revolution and Russian nationalism, Soviet nationality policy, Soviet policies toward the uncommitted countries, the Soviet orbit, and international communism—in no particular order. It might have been well (in addition to providing a conclusion) to give a more systematic historical treatment, which might have put the problems of "continuity and change" in better perspective—and would also have enabled the author to focus on what is (or may be) new in Khrushchev's world view and *modus operandi*. As it stands, the (not unwarranted) assumption that Moscow's long-range trends and objectives remain substantially unaltered tends to push aside contradictions, ambiguities or genuine changes in Soviet outlook.

Inevitably, much of the ground has been surveyed before. Through no fault of the author, and in no sense to his discredit, Kulski's volume therefore lacks the element of novelty. To this reader, the most useful contribution (in addition to some theoretical formulations) was the discussion of Soviet doctrine and policy regarding underdeveloped countries. Here the shifts in Moscow's tactics as well as the long-range objectives emerge vividly and persuasively, going well beyond previous treatments.

On the other hand, this reader found himself questioning the author's interpretation by which the nationalities within the Soviet Union are treated as "Soviet colonial possessions" and the East European satellites as "Soviet colonial protectorates." This scheme seems neither correct nor useful. Eastern Europe may be or may become an economic, military and political liability for the Soviet Union. Moreover, the latitude which the satellites possess varies from nil to a degree (exemplified by Poland, for instance) far beyond that of conventional protectorates. Finally, the implicit view of Soviet policy toward Albania as an extrapolation of Russian policy toward the Kazan Tartars (to take an extreme example) is not persuasive. In all fairness, one should add that Professor Kulski is generally aware of the complexities of the problem even where he seeks clear-cut formulations. Thus the actual ups and downs are of course not suggested by his comment on Russian nationalism that "the Second World War intensified it, and it continues to prosper today." Likewise, on the face of it, it is a dubious thesis to maintain that pre-1914 differences within the socialist fold "may be understood only if one pays attention to the divergent nature of the national backgrounds of Lenin and his Western socialist contemporaries" (as if there had been no non-Bolsheviks among the Russians).

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While this reviewer regrets Mr. Kulski's inclination toward black-white pictures, the book is valuable in its balanced view on the controversy of ideology vs. power. Professor Kulski is likewise on safe ground when he reiterates the continued significance of communist doctrine in Soviet policy; when he stresses the fact that "the actual, world-wide distribution of power, not kind intentions, sets the limits for Soviet foreign policy"; and when he describes the Soviet view of international relations as a projection of the class struggle. With all the reservations, Professor Kulski's volume is a distinct and distinguished contribution to the current efforts to order our insights and interpretations of Soviet intentions and performance abroad.

ALEXANDER DALLIN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Neutralism and Nationalism in France: A Case Study. By JOHN T. MARCUS. New York, Bookman Associates, 1958.—207 pp. $4.50.

Why don't they like us? In essence, this is the problem which John T. Marcus proposes to analyze in his book. Less succinctly stated, the subject of his study is "the psychological effect of neutralist propaganda in developing a climate of French opinion suspicious of America's motives and leadership, and indirectly in contributing to the growth of a similar streak in the larger fabric of European attitudes—which in turn have played some part in the subsequent orientation of American policies" (p. 84).

Mr. Marcus approaches his subject resolutely from an American point of view and he has obviously written *Neutralism and Nationalism in France* for an American public. His aim is strictly pragmatic. Neutralism in France does not interest him as a historical phenomenon deserving attention for its own sake. His intention is to make the United States, particularly the American government, understand French reactions better by showing what they were and how they developed. This being his purpose, which is surely a very laudable one, it seems odd that, while examining the growth of hostility in France on the part of the non-Communists toward America, he does not think it necessary to scrutinize also the foreign policy of the United States in order to discover if it did not have some relation to French attitudes. But he completely ignores this very important aspect of the problem. One sees the French react, but not what they are reacting to. American policy seems to have no bearing upon French fluctuations; nor is there any discussion of its

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variations. Even so important an event as the replacement of Acheson by Dulles is not so much as mentioned. Nor do we learn, as Mr. Marcus led us to hope we would, if French reactions had an influence on Washington. Necessarily then, since a good part of the picture is missing, much of its interest and meaning is lost.

However, what we are given of it is nicely done. The evolution of French sentiments on the question of neutralism, particularly that of Gaullist opinion, which is the core of the book, is carefully traced. The author shows with success how "the long road travelled by the General and his companions" led "from nationalism to opposition to EDC, from opposition to EDC to opposition to American policy in Europe and the Far East, from opposition to American policy to opposition to the United States, from opposition to the United States to the assertion that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were equal dangers to peace, from the equating of these dangers to the assertion that France must act as a bridge between the two blocs" (p. 105). To complete his analysis of neutralism which he defines as "a convergence of an ideological neutralism of the left and a nationalist mystique of the right" (p. 167), he has added less detailed and less fruitful studies of similar trends in England and in West Germany.

Neutralism and Nationalism in France. is based on a considerable amount of work, as is attested by the critical bibliography. The so-called "footnotes", which are inconveniently placed at the end of each chapter, also bear witness to the painstaking efforts of Mr. Marcus. This is not an agreeable book to read; for, as can be seen from the above quotations, Mr. Marcus is not afraid of being dull and repetitious. However, it will be of value to those who are interested in contemporary France, but lack the time and patience to pore over collections of newspapers and magazines, as Mr. Marcus has done very conscientiously.

ADRIENNE D. HYTIER

VASSAR COLLEGE

Dream and Reality: Aspects of American Foreign Policy. By LOUIS J. HALLE. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1959.—xxi, 327 pp. $5.00.

The title may seem extraordinary for a study in American foreign relations but it is in keeping with the thesis and content of the book. Foreign policy is put in a setting of broad general ideas, major movements of history, the forms of society and

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civilization, and man's inner nature; and international relations are seen not as separate phenomena peculiar to themselves but as parts of a larger whole and inseparable from it. We do not often get books on foreign policy and relations dealt with in these terms. They generally deal with diplomatic history or "issues". For that reason alone this book is welcome and deserves careful reading.

To Mr. Halle foreign policy signifies "broad and general principles of conduct", but what hampers the working of these principles, if it does not actually modify them, is the conflict between the myths that govern a country's thinking (both about itself and other countries) and the realities of the world at any period. More often than not foreign policy is built on myth, Mr. Halle holds, and this complicates relations between nations and at times produces tragedy, perhaps unnecessarily. It is on this theme that he develops his argument. We see other nations as we wish to see them and ourselves as we wish to see ourselves, not always with accuracy in either case.

The United States perceived and understood the reality of its position in the first decades of the republic and saw it clearly on the whole until the end of the nineteenth century. In the ensuing fifty years, however, it wandered aimlessly in a world that had no relevance to its situation, unable to recognize that the earlier world no longer existed, unable to face the new one. In support of this argument Mr. Halle subscribes to the "aberration thesis" of Samuel Bemis: The United States swerved fatally from a sound course in world politics when it leaped off the continental boundaries into the far Pacific and took the Philippines. Thereby it was caught in the constricting coils of Far Eastern politics. Though widely accepted, this thesis may be questioned. One may say, instead and perhaps with better historical evidence, that the United States did not get involved in the Far East because it took the Philippines; it took the Philippines because it was involved in the Far East. So also the enunciation of the Open Door doctrine was historically consistent. In essence it had been pronounced fifty years before. Significantly, in the Senate debate on whether to keep the islands the main argument for keeping them was that they would be of advantage in getting a larger share of the China trade. It may be that we did not realize then the web we were spinning for ourselves when we pronounced and later stood by the principle of Chinese territorial integrity; but we did so deliberately and the first step was taken on the road that led to Pearl Harbor.

One may question, too, Mr. Halle's certainty of the ill effects of democracy in the conduct of foreign relations. Public opinion

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may be uninformed, impulsive and irrational and governments be constrained to follow it; but did the "aristocrats' international" that conducted diplomacy before do any better, measured by results? August 1, 1914, was not brought about by irresponsible public opinion and the necessity for governments to defer to it. Indeed, public opinion, even in European parliamentary bodies, knew little or nothing of what was at issue and what was likely to befall. The nostalgia for the genteel diplomacy of the past is a contemporary weakness. However, when Mr. Halle says that strident nationalism is a by-product of democracy he is on surer ground.

Finally, one discerns too heavy an accent on "leadership". Leaders can be as muddled and feckless as legislative bodies, and leaders, when headstrong and too sure of themselves, can be calamitous in effect. A good deal of recent evidence can be cited on both points in this country as well as elsewhere.

Mainly what must be said is that as one goes through the 327 pages of this book one is again and again stabbed into awareness and interest, aroused to reflection and analysis, given pause for thought, whether in assent or dissent. This is the merit of any book; it is definitely the merit of Mr. Halle's—a job well done.

NATHANIEL PEFFER

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Crisis Diplomacy: A History of U.S. Intervention Policies and Practices. By D. A. GRABER. Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1959.—xviii, 402 pp. $6.75.

It is misleading to equate "intervention" with "crisis diplomacy". Most Americans and possibly even most policy makers do not so regard the subject. Indeed, probably few would disagree with Hans Morgenthau's prefatory comment that "the unchallengeable superiority of the United States within the Western hemisphere, in conjunction with the American ideals at the service of which that superiority was supposed to be employed, [has] made it appear to American eyes as though what was actually intervention was in truth something different, if not the exact opposite."

The word "intervention" has many meanings—all of them in use here—and the resulting ambiguities are difficult to sort out. Sometimes it is the reverse of "isolation"; sometimes it is a synonym for "imperialism"; often it is the same as "intermeddling". If American intervention means anything at all, it means the projection in anger of the power and prestige of the United

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States upon another country. "Nonintervention" has, of course, sometimes had as powerful an effect as intervention. Spruille Braden saw this when, as Assistant Secretary of State, he declared in 1946: "Not to use our power in the interests of peace and freedom may be *mis*using that power just as much as if we brought our influence to bear on the wrong side of the issue."

Quite apart from the author's difficulty in finding a usable definition of intervention, she is convinced that we have been guilty of too much of it. She expresses her concern that the United States "during the forties and fifties [may have] exaggerated its needs of self-defense and engaged in unwarranted intervention. . . ." She considers, for instance, that the undelayed recognition of Israel by the United States in 1948 was "interventionary" because the Department of State failed first to make certain "that a new state entitled to recognition had been established." (On the other hand, she seems to say that the United States pursued a wrong policy with respect to the Iron Curtain countries "when it refused to uphold its views by stepping from the rostrum on to the battlefield.")

Intervention, Miss Graber asserts, may be verbal as well as military or diplomatic. She points out, for example, that when in 1958 John Foster Dulles at a news conference expressed his belief that the Indonesians would never want a Communist-type or a Communist-dominated government, he found he had offended some Indonesian leaders. Not only did they regard the Secretary's remark as a slur upon their country's name, but also they considered it, in the author's phrase, "illegal intervention".

Miss Graber's summary words on her big subject are graceful: "Fortunately moral idealism and political realism will at times point in the same direction in the choice of interventions." Her specific proposal, that the United States make clear it will engage in intervention only when justified under international law—"so that American political leaders can act forcefully, without an unwarranted guilt complex"—tamely concludes her book.

The phrase "under international law" is no easier to deal with today than it ever was. In fact, it is illuminating that, in discussing the occupation of Greenland by our military forces in 1940, Miss Graber calls the official United States explanation "legal acrobatics". Yet, she adds: "This military intervention was justified only if the occupation was truly essential to the security of the United States." Thus, in the end, circumstances condition interpretation.

To cite another example: Miss Graber applauds the official ending of armed intervention to protect United States citizens abroad. But, she observes, the year 1958 witnessed a severe test

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of the policy, when Vice President Nixon and his entourage were in apparently serious physical danger while traveling in Venezuela. In a masterly understatement which one wishes were intentional, she declares: "That the United States would have meekly allowed its vice-president to be murdered by hostile mobs in Venezuela seems doubtful. If an actual landing had been essential to snatch him and his party from his pursuers, it would probably have been undertaken without worrying about the formalities of an official invitation [from the government of Venezuela]."

The primary aim of foreign policy must be to make the nation secure. Hopefully, this is accomplished better through diplomacy than through a resort to force. But an unwillingness to resort to force cannot of itself be an appropriate aim of the formulators of policy. An apparent failure to come to grips with this fact lies at the bottom of Miss Graber's difficulty in assessing her broadly conceived "intervention".

HENRY F. GRAFF

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Uncertain Ally. By JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON. London, Christopher Johnson, 1957.—199 pp. 15/.

Shortly before his death J. V. Stalin studied the impact of America's foreign economic policies on her allies. "Can it be assumed", he queried, "that they will endlessly tolerate the present situation, in which, under the guise of Marshall plan aid, Americans are penetrating into the economies of Britain and France and trying to convert them into adjuncts of the United States economy, and American capital is seizing raw materials and markets in the British and French colonies and thereby plotting disaster for the high profits of the British and French capitalists?" In these disturbing sentences Stalin struck unerringly at Europe's fundamental concern over America's perennial war on the world's economies and phrased simultaneously the theme of the challenging book under review. This small volume reflects an understandable vigor and resentment, for its author is a young British economist and Conservative member of Parliament.

Mr. Biggs-Davison begins his account with Woodrow Wilson's plea for the removal of economic barriers and the establishment of equality of trade conditions among nations. But he points out that Wilson's exhortation was no reflection of American purpose; for the United States, under the guise of idealism, directed its giant economic power toward the domination of

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world trade. During the twenties this nation's productive capacity, operating under tariff protection, quickly submerged the economies of trading nations. When America's economic collapse after 1929 destroyed the prosperity of Europe, the British met the challenge by going off the gold standard, instituting their own tariff, and granting empire preference at the Ottawa Conference of 1932.

In Cordell Hull's reciprocal trade agreements of the thirties the author discovers an even greater threat to balanced economies over the world. These established the principle of the most favored nation and exposed the opposing economies to the full impact of America's ability to produce. This nation's trade policy, writes the author, broke "the world into economic fragments incapable of independent survival." In the late thirties Hull employed trade policies to combat Japan and Germany, and once admitted that "the countries with which we signed trade agreements joined together in resisting the Axis. The political line-up followed the economic line-up." Eventually in the hard days of World War II Hull was able, at last, to force England to concede her discriminatory practices and grant the United States equal trading advantages in the Empire.

Perhaps the trade policies of the United States since the war have served the nation too well, for now the economies of the West are dependent on American prosperity. The collapse of the American economy would bring economic ruin to the entire non-Soviet world. To gain security and develop balanced production, the author believes, nations require the right to discriminate and grant preferential treatment. He would have the United States expand more at home and less abroad; he would have Britain defend herself by challenging America's favored economic position with retaliation. This is a serious and disquieting book which merits the attention of those who determine policy for the world's great creditor nation.

NORMAN A. GRAEBNER

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

Communism and British Intellectuals. By NEAL WOOD. New York, Columbia University Press, 1959.—256 pp. $4.00.

Professor Wood has not only provided a careful and well-documented account of the small but important portion of high-level British intellectuals publicly known to have been attracted to communism between 1918 and 1957. He has also attempted the more difficult task of explaining why these intel-

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lectuals were attracted, and in most cases eventually repelled, by communism. Here Wood seeks to contribute to an understanding of political philosophy by his analysis of the appeal of a given set of ideas to particular intellectuals in given historical circumstances. However, the circumstances themselves, like the depression and World War II, do not command the author's attention nearly so much as do the ideas on their own. Accordingly it is understandable that he should have concentrated on intellectuals in the limited and purer sense of that term: "chiefly men of literature and science who have been articulate about man, society and nature, and who have left a written record of their thoughts" (p. 9). The larger number of middle-class, Left-wing political activists, intellectually interested but not professionally intellectual, are largely outside the author's concern.

Even so, Wood is left with a substantial subject matter—that is, of written expressions by communist intellectuals. Partly this is because he counts as communist intellectuals not just those who joined the Communist party but also those who significantly sympathized with its purposes. The author's classification of sympathizers is discreet and reasonable. It would have made no sense to leave out of account an active communist propagandizer like John Strachey (in the 1930's) simply because he was not a party member. However, some of what Wood has to say, particularly about the ultimate reaction in 1955-1957 of intellectuals to the party's bureaucratic rigidity, is mainly relevant to an understanding of those who formally submitted to communist discipline.

A principal thesis of the author concerns the undoubted attraction of communism in the 1930's. Primarily, Wood believes, a number of British intellectuals were then reacting against their own nihilism of the 1920's. This is not an unfamiliar explanation as applied to the literati's "escape from the wasteland", but Wood adheres to a similar theme in his analysis of the movement of scientists to communist ranks and especially to the associated "social relations of science" movement. For the men of science as for the men of letters, communism promised an activist release. The nihilistic scientist, it is argued, found attractive the communist advocacy of a controlled society in which scientist-kings could be envisioned. Significantly most of the communist scientists as well as the communist literati had earlier been entirely uninterested in politics. Communism seemed to be their first faith outside their own intellectual work.

Generally the author's judgments concerning the British setting appear sound and well informed. In a few instances it might have been helpful to have distinguished the various peri-

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ods to which descriptive statements about public attitudes belonged. Then there would have been less cause to quarrel with this judgment: "No great stigma is attached to a Labour M.P. who associates with communists or writes for their publications" (p. 24). Perhaps, in any case, the quarrel here is only over what is meant by "great" stigma; not so great, it may be granted, as for an American congressman who associated with Communists, but great enough during most of the Labour party's recent history to cause political trouble for the M.P.

LEON D. EPSTEIN

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

British Interests in the Mediterranean and Middle East. A Report by a Chatham House Study Group. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1958.—vii, 123 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*; $2.00.

Australia's Outlook on Asia. By WERNER LEVI. East Lansing, Michigan State University Press, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1958.—246 pp. $5.00; 27*s.* 6*d.*

Commonwealth Perspectives. By NICHOLAS MANSERGH *et al.* Durham, Duke University Press, London, Cambridge University Press, 1958.—ix, 214 pp. $4.50.

Of these three books the first is by far the best, but all three provide useful material for the student of Britain and the Commonwealth of Nations.

The Chatham House Report on British interests in the Mediterranean and Middle East is that unusual document, a clear, forceful and effective piece of writing produced by a committee. The distinguished members of the Study Group must have exercised considerable restraint in not interfering with their two Rapporteurs, Mr. D. Mack Smith and Mr. D. C. Watt. It is very much a post-Suez document, showing clearly how the disastrous experience of being cold-shouldered by the United States, denounced by India, and disagreed with by Canada has affected the thinking of British people concerned with world affairs. Whereas in earlier years the dominant British viewpoint was that Britain could act as a kind of policeman of the Middle East and ought always to have an active "Middle East policy", the argument advanced in this book is that now Britain cannot, and should not, have a "Middle East policy" at all—in the sense

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of a policy which she alone pursues. Throughout the Report the emphasis is laid upon Britain's incapacity to take direct action in the area, and her need to get her friends and allies involved in any sort of action which may seem necessary in order to preserve western interests generally. These are seen to lie in the fields of oil and the trade route through the Suez Canal. The Report shows how dangerous and out of date are Britain's treaty obligations to the Sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf and southern Arabia, and suggests that here too Britain may be carrying obligations which should be shared by her allies and friends. It foreshadows much of what has already taken place in British relations with Cyprus and Egypt, and is particularly effective in its analysis of nationalism in North Africa and the Middle East. It is short, even terse; but it is a Report which takes up positions, argues them fully, and does not shirk the treatment of awkward and unpleasant situations. It is a model of how factual analysis can come to the aid of sensible policy.

Dr. Levi's book shows evidence of great industry. He has assembled a formidable bibliography on Asian-Australian relations which shows that more has been written on the subject than most Australians would think. His method is historical, the first third or so of the book being devoted to Australian attitudes before 1945, and the remainder to Australian policy since then. These proportions seem to me about right, since it is the post-war period that matters. On the whole he sticks to a straight narrative of events, with comparatively little comment, though he does stress the essential homogeneity of Australian views about Asia. He has been criticized in some quarters in Australia herself for not distinguishing more sharply between the policies toward Communist China of Mr. Menzies and Dr. Evatt; but, when one makes allowance for the differences to be expected between a government and an opposition, these two men do not seem so very far apart. Dr. Levi's style is somewhat labored at times, but he has produced a work of value which should be taken into account by anyone studying Australian foreign policy.

The third book is a series of miscellaneous papers produced at the Commonwealth-Studies Center of Duke University. They do not really make a book. The Commonwealth is wide and expansive in character, but it is not wide enough to enable one to find an organic connection between an essay on "Commonwealth Foreign Policies 1945-56" and one on "The Development of Health and Welfare Programs in Australia". The latter essay, by Dr. B. U. Ratchford (which has since been expanded into a useful book), is admirable in its way, but it has no connection

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with anything else in this volume: if it has a "perspective", this is on quite a different plane from the general discussions of Commonwealth affairs contributed by Professors Mansergh and Wilson. For students of Commonwealth relations, the most useful essays are the first three and the last. But it is a pity that the Commonwealth-Studies Center did not wait until it had enough essays on a single theme to turn them into a book with some point. Its other volumes have all had unity of purpose, and been correspondingly successful.

J. D. B. MILLER

UNIVERSITY OF LEICESTER

Communism in American Unions. By DAVID J. SAPOSS. New York, Toronto, London, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1959.—xii, 279 pp. $7.50.

It will be most salutary if this book is read by those decent, well-meaning Americans who think that since things are somewhat improved in Khrushchev's Russia, in comparison with that of Stalin, it is possible truly to "coexist" with the former's more or less benevolent tyranny (or is it tyrannical benevolence?). For here, it seems, is the definitive work concerning Red subversion in American trade unions during the past forty odd years.

After two short introductory chapters dealing with the always dangerous antics of the Communists in the period from the Bolshevik Revolution until the 1930's, the author devotes the rest of his long story to the grim tale of Red activities in the unions of this country from the thirties until today. Part II and Part III, respectively entitled "Communist Penetration of the American Federation of Labor" and "Communist Infiltration of the CIO", carefully record and document the strategy, tactics and dreadful successes that ofttimes the superbly trained and ideologically armed American (and in a few instances foreign) Reds avidly pursued and achieved. That record is enough to send "intelligent shudders" up and down any thinking American's spine.

In the concluding Part IV, "Combatting Communist Domination", we learn how a combination of governmental and (finally aroused) trade-union forces exposed the nefarious work of the Reds and their fellow travelers and broke their power. Employers, it would appear, unlike trade-union leaders, did not learn much from their earlier mistakes. Thus we have the fantastic example, in 1948, of the General Electric Company taking a neutralist position in the war going on under its nose

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between the Communist and anti-Communist elements within the United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers Union! To the General Electric Company commanders both sides were equally suspect because each contained collectivists. This reviewer wonders, in 1960, how many employers are still equating democratic collectivist enemies of communism with the Communist collectivists.

Mr. Saposs, who has served as Special Assistant to the Commissioner of Labor Statistics in the United States Department of Labor and as Chief Economist for the National Labor Relations Board, deserves the accolade from every democratic American, from extreme Right to extreme Left, for hammering home constantly the warning that, wherever and whenever Communists exist outside of their countries (for in a real sense the United States is not the country of American Communists), they have a particular job to do. In one fashion or other they will work to subvert those societies as best they can.

One minor critical point, and one important shade of disagreement with the author: Lenin, who told us the score, particularly in *Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Malady,* fails to rise even to the dignity of a footnote (unless I missed a page) in this documented story. Moreover, the author is a bit keener than is this reviewer concerning the value of congressional investigating committees. This is understandable in view of the positive contributions, along with the negative, that the committees made in arousing the unions and the public to the Red menace. But Walter Reuther, George Meany, *et al.* always stood firm and smelled out the rats early. We may be sure that they and their successors will have an excellent olfactory sense in the long struggle ahead.

CARROLL HAWKINS

OREGON STATE COLLEGE

The Italian Fascist Party in Power: A Study in Totalitarian Rule. By DANTE L. GERMINO. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1959.—xii, 181 pp. $4.50.

Italian fascism, the subject of an extensive literature in its heyday, has been largely ignored in recent discussions of comparative government. Attempts to reappraise this political development in the perspective afforded by the passage of years are, therefore, now most welcome. This book is such an attempt. As compared with students of Italian fascism who worked with the current régime, Germino has distinct advantages. He has used much documentary material and many memoirs only avail-

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able recently. World War II and the tensions preceding it, moreover, stopped the earlier series of studies before the régime was fully developed in a totalitarian direction.

Although the book is broadly descriptive of the Fascist party specifically and of the régime in general (in so far as party organs were involved in its functioning) Germino is concerned throughout with the conceptual problem of whether the Italian Fascist régime was genuinely "totalitarian" in the sense in which this term describes common features of the German Nazi and Russian communist systems. He concludes that it was, and believes (correctly) that in so doing he is correcting a general impression left by the earlier literature. To the present reviewer the essence of this question is whether the so-called "Italian Fascist party" was a genuine "ruling order" with serious internal dynamism, operating directly as a governing device without regard for normal bureaucratic canons and jurisdictions, and overshadowing and manipulating at will the official state bureaucracy. On this limited basis Germino, with the materials now available, abundantly demonstrates the fully totalitarian character of Italian fascism and refutes the notion (once at least compatible with available evidence) that the "party" was merely a specialized branch of the state bureaucracy.

Unfortunately (it seems to the present reviewer) Germino seeks to make his demonstration of the truly totalitarian character of the Italian dictatorship according to a complex set of criteria rather than as the simple concept of a "ruling order" suggested in the previous paragraph. This clouds the argument and makes the practical sufficiency of his evidence less clear than it really is. Following Friedrich's definition, he seeks not merely to prove the special character of the "ruling order" as a device of government but also to satisfy criteria relating to "official ideology", "monopoly of . . . means of . . . mass communication", and "terroristic police control." These criteria do not have the "advantage" which he ascribes to them (p. 133) of "being empirically verifiable with reference to any current or recent dictatorship." We lack adequate concepts for dealing scientifically with ideologies and specifically for distinguishing their operative parts from their purely ceremonial portions. Most students are under the subjective impression that ideology should be taken much more seriously in an operative sense in the Soviet and German dictatorships than in the Italian. Germino's somewhat casual treatment of the subject hardly suffices to overcome this impression. In any case the problem is almost certainly one of degree, as is also the case with the other criteria mentioned. Moreover,

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these latter ones would seem to be satisfied to a fairly high degree in most authoritarian régimes, whether "totalitarian" or not. Only the "ruling order" represents a qualitative feature in which modern totalitarian dictatorships are peculiar. Since the body of his study is exclusively devoted to identifying the Fascist ruling order as a totalitarian organ, it is unfortunate that the argument is clouded by other less useful criteria.

G. LOWELL FIELD
THE UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT

An Encyclopedia of Parliament. By NORMAN WILDING and PHILIP LAUNDY. Foreword by The Rt. Hon. The Viscount Malvern. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1958.—x, 705 pp. $12.50.

Encyclopedias are more than collections of certain kinds of information, for they always mirror the *Zeitgeist;* and because they are not specifically created to serve such a purpose, they are all the more significant as reflections of the sentiments that animate the age in which they originate. No exception to this generalization is the recent compendium by two British-born and -trained legislative librarians, Norman Wilding and Philip Laundy, now practicing their craft in Rhodesia. The work grew out of an information index instituted by harassed librarians for harassed men of affairs. No doubt Edmund Burke would have been appalled at such an abstraction of the complexities that he cherished. Yet what better testimonial could one find to the state of the empirical politicians of today, so frantically busy with the urgencies of the moment as to have to be reminded of their heritage in such a fashion!

Concentrating upon the Parliament of the United Kingdom, but including material on all the representative bodies of Empire and Commonwealth, are 626 pages of text. For the sake of balance a single lengthy historical survey of Parliament is replaced by separate entries on each reign from Elizabeth I to Victoria. A discussion of the origins of Parliament and of its history prior to Elizabethan times is found under the entry, "Parliament". Statesmen and politicians are treated individually, only if they have been directly concerned with the growth of Parliamentary powers and traditions. Data are drawn from many sources, some more readily available than others. Material on matters of procedure is based upon the fifteenth edition of Sir Erskine May's classic *Parliamentary Practice.* Seventy-eight pages of appendices include lists of ministers and an excel-

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lent twenty-four page bibliography, enumerating political biographies and general and specialized works on the Parliaments of the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries.

With some mental effort most of us can usually recall scattered bits of knowledge about the Reformation Parliament, the Reconciliation Parliament, the Long Parliament, the Rump Parliament, and Barebone's Parliament. But how many of us were ever aware of the existence of a Drunken, a Mad, a Merciless, and a Running Parliament, or realize that the Short Parliament was not the shortest, but so named only because it preceded the Long? The shortest met for one day over half a millenium ago and deposed Richard II, whose mysterious death became the subject of Shakespeare's art. Such are some of the intellectual canapes offered by Messrs. Wilding and Laundy. If these fail to whet the appetite, there are many others, including Antigua Legislative Council, Speakers Chop, Faggot Voting, and the Journal of the Society of Clerks-at-the-Table in Commonwealth Parliaments.

Of course, there will always be criticism of such a work: from the specialist that it is too general; from the generalist that it is too specialized. What is offered is well organized and succinctly summarized. Some carping might be made about allocation of space and omissions. If there is to be only half a page on "Constitution", why include it at all? Should the space allotted to the Communist party in Parliament nearly equal that devoted to the Liberal party? And certainly a page and a half given to Locke, Bentham, Mill and Bagehot would be of more relevance than the same space into which the eight monarchs named Henry have been compressed. These cavils aside, the volume should prove to be of invaluable assistance to legislators, civil servants, teachers, librarians and students—among the most harried and hurried of our harried and hurried world.

NEAL WOOD

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

John Maitland of Thirlestane and the Foundation of the Stewart Despotism in Scotland. By MAURICE LEE, JR. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959.—xii, 314 pp. $6.00.

In this excellent study, recently awarded the David Berry Prize of the Royal Historical Society, Professor Maurice Lee, Jr., has delved deeply and thoughtfully into that period of Scottish history in the years between 1585 and 1595 when the youthful James VI and I passed his majority and learned his first lessons in the practical art of kingcraft. The king's chief councillor

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and minister of state in those turbulent years was Lord Chancellor Sir John Maitland of Thirlestane, one of two able brothers prominent in the jumbled politics of late sixteenth-century Scotland. To most historians the elder of the two, "Secretary Maitland"—Sir William Maitland of Lethington whose fate was linked with that of Mary Queen of Scots—is better known but, in Professor Lee's opinion, less deserving of historical reputation. With conscious purpose, therefore, the author has reconstructed and rehabilitated the reputation of the younger Maitland until he emerges in this book as a kind of Scottish Richelieu or Thomas Cromwell who strove to make his strife-torn, poverty-ridden country into a "new monarchy" on the approved sixteenth-century model.

Maitland of Thirlestane, argues Professor Lee, was actually a far more important person than history has recognized not only because he was the initiator of a policy of reconstruction in the Scottish state but because he was King James's most influential tutor in the sphere of practical politics. By inference, it is also made plain that the lessons Maitland taught were carried over into a later period after James became England's king with important consequences for English as well as Scottish history. What Maitland tried to do—and with modest success, as Professor Lee sees it—was to balance the centrifugal forces of Scottish life (the great nobles and the kirk) in such a way as to make the machinery of monarchy truly functional. While it may be argued, particularly in the light of seventeenth-century events, that Maitland was probably less successful than Professor Lee implies, there is no doubt but that he contributed much toward making James VI the most effective king that Scotland had seen since the Middle Ages. By English or French standards this was not saying a great deal, but then Maitland had far greater difficulties to overcome than other royal servants in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The basic problem of every Scottish government down to the Union of 1707 was finance; and while this was also a problem for most other European states, in Scotland it was peculiarly difficult. The country was afflicted by poverty to an almost unbelievable degree. There was no industry; and agriculture, the most productive element in the kingdom, was extremely primitive and precarious. As a consequence, while the wealth of the country was expanding, its rate of growth was extremely slow; and land, which was still largely controlled by the nobility, was virtually the sole basis of wealth. For that reason the disposition of landholdings was important to every significant group in society: to the nobles, the church, the

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lairds, the townsmen, and, above all, to the crown. In his treatment of this tangled problem Professor Lee has given us a remarkably lucid picture of a problem that was Europe-wide in scope. He has also documented in admirable detail the curiously diffuse and highly personalized vendetta-like quality of Scottish political life. Perhaps he has overestimated Maitland's abilities and underrated those of James, for it was the king, after all, who chose Maitland as his servant in the first place. Moreover, James knew, then and later, that something had to be done about the Scottish economy if he was to achieve permanently the kind of government he wanted for his northern kingdom. The dilemma that confronted him, as it confronted his son Charles I afterward, was that, while he could see what was needed, he was unable, partly from personal defects and partly from circumstance, to accomplish his purposes more than temporarily.

As a study in the tortuous personal and political relations of sixteenth-century Scottish society this is a work of high quality. It is based on careful research and its conclusions are presented in a well-thought-out way. This is a book that is well worth reading for any who would wish to know something of the complex processes by which the modern state came into being.

SIDNEY A. BURRELL

BARNARD COLLEGE

A Diderot Pictorial Encyclopedia of Trades and Industry, Manufacturing and the Technical Arts. By DENIS DIDEROT. Edited with Introduction and Notes by Charles Coulston Gillispie. New York, Dover Publications Inc., 1959.—2 volumes. xxxii, 920 pp. $18.50.

Diderot's *Encyclopédie* is like an aged and formidable personage. Historians and political theorists alike pay their respects to it and use belligerent metaphors to attest to its vigor: it is a battering ram, a bomb, a machine of war. But almost no one reads it. It is too rare to be bought cheaply or to be placed on the open shelves of reference rooms; it is too long, too miscellaneous, too bulky to be read for amusement. J. Lough's selected articles from the *Encyclopédie,* as well as the labors of such Diderot specialists as Arthur M. Wilson, have done something to alleviate this situation. They have given us essential information about this powerful combination of collective scholarship and single-minded propaganda, and about the qualities of the leading minds behind the enterprise.

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This small company has now been worthily joined by Charles C. Gillispie's invaluable edition of a selection from the more than 2,900 plates which followed the seventeen volumes of text. The present version, handsomely printed in two impressive folios, offers 485 of these plates, rearranged by the editor under such general titles as "Art of War", or "Extractive Industries", and illuminated by his generous, witty captions and a stimulating Introduction.

The plates are a delight and provide a superb, if somewhat retouched, view of eighteenth-century France, her crafts and industries. We see beekeepers, landscape gardeners, coal miners, sword makers, printers, button makers, all in their place of work, illustrating their procedures, with their tools. Five fascinating plates show the process of casting an equestrian statue; a dozen are devoted to the making of Gobelin tapestries. Of course, not all operations are as tidy as these, or as artistic in their effects, although the beautifully etched plates suggest processes clean beyond belief. "The scene, if not idealized," writes Gillispie in his candid Introduction, "has certainly been tidied a bit by Diderot's artists." But the distortion is not damaging; accurate information overflows each page.

The plates are, then, an aesthetic feast, but they are more than that: to those who can see they provide insight into class relations, economic change, and the quality of life in eighteenth-century France. Gillispie's Introduction is an excellent guide to what the historian can extract from the plates; in fifteen pages he gives a short history of the *Encyclopédie* and estimates its significance; discusses the provenance of the plates and the complicated charges that Diderot's artists plagiarized them; offers a sketch of Diderot's life and philosophy; and speculates about what the plates reveal about the Enlightenment and about the controversial "Industrial Revolution". To cover so much ground in so little time makes the editor sound a little breathless, but it is better to suffer under too much than under too little material. Words and pictures are happily matched; together they show once and for all that Diderot did not lavish all his care on the anticlerical and subversive political articles, but that the whole encyclopedic enterprise, including the articles and plates on crafts, was part of his proud enterprise to change "the general way of thinking."

PETER GAY

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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A History of Japan to 1334. By GEORGE SANSOM. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1958.—xi, 500 pp. $8.50.

It is admittedly difficult for a student who has come under the spell of Sir George Sansom's scholarship, and who has had the privilege of doing research under his guidance, to review a work of his teacher with any degree of candor and detachment. Moreover, it is pretentious—it would be so in Japan—for a pupil to dare to pass judgment on his master. However, a review of *A History of Japan to 1334*, the first of a trilogy planned by the author on the civilization of the Japanese, is attempted here by the pupil with the knowledge that the master, for all his profound insight into the Oriental mind, is still an Occidental at heart who would not be offended with even the most amateurish attempt at criticism of his work by one of his former pupils.

Sir George says with characteristic modesty that the book, containing a few matter-of-fact interpretations and a comparison here and there, is a straightforward narrative history intended for the ordinary reader. One might concede—and not without qualification—only the last of these modest claims. It is, indeed, a book for the ordinary reader—to the degree that it is a more general, better-balanced, and a more strictly chronological narrative than his earlier *Japan: A Short Cultural History* (1931), which was topical and discursive. The long and often technical discussions about the origins of the Japanese, the differences between the Chinese and Japanese languages, the introduction of Chinese institutions in Japan, and so on, which characterized the opening chapters of his first book, and which made early Japanese history seem interminably long for the ordinary reader, have been reduced to their essentials in this book and skillfully woven into a broader, better-balanced, and pleasing historical tapestry.

However, the author's concern for the ordinary reader should not delude the specialist into thinking that he may not read the book with interest and profit. It is nearly thirty years since the author first published his cultural history, and much new research has been done in the meantime by Japanese scholars, now freed from the restrictions of the pre-war era. The results of these studies as well as the thoughtful reflections and researches of Sir George himself have been incorporated into this book. Thus the specialist will find much that is new and refreshing in this latest work.

The author's thoroughness in analyzing important events and movements may be seen in his treatment of such events as the

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Taika Revolution of 645, the transfer of the capital to the present site of Kyoto in 794, the flowering of a sophisticated society at Kyoto in the ensuing centuries, and the rise of a warrior society in the twelfth century. On the Taika Reform, for example, Sir George is not satisfied with the usual explanation that the Reform was motivated by clan rivalry, and by the desire of one of the principals in the rivalry to establish a strong, centralized government in the pattern of T'ang China so as to secure the position of the reigning house against the pretensions of ambitious clans. Sir George sees, as one of the factors which hastened the Reform, the threat of Korea. In the seventh century Korea was making rapid progress toward a unification which was to result in the expulsion of the Japanese from the peninsula before the end of the century. Korea looms large in the author's account of seventh-century Japan, and this leaves one with the thought that perhaps that land, to be known later as the Hermit Kingdom, played a far greater rôle in early Japanese history than was heretofore suspected.

In a similar exhaustive manner Sir George examines the problem of the choice of Kyoto in 794 as the site of a new capital. The Japanese court had moved from Nara to Nagaoka only ten years earlier, and these two moves inland had always puzzled historians. Sir George, looking into geography, provides a reasonably satisfactory answer. He points to the river running through the site, at the delta of which was situated the important port of Naniwa. Communications to the sea and with China were matters of primary concern with the Japanese court to which China was the source of its cultural lifeblood.

It is in this area of Chinese-Japanese relations that one might look for a theme for this volume—if Sir George intended one. No one reading the book can fail to note that the early Japanese, despite their extraordinary efforts to borrow and implant the culture of the more advanced Chinese in their native soil, produced a civilization quite unique and clearly distinguishable from that of the culture which inspired the efforts. With a provincial warrior class in control of the government, popular sects of Buddhism unlike those of China, and a phonetic system of writing in use by certain elements of the aristocracy, Japan by 1334, the year at which Sir George brings the volume to a close, was unmistakably a nation culturally independent of its mother, China.

MINORU SHINODA

UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII

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BOOK NOTES

The conflict between the public's right to know and its need to know is one of the most important aspects of government today. The Soviet Union has resolved it quite simply by feeding its citizens only such carefully prepared accounts of its work as it considers good for them. In the United States, as Douglass Cater shows in his sympathetic report on Washington correspondents—*The Fourth Branch of Government* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959; ix, 194 pp. $3.50)—the issue is vastly more complicated because it arises from the very basis of democratic government—the guarantees of free speech and a free press. While there is little in his able summation that is new to the professional journalist, whose duty it is to find and print the news, his work ought to be required reading for the professional diplomats and others in government who believe quite sincerely that the public is now being told too much. In one sense, as Cater demonstrates, the issue is academic because the system of checks and balances built into our government automatically provides fuel for the massive engines of public information even if one major source of supply is blocked off. To those who would abolish the presidential news conference, he quotes the words of a veteran Washington correspondent: "Okay, cut out the President's press conferences—better cut out the Secretary of State's and the other Cabinet officers' while you're at it. Then let the Adminstration enemies on the Hill dominate the headlines!" But in a more practical sense—that of the responsibility of a press that must regulate itself or face the eventual possibility of greater curbs on its freedom than presently exist—Cater finds that the cry of "the right to know" is something more than a self-serving newspaper slogan. The serious Washington correspondent, as he points out, does not lightly rush into print with information that could jeopardize a government position in international relations; nor, for that matter, does he disclose state secrets to the enemy. However, if he is really a "fourth branch of government", in Cater's phrase, then it is obvious that he must act in the public interest both as a professional journalist and as a citizen. The major conflict, therefore, is within the journalist himself in a democracy such as the United States. It is a miracle that he does so well in the discharge of his duties despite all the pulling and hauling to

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which he is subjected. Cater, the Washington correspondent of *Reporter* magazine, has performed a useful service in presenting an unvarnished picture of his colleagues and their problems, their attitudes and techniques. He is, to use the highest compliment one journalist can give another, a good reporter. —JOHN HOHENBERG, Columbia University.

The Poll Tax in the South, by Frederic D. Ogden (University, The University of Alabama Press, 1958; xiv, 302 pp. $6.00), is a most complete and authoritative study of the poll tax and its relation to contemporary American politics. Though the tax survives today in only five Southern states, it remains to many Americans a special kind of tarnish on our democracy. The book carefully traces the origins of the tax, and Dr. Ogden's discussion of the relationship of disfranchisement to the rise of Populism is especially helpful. The poll tax was actually only one of a series of restrictive measures adopted in Southern states in the years just before and after 1900. While the major purpose of these measures was to inhibit Negro voting, the poll tax was one which struck at poor whites as well. Thus, Loudon county, Virginia, which cast 4,800 entirely male votes for president in 1896, has never reached that figure since, despite universal suffrage, even in the heavy-vote Eisenhower elections of 1952 and 1956. The Ogden study includes details on poll tax administration not previously at hand in such useful form and an excellent chapter on corruption—one of the original arguments for the adoption of the poll tax device. Actually, as *The Poll Tax in the South* points out, there is much evidence to suggest that poll tax operations increase rather than diminish electoral fraud. Certainly experience in the "buying" of poll tax receipts and the payment of poll tax levies by candidates is widespread enough to make many observers feel corruption goes up, not down, with the adoption of a poll tax system of voting. In the more specifically party field, numerous cases are presented to show the effect of the poll tax upon voter participation in general and on party fortunes in particular. Detailed comparison tables are provided relating poll tax to urbanism, to Negro and Mexican-American voters, to income and wealth, and the like. Considerable attention is also given to repeal of the poll tax, in terms both of the individual states and of the nation as a whole. Only five states still continue poll-tax paying as a requisite for voting; many have abandoned it over the last few years. Dr. Ogden traces the circumstances under which repeal was accomplished in such states as Georgia, Tennessee, Florida, Loui-

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siana and the Carolinas. Equally important, he analyzes why repeal efforts have failed elsewhere and what possibilities may exist for future repeal drives in these states. Finally, a concluding chapter details the efforts at poll tax repeal from the top—that is, from the Congress. *The Poll Tax in the South* is a first-rate work of scholarship. It is our best study of the subject. In depth of enquiry, detail of research, and general awareness of the field it leaves very little to be done. But this book is not only a reference tool for details about the poll tax, it is also a most interesting essay in a highly controversial area of American politics.—RICHARD M. SCAMMON, Governmental Affairs Institute.

Much investigation is currently under way to determine whether the old political labels of Left and Right are valid for modern politics. One such attempt—*Three Against the Third Republic: Sorel, Barrès, and Maurras* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959; 313 pp. $6.00) by Michael Curtis—finds more similarities than differences between Left and Right in its examination of France, 1875-1914. Reviewing the criticism of three strange bedfellows, Curtis handles their basic differences capably. He finds a number of similarities, more keenly sensed by his sober summaries of their major ideas, underneath their differing views on the precise nature of the élite, their various misinterpretations of history, their disagreements on the rôle of the intellectual, and their vastly different solutions of monarchism, nationalism or syndicalism to French needs. One such similarity is their common style, a "vigor for polemics, a tendency to overstate the case, a contempt for opponents, a . . . vituperation which bordered on the libelous . . . and a lack of generosity tempered only occasionally by kindness" (p. 49). More significant is their likeness as voices of doom or their agreement on the necessity of action, their contempt for human nature, and their opposition to democracy. Perhaps the strongest link is what the author terms their mistaken belief in the antithesis between the individual and the state under the Republic. All were unhappy and disgruntled men, all shared what Curtis attributes to Maurras, "an expression of bewilderment before the problems of modern life" (p. 125). Concentration on such vigorous and persuasive criticism necessarily depicts the disreputable side of the Republic. The author seems sympathetic to the portrayal of the Republic as crisis-ridden, divided, corrupt, decadent, incompetent, and non-French since he believes that "the remarkable thing about it was that, like Sièyes, it survived" (p. 4). Apparently he does not sense any historic

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development during these years, for he places side by side Barrès' criticism of the Boulanger crisis with Maurras' attack of 1913. Yet the Republic did develop a loyalty to its political forms until it was able to absorb most of its critics. Before 1914, the Republic successfully resisted the attacks of such malcontents. Only in a later period with France exhausted and Germany revitalized did one of them, Maurras, present any serious obstacles to governmental operations. It might even be argued that the Dreyfus Affair made the Republic. The occurrence of the Affair reveals a seriously embittered division of opinion; the ability to survive the Affair is an indication of the Republic's strength. What other nation could have endured such a venomous struggle involving its major institutions or, to be more realistic, what other régime in France could not only have survived but have emerged from the struggle stronger than ever? To reinforce this conventionally unfavorable view of the Republic, Curtis uses a formidable array of authoritative political theorists but only occasionally does he offer his own judgment. When he does, his opinions are most refreshing in contrast to the concise reporting of his sources.—LOUISE DALBY, Barnard College.

The survey, *Scandinavian Democracy,* edited by J. A. Lauwerys (The Danish Institute, The Norwegian Office of Cultural Relations, The Swedish Institute in cooperation with The American-Scandinavian Foundation, Copenhagen, 1958; 437 pp. $6.00), is a new version in English of a coöperative work that appeared in Copenhagen a decade ago under the editorship of Professors Hal Koch and Alf Ross. The present book is both a condensation and an elaboration of its predecessor in that some of its sections have been altered or omitted, and others have been brought up to date and some new material has been added. The end result is gratifying. One limitation is to be noted, however. As the editor puts it, "for practical reasons, the contributors to this book have been drawn only from" Norway, Sweden and Denmark. The result is that Finland and Iceland are not adequately covered. The references to Finland, to be sure, are numerous and lengthy enough to indicate quite clearly where the line separating the Scandinavian democracies from the eastern "people's democracies" runs. The editor and the twenty-three contributors to the volume have produced an excellent discussion of those aspects of the body politic and social in the Scandinavian North that can legitimately be considered as illustrations of functioning democracy. The chapters dealing with democratic thought and institutions are preceded by a lengthy

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chapter on "Lands and Peoples" by Mr. Lauwerys, and another summarizing the historical heritage and developments before the twentieth century. Mr. Lauwerys, incidentally, repeats the well-worn purely philological Finno-Ugric concept in speaking of the Finns' "origins" but manages in other ways to give an altogether adequate summary. His introductions to the chapters of the book—six of the eight chapters have them—admirably serve their purpose. The main content of the volume consists of sections on justice and liberty under the law; economic factors and circumstances especially as they involve or relate to intervention or control by the state, or concern employer-employee problems and "industrial democracy"; the "building up" of democratic attitudes which involves such broad areas as the school on the one hand and the press, the theatre, the radio and the church on the other; and an ambitious attempt to delineate the rôle and importance of Scandinavian democracy in the contemporary world. The fact is, however—possibly quite unavoidably—that nearly all of the contributions by the different authors relate to problems and solutions recorded by national (Danish, Norwegian, Swedish, etc.) experience. "Scandinavian experience and achievement" therefore becomes, in a sense, a fictional label. Yet it is fully justified by a fact familiar especially to all serious students of the Scandinavian nations: this is that the four peoples have managed to fashion modern democracies that are surprisingly alike in their institutional architecture, and have also succeeded in providing, in a manner congenial to free citizenries, workable solutions for the problems that are inescapable parts of man's life in modern (and by now industrial) society. This admirable book invites the conclusion that they will continue to record no less impressive successes in the years that lie ahead.—JOHN H. WUORINEN, Columbia University.

Yearbook of the United Nations, 1958 (New York, Columbia University Press in co-operation with the United Nations, 1959; xii, 610 pp. $12.50) is the twelfth volume in the series which began with the establishment of the Organization in 1945. It provides a "comprehensive and documented" account of the proceedings and activities of the United Nations and related intergovernmental agencies for the calendar year 1958. It gives further indication that a substantial measure of stability and continuity has been achieved in format, structure and content of this useful annual volume of reference. Since 1954 the Yearbook has been kept roughly within the limits of 550-650 pages. This limitation has not been noticeably at the expense of

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usefulness and has resulted in a much more convenient and usable book of reference than some of the earlier volumes. The plan of organization, the manner of treatment of specific topics, the kind of factual information given, and the documentary references follow generally the pattern of the immediately preceding volumes and are satisfactory for reference purposes. Comparing the Yearbook for 1958 with that for 1957, one omission is to be noted. The former does not contain a chart showing the membership of the United Nations and the related inter-governmental organizations. To be sure, the information is given under the various agency headings, but for anyone interested in making a quick comparison, the omission of the chart from the 1958 volume is to be regretted.—LELAND M. GOODRICH, Columbia University.

A good popular book about the revolutionary transformation going on today is available to the general public in *Five Ideas That Change the World* (New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1959; 188 pp. $3.75) by Barbara Ward. As a writer and as a speaker she excels by the clarity of her presentation. Her views are well known to a wide audience by her frequent articles in *The New York Times Magazine.* The present book contains five lectures which Miss Ward delivered at the University College in Ghana. Among her audience was Ghana's Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah who wrote an introduction to the present volume. The five lectures dealt with nationalism, industrialism, colonialism, communism, and internationalism. These forces are shown in their historical setting and in their present application. The lectures are well written and the short book is very handsomely and generously printed.—HANS KOHN, The City College.

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VLADIMIR GREGORIEVITCH SIMKHOVITCH

Vladimir Gregorievitch Simkhovitch, who was V.G. to his friends, was born on October 14, 1874, near the town of Velikiia Luki, Russia. He attended a Russian secondary school where he acquired a good knowledge of Greek, Latin, and Old Slavonic. He then went to Germany and studied economics, history, philosophy and art, especially classical art, at the universities of Halle and Berlin. Among his teachers were Eduard Meyer, Zeller, Harnack, Simmel, Max Weber, and Stammler. In 1898 Simkhovitch was awarded a doctor's degree by the University of Halle-Wittenberg. In Germany he met Mary Kingsbury, of Boston; he followed her to the United States and on January 7, 1899, they were married at the Chapel of the Incarnation in New York. In 1904 Simkhovitch joined the faculty of Columbia University as lecturer in Russian history; he was adjunct professor of economic history, 1905-1910; associate professor, 1910-1915, and professor, 1915-1942. In 1942 he became professor emeritus. Simkhovitch was the author of the following books translated into different languages: *Die Feldgemeinschaft in Russland,* 1898; *Marxism versus Socialism,* 1913; and *Toward an Understanding of Jesus,* 1921. His better-known articles which appeared in the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY (as did the preliminary versions of his books) are "Hay in History", 1913; "Rome's Fall Reconsidered", 1916; and "Approaches to History", six instalments, 1929-1936. The last study, an informal examination of the factors and forces which determine the character of the historical process during selected periods, is illuminated by flashes of profound insight. It is hoped that an extended version may appear in book form before long.

V.G.'s outstanding traits were perhaps breadth of interest, love of beauty, and zest for life. An author and a teacher, he

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was also a distinguished art collector, a nature lover, and a successful and imaginative farmer. Greek sculpture, Chinese painting, and medieval illuminated manuscripts—western and islamic—were the major fields of art in which he was a recognized authority. He has made important contributions to the building up of some of America's greatest collections—the Metropolitan Museum, the Morgan Library, the leading museums in Philadelphia, Cleveland, Boston, and elsewhere. From 1910 to 1920 he owned and successfully managed a large dairy farm, Orlanova, at White House, New Jersey; and in 1920 he acquired The Mansion House, an enchanting late eighteenth-century house and vast estate at Robbinston, Maine, overlooking the Bay of Fundy. Here he grew acres of delphiniums in which he developed fragrance, bred pheasants and Chinese ducks which today populate the woods of Maine, and experimented with apple orchards.

Simkhovitch shared his wife's interest in social work and after her death in 1951 he continued to live at Greenwich House which she founded and of which she was the director.

Fate was kind to V.G. He was spared the worst trials of old age and retained to the end his cheerful disposition, optimism, and intense enjoyment of life. He suffered a cerebral haemorrhage early on December 8 and died without recovering consciousness on December 9, 1959.

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RAGNAR NURKSE

Ragnar Nurkse was born on October 5, 1907, in Estonia. He died near Vevey, Switzerland, on May 6, 1959.

Both in his family origins, his formal education, and his adult life and work, he was the epitome of the international scholar and gentleman. He began his career in economics at the University of Tartu; then studied for four years at the University of Edinburgh, where he received the M.A. degree with first-class honors in 1932; and then spent two more years at the University of Vienna, on a Carnegie Fellowship, just as the great second flowering of Austrian economics was coming into full bloom.

Immediately thereafter, he joined the Economic Section of the League of Nations Secretariat in Geneva. This was the world's first major international research organization in the social sciences, and Nurske contributed much to the high quality of its work. When the Economic Section moved to Princeton in 1940, under the pressure of the war, he came with it, and remained a member until 1945. He joined Columbia's Department of Economics in the fall of that year, serving first as lecturer and then as visiting professor, and in 1947 was appointed professor of economics. In 1946-1948, he was also a member of the Institute for Advanced Study, at Princeton.

He was a sensitive and accomplished musician and a remarkable linguist, but his overriding interest and his life work lay in international economic problems. His first book, written in German, was a pioneering essay in what was then the "new" approach to the explanation of equilibrium in international payments. Nine years later he published his classical study of the world's foreign exchange and currency experience between the two world wars, written for the League of Nations; and his subsequent shorter analysis of the conditions of international monetary equilibrium rapidly achieved an almost equally wide reputation. In the last ten years of his life he turned increasingly to questions of economic development, in both the industrialized and the less advanced countries. His volume on the process of capital formation in underdeveloped areas, published in 1953, presented a set of ideas which has had a powerful impact both on subsequent speculative analysis and on practical

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policies and actions. His last work, the Wicksell Lectures delivered a month before his death, constituted a further contribution in this field.

Nor were Nurkse's activities and influence confined to the classroom and the written word. In the last decade he had given notable lecture series abroad; had worked with study groups, seminars and panels of experts in the United Nations, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Rand Corporation, and the Center for Economic Development in Rome; was for two years External Examiner in Economics in Malaya; and last year held a Ford Research Professorship. Few academic men of his age were as widely and favorably known.

But it was Nurkse's personal qualities that particularly endeared him to his hosts of friends in all parts of the world, and for which he will be especially remembered. He was lucid, patient and encouraging to his students; generously helpful with his colleagues; modest and almost apologetic about his own achievements and honors. A gentle man and a lover of beauty, it was not unfitting that he should fall in a sunny field of flowers, walking upward toward a favorite grove of trees.

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ERNEST JACKH

Ernest Jackh, visiting professor at Columbia University from 1940 to 1946 and later consultant to the School of International Affairs, died in New York City on August 17, 1959. Born in Urach, Germany, Dr. Jackh received his doctorate from Heidelberg University. Interested in all aspects of politics and international affairs, he was especially absorbed by their geopolitical interpretations. He was influential in forging the link between Germany and Turkey that brought the latter country into the war of 1914 on the side of the Central Powers. Thereafter he was founder and President of the *Hochschule für Politik* until 1933. Refusing to bend his intellect to the service of a totalitarian state, he then fled to England with a price on his head. There he carried on his studies and political and editorial activities until summoned to Columbia by President Butler in 1940.

Professor Jackh was dedicated to a democratic Germany. He had faith in the Weimar Republic and labored in its behalf. During World War II and after, he was a strong advocate of the democratization of Germany according to the British pattern.

Dr. Jackh was the author of more than twenty-one books and of over two hundred pamphlets and brochures. Among his more important books are: *The War for Man's Soul* (1945); *The Rising Crescent* (1944); *Amerika und Wir* (1951); *Der goldene Pflug* (1954), the first volume of his autobiography; and *Weltstaat,* the second volume of his autobiography to be published in 1960. During the course of his long life, he also edited many important journals.

Dedicated to the reconciliation of theory and practice, Dr. Jackh was a distinguished examplar of that combination of scholar, doer and publicist in which Europe is perhaps more rich than the United States. He was friend and advisor to many eminent men, among them Kaiser Wilhelm II, Chancellor Adenauer, Ataturk and President Theodor Heuss. In his quiet way, he was able to influence the course of men and states. For this he received more honors than can be enumerated here. Let it be recorded only that among them was the honorary citizenship of his birthplace.

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